Natomas Unified Sch. Dist. v. Sacramento Cnty. Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 12 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | C093475 |
| Parties | NATOMAS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SACRAMENTO COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant and Appellant, I.O., a Minor, etc., Real Party in Interest and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Order Filed Date 1/17/23
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County No. 34-2019-8000-3194-CU-WM-GDS, