Natkow v. Natkow
| Decision Date | 01 May 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 88933,88933 |
| Citation | 696 So.2d 315 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly S230 Neil Alan NATKOW, Petitioner, v. Adrienne Beth NATKOW, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Paul Morris of the Law Offices of Paul Morris, P.A., Coral Gables, and Gerald I. Kornreich, Miami, for Petitioner.
Arthur J. Morburger, Miami, and Alvin N. Weinstein of Weinstein, Bavly & Moon, P.A., Miami, for Respondent.
We have for review Natkow v. Natkow, 677 So.2d 339 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), which expressly and directly conflicts with this Court's opinions in Mendez-Perez v. Perez-Perez, 656 So.2d 458 (Fla.1995), and Cerniglia v. Cerniglia, 679 So.2d 1160 (Fla.1996), on the issue of the retroactive application of amended Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
A judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered on November 16, 1992, for Adrienne Beth Natkow (wife) and Neil Alan Natkow (husband). At that time, Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) provided a one-year limitation to file motions seeking relief from judgment, including those based on fraud. On January 1, 1993, a new rule became effective which removed the one-year limitation for filing a motion under the rule based on fraudulent financial affidavits in marital cases. See In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of Civil Procedure, 604 So.2d 1110 (Fla.1992). On January 17, 1994, the wife filed a motion for relief under rule 1.540(b), claiming that the husband's financial affidavit filed during the dissolution of marriage proceeding was fraudulent. The husband moved to dismiss the wife's motion as untimely because filed beyond the one-year limit provided by the rule in effect at the time of the final judgment. The general master recommended dismissal, finding that this Court's decision in Mendez-Perez barred retroactive application of the January 1, 1993, amendment. The circuit judge agreed and dismissed the wife's motion as untimely.
On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed and applied the 1993 amendment to the parties' 1992 judgment. Natkow, 677 So.2d at 339. The district court stated that an "alarm clock" was set by rule 1.540(b) that would have gone off in November 1993, but the "timekeepers' " adoption of the rule change dismantled the alarm clock's machinery so that there would be no alarm after January 1, 1993. Id. at 340. Thus, the district court concluded that the January 1994 filing was not time barred. Id. Writing in dissent, Judge Green stated that this Court had not created any such retroactive "window period" when it amended rule 1.540(b) and that the Court had disposed of Mendez-Perez with a simple "rule in effect" analysis. Id. at 342 (Green, J., dissenting). While Judge Green would have certified the issue as a question to this Court, the panel did not do so. Instead the husband petitioned this Court to accept jurisdiction based upon conflict with Mendez-Perez and Cerniglia on the issue of the retroactive application of the amended rule of procedure.
The question certified to this Court and answered in the negative in Mendez-Perez was whether the amended rule 1.540(b), which was effective January 1, 1993, could be retroactively applied to a final judgment of dissolution of marriage entered July 20, 1990, where the motion for relief from judgment alleged financial affidavit fraud and was filed more than one year after the judgment was entered. 656 So.2d at 458. Thus, Mendez-Perez involved circumstances where the one-year time limit had already expired before the Court promulgated the rule change and before the rule took effect. Cerniglia, which cited Mendez-Perez for the proposition that the rule change was not applicable retroactively, also involved similar circumstances in that the judgment of dissolution was final in July 1990 and the motion for relief from judgment was not filed until 1993. 679 So.2d at 1161-62.
In contrast, final judgment in the instant case was entered after the rule was promulgated and the one-year time period had not run when the rule amendment took effect on January 1, 1993. Thus, the issue presented here is whether the rule amendment abolishing the one-year time limit for motions for relief from judgment based upon financial affidavit fraud applies in those cases where the final judgment was entered before the effective date of the rule amendment, but where the one-year time limit had not run at the time that the amendment took effect.
In Mendez-Perez, this Court concluded that "[u]nder the rule in effect when Mendez-Perez's divorce was final, she had one year to bring a motion under rule 1.540(b)." 656 So.2d at 460. In her dissenting opinion below, Judge Green characterized this Court's disposition of Mendez-Perez as a "simple 'rule in effect' an...
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Smith v. Smith
...apply to a case pending on appeal on the effective date of the rule. As authority for the ruling, the Fifth District cited Natkow v. Natkow, 696 So.2d 315 (Fla.1997).1 We are unable to reconcile the retroactivity discussion in Natkow and Reddell with the settled principle of law that proced......
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Nicoletti v. Nicoletti, 2D04-2356.
...467. Amendments to rules of procedure are prospective unless the language of the rule specifically provides otherwise. Natkow v. Natkow, 696 So.2d 315, 317 (Fla.1997). Neither the text of rule 12.525 nor the Florida Supreme Court's opinion adopting the rule states that it applies retroactiv......
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D'ANGELO v. D'ANGELO, 2D04-3689.
...v. Nicoletti, 902 So.2d 215 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citing Reddell v. Reddell, 900 So.2d 670, 672 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Natkow v. Natkow, 696 So.2d 315 (Fla.1997) (an amendment to a rule of procedure is prospective unless specifically provided ...
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Betts v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., 5D03-825.
...It noted that the plain language of the amendment setting a specific date for applicability was controlling. Similarly, in Natkow v. Natkow, 696 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1997), the high court reiterated that rules of procedure are prospective unless specifically provided otherwise, and that when it ......
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Applying New Fla. Settlement Proposal Rule To Pending Cases
...1679398, at *1, with In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 , 317 So. 3d 72, 77–78 (Fla. 2021). [4] Natkow v. Natkow, 696 So. 2d 315, 317 (Fla. 1997) (citing Mend ez-Perez v. Perez-Perez, 656 So. 2d 458, 460 (Fla. 1995); Pearlstein v. King, 610 So. 2d 445, 446 (Fla.1992))......