Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Austin

• Decision Date: 30 September 2009
• Docket Number: 1061505.
• Citation: 34 So.3d 1238
• Parties: NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANYv.Walter George AUSTIN and Charlene Austin.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

34 So.3d 1238

NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANYv.Walter George AUSTIN and Charlene Austin.

1061505.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Sept. 30, 2009.

[34 So.3d 1238 1239]

Kori L. Clement of Hare, Clement & Duck, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.

Robert C. Gammons and Joshua B. White of Stephens, Millirons, Harrison & Gammons, P.C., Huntsville, for appellee.

MURDOCK, Justice.

Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (“Nationwide”) appeals from an order of the Madison Circuit Court denying Nationwide's motion to show satisfaction of the judgment and granting Walter George Austin and Charlene Austin's motion for taxation of additional costs following a judgment in favor of the Austins. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On May 18, 2004, the Austins' vehicle was involved in an accident with a vehicle driven by Stephen Anthony Horton. The Austins suffered injuries as a result of this accident, and they filed a complaint in the Madison Circuit Court alleging negligence against Horton and seeking uninsured-motorist (“UM”) benefits ¹ from Nationwide and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), the Austins' automobile insurance carriers.

The Austins' automobile-insurance policy with Nationwide (“the policy”) provided UM coverage. The policy also provided medical-payment coverage. The portion of the policy providing UM coverage contained a section entitled “Limits and Conditions of Payment.” In that section, the policy stated, in pertinent part:

“4. Damages payable [for UM coverage] will be reduced by any amount paid or payable under:

“a) the Medical Payments coverage in this policy.”

[34 So.3d 1238 1240]

Following discovery, both State Farm and Nationwide filed motions, which the trial court granted, to opt out of the trial pursuant to the procedure provided by this Court in Lowe v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 521 So.2d 1309 (Ala.1988).² As contemplated in Lowe, Nationwide remained a party defendant to the Austins' action.³

At the conclusion of the trial on May 2, 2007, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the Austins and assessed damages in the amount of $130,000 for Walter Austin and $60,000 for Charlene Austin. Based on that verdict, the trial court entered a judgment on the same date and for the same amounts against both Horton and Nationwide. On May 15, 2007, the Austins filed a motion for taxation of additional costs. The Austins requested, pursuant to § 12-21-144, Ala.Code 1975,⁴ the taxation as costs of the amounts paid to a court-reporting service for transcripts and videotapes of two depositions of treating physicians that the Austins had offered as evidence during the trial. Nationwide did not file an objection of any kind to this motion.

On May 29, 2007, Nationwide tendered to Walter Austin $95,369.07, and tendered to Charlene Austin $31,736.71. The Austins refused to acknowledge these payments as payment in full for the judgment, and, as a result, Nationwide filed what it styled as a motion to show satisfaction of the judgment. Nationwide asserted in its motion that, pursuant to the terms of the policy, it was entitled to a setoff of the medical payments it had previously tendered to the Austins against the final judgment awarded. Nationwide had previously made payments to the Austins under the medical-payments provision of the policy in the amounts of $14,630.93 to Walter Austin and $11,201.29 to Charlene Austin. ⁵

The trial court held a hearing on the Austins' motion for taxation of additional

[34 So.3d 1238 1241]

costs and Nationwide's motion for satisfaction of the judgment. On June 20, 2007, the trial court issued an order granting the Austins' motion and denying Nationwide's motion.

With regard to the taxation of additional costs, the trial court found that the Austins had “properly established the actual cost of each deposition and that said depositions were introduced during the course of the trial.” It therefore concluded, pursuant to § 12-21-144, Ala.Code 1975, that “the cost of such depositions should be taxed as additional costs in this case” in the amount of $903.83 against all the named defendants.

Concerning Nationwide's motion for satisfaction of the judgment, the trial court concluded that Nationwide's election to opt out of the litigation bound it to the amount of damages awarded in the final judgment and that the medical-payments setoff provision of the policy would limit the recovery allotted to the Austins in the final judgment in a manner contrary to the public policy of § 32-7-23, Ala.Code 1975,⁶ which requires automobile insurance companies selling automobile-liability policies in Alabama to provide UM coverage in their policies.

