Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rockford Commercial Warehouse, Inc., 2:18-cv-01458-RJC

• Decision Date: 28 April 2020
• Docket Number: 2:18-cv-01458-RJC
• Parties: NATIONWIDE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., as subrogee of, Gregory Beaver d/b/a/ Beaver's Tire Service, and GREGORY BEAVER, d/b/a/ Beaver's Tire Center, Plaintiffs, v. ROCKFORD COMMERCIAL WAREHOUSE, INC. d/b/a ROCKFORD CONSUMER PRODUCTS, CARKU TECHNOLOGY, LLC, and SHENZHEN CARKU TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

NATIONWIDE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE CO.,as subrogee of, Gregory Beaver d/b/a/ Beaver's Tire Service, and GREGORY BEAVER,d/b/a/ Beaver's Tire Center, Plaintiffs, v. ROCKFORD COMMERCIAL WAREHOUSE, INC.d/b/a ROCKFORD CONSUMER PRODUCTS, CARKU TECHNOLOGY, LLC,and SHENZHEN CARKU TECHNOLOGY CO., LTD., Defendants

2:18-cv-01458-RJC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

April 28, 2020

Judge Robert J. Colville

OPINION

Robert J. Colville, United States District Court Judge

Before the Court are Renewed Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (ECF Nos. 41 and 46) filed by Defendant Rockford Commercial Warehouse, Inc. ("Rockford") and Defendant Shenzhen Carku Technology Co. Ltd. ("Shenzhen Carku"). In response to these Motions, Plaintiffs seek transfer of this action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which they assert has personal jurisdiction over all Defendants. Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' Renewed Mot. to Dismiss 3, ECF No. 48. This matter has been fully briefed and is now ripe for consideration.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History

This action arises out of a fire that occurred at Plaintiff Gregory Beaver's automotive repair shop, Beaver's Tire Service, located at 8465 State Route 22, New Alexandria, Pennsylvania. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 18, ECF No. 4. At all material times, Plaintiff Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance insured Beaver's Tire Service. Id. at ¶14. Plaintiffs Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance and Gregory Beaver (collectively, "Plaintiffs") allege that the fire at issue was caused by a jump starter (the "Jump Starter"), and specifically a Rockford Consumer Products Pocket Power Jump Starter Model No.: RFDPPJS2976DLX. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 19, ECF No. 4. Plaintiffs allege that the Jump Starter was manufactured, designed, distributed, marketed, sold, and/or assembled by Defendants Rockford, Shenzhen Carku, and/or Carku Technology, LLC ("Carku, LLC"). Am. Compl. ¶ 17, ECF No. 4. Plaintiffs have clarified their allegations in stating that discovery has revealed that the Jump Starter was manufactured by Shenzhen Carku, and was shipped to and then distributed by Rockford. Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' Renewed Mot. to Dismiss 2, ECF No. 48. Plaintiffs aver that the Jump Starter was defective and dangerous, and assert claims against Defendants sounding in negligence and strict liability. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25-36.

Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4) on November 13, 2018. Rockford filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (ECF No. 11) on December 14, 2018, and Shenzhen Carku filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (ECF No. 19) on April 15, 2019. Rockford and Shenzhen Carku also previously filed materially similar Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (ECF Nos. 27 and 32).¹ In response to these Motions,Plaintiffs requested an opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery, and alternately moved for transfer of this action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Pls.' Resp. to Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 35. On July 18, 2019, the Court denied Defendants' Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 27 and 32) without prejudice, and granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery. Order, ECF No. 37.

Following the period of jurisdictional discovery permitted by the Court's July 18, 2019 Order (ECF No. 37), Rockford and Shenzhen Carku each filed a Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (ECF Nos. 41 and 46). Rockford and Shenzhen Carku argue that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over any Defendant in this matter. Plaintiffs filed a "Response to Defendants' Renewed Motions to Dismiss, and Plaintiffs' Request to Transfer this Matter to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois" (ECF No. 48) on November 19, 2019. Plaintiffs oppose dismissal of this action, but do not advance any argument as to why this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Rather, Plaintiffs renew their request that this Court transfer this matter to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which Plaintiffs assert has personal jurisdiction over all Defendants. Rockford filed a Reply in Support of its Renewed Motion (ECF No. 49) on November 22, 2019. Rockford does not oppose transfer to the Northern District of Illinois, but argues that any such transfer may only be effected pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Rockford's Reply in Supp. 1, ECF No. 49. Shenzhen Carku filed a Reply in Support of its Renewed Motion on November 25, 2019. Shenzhen Carku opposes transfer to the Northern District of Illinois, and argues that the UnitedStates District Court for the Northern District of Illinois does not have personal jurisdiction over Shenzhen Carku. Reply in Supp. 1-3, ECF No. 50.

II. Legal Standard

"[I]n reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2), we 'must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true and construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff.'" Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Carteret Sav. Bank, F.A. v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 n. 1 (3d Cir.1992)). Once a defendant has properly raised a jurisdictional defense, however, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving, either by sworn affidavits or other competent evidence, sufficient contacts with the forum state to establish personal jurisdiction. North Penn Gas Co. v. Corning Natural Gas Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir.1990) (per curiam). "[W]hen the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction and the plaintiff is entitled to have its allegations taken as true and all factual disputes drawn in its favor." Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002)).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, district courts are authorized to exercise personal jurisdiction over non-residents to the extent permissible under the law of the state in which the district court is located. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); North Penn Gas Co. v. Corning Nat. Gas Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir. 1990). In exercising personal jurisdiction, the court must first ascertain whether jurisdiction exists under the forum state's long-arm jurisdiction statute and then determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481, 489-90 (3d Cir.1985). This inquiry has been collapsed in Pennsylvania, as the Pennsylvanialong-arm statute provides that: "the jurisdiction of the tribunals of this Commonwealth shall extend to all persons . . . to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States and may be based on the most minimum contact with this Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322(b); Van Buskirk, 760 F.2d at 490. The reach of the Pennsylvania long-arm statute is thus "coextensive" with the due process clause. North Penn Gas, 897 F.2d at 690. The due process clause permits the court to assert personal jurisdictional over a nonresident defendant who has "certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of [a] suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quotations omitted).

III. Discussion

Initially, Plaintiffs have seemingly abandoned any argument that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any Defendant in this matter. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Renewed Motions to Dismiss, and Plaintiffs' Request to Transfer this Matter to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (ECF No. 48) advances no argument and introduces no evidence to support this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over any Defendant, but rather opines that Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the Northern District of Illinois. Because Rockford and Shenzhen Carku have raised jurisdictional defenses, Plaintiffs' bear the burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. North Penn Gas Co. v. Corning Natural Gas Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 689 (3d Cir.1990) (per curiam). In requesting to conduct jurisdictional discovery, Plaintiffs explained:

Here, whether there is specific jurisdiction over the defendants will depend on their business activities relating to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Specifically, those activities that caused and/or allowed the jump starter to be shipped to and sold in Pennsylvania. This will involve discovery of the bills of lading, purchase orders, invoices, dealings, marketing materials, and contracts with any third party distributors and/or purchasers doing business with the defendants.

This type of discovery will be narrowly tailored and will reveal whether the defendants were aware their product was being shipped to and sold in Pennsylvania, whether they sought to do business in Pennsylvania, and whether they purposefully availed themselves of Pennsylvania and its marketplace.

Pls.' Resp. to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, and Pls' Req. for Limited Jurisdictional Disc. 4, ECF No. 35. Following the period of discovery permitted by Court Order (ECF No. 37), Plaintiffs have advanced no argument as to why this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants, and instead request a transfer. Such can be considered a concession that the jurisdictional discovery at issue does not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction by this Court.² In any event, for the reasons discussed below, this Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established a prima facie case that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any Defendant in the present matter.

A. Personal Jurisdiction in...