Nationwide appeals from the trial court's June 20, 2007, order, objecting to both the taxing of additional costs and the denial of Nationwide's motion for satisfaction of the judgment. In the alternative, Nationwide states that it appeals the May 2, 2007, order of the trial court memorializing the jury verdict in favor of the Austins. Nationwide offers no arguments on appeal, however, concerning the May 2, 2007, order; accordingly, it has waived any objection to that order.

II. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on taxation of costs under § 12-21-144, Ala.Code 1975, to determine whether the trial court exceeded its discretion. See Vulcan Oil Co. v. Gorman, 434 So.2d 760, 762 (Ala.1983) (stating that “the taxation of costs ... rests in the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed unless clear abuse is shown”).

Although not styled as such, Nationwide's postjudgment motion for relief from the judgment on the ground that the judgment had been satisfied is properly considered a motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5), Ala. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(5) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment if the circumstances presented fall within one of three categories, namely: “[i] the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or [ii] a prior judgment upon which it is based has been revered or otherwise vacated, or [iii] it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” Nationwide's motion for relief on the basis of a satisfaction of the judgment falls within the first of these three categories.

As has been recognized in cases such as

[34 So.3d 1238 1242]

Satterfield v. Winston Industries, Inc., 553 So.2d 61, 63 (Ala.1989), whether the circumstances warrant relief to a movant under Rule 60(b)(5) can involve the “discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be reversed unless there [is] an abuse of that discretion.” As the Court in Satterfield noted, however, “[t]hat portion of Rule 60(b)(5) relied on by Satterfield applies only when new facts or new law arises after the original judgment is entered, rendering prospective application of the judgment inequitable.” 553 So.2d at 63. The application of an abuse-of-discretion standard in cases such as Satterfield is consistent with the nature of the issue presented and the relief sought. As one court has explained in reference to motions for relief of the nature provided by Rule 60(b),

“[i]f there is a discretionary appraisal or weighing by the [trial] court of the facts of a particular case, the [trial] court's determination on appeal is subject to abuse or misuse of discretion. Here, the standard of review is the standard abuse of discretion test.”

In re Marriage of Barnes 251 Mont. 334, 336, 825 P.2d 201, 203 (1992).

Our cases recognize that where relief is sought under a different provision of Rule 60(b)-Rule 60(b)(4)-a de novo standard of review is applied. This is so because the issue of jurisdiction raised in a Rule 60(b)(4) motion is a purely legal one. Thus it was that the Court in Satterfield was able to contradistinguish the alternative relief sought under Rule 60(b)(4) in that case from the relief also sought in that case under the above-referenced portion of Rule 60(b)(5):

“The standard of review on appeal from the denial of relief under Rule 60(b)(4) is not whether there has been an abuse of discretion. When the grant or denial of relief turns on the validity of the judgment, as under Rule 60(b)(4), discretion has no place. If the judgment is valid, it must stand; if it is void, it must be set aside.”

553 So.2d at 64. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit explained in Sloss Industries Corp. v. Eurisol, 488 F.3d 922, 925 (11th Cir.2007): “We review de novo ... a district court's ruling upon a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside a judgment as void because the question of the validity of a judgment is a legal one.” (Emphasis added). See

Export Group v. Reef Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir.1995) ( “Ordinarily, motions for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) are addressed to the sound discretion of the district court and will not be reversed absent some abuse of discretion.... We review de novo, however, a district court's ruling upon a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to set aside a judgment as void because the question of the validity of a judgment is a legal one.”) (emphasis added).

As the Supreme Court of Montana explained in Essex Insurance Co. v. Moose's Saloon, Inc. 338 Mont. 423, 428-29, 166 P.3d 451, 455-56 (2007):

“Our standard of review of a [trial] court's ruling on a motion pursuant to [Rule] Civ. P. 60(b) depends on the nature of the final judgment, order, or proceeding from which relief is sought and the specific basis of the Rule 60(b) motion .... As a general rule, the [trial] court's ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion.... By contrast, where the movant sought relief under subsection (4) of Rule 60(b) on the ground that the judgment is void, the standard of review is de novo since the determination that a judgment is or is not void is a conclusion of law. Export Group [ v. Reef Indus., Inc.], 54 F.3d [1466] at 1469 [ (9th Cir.1995) ] (‘We review de novo ... a

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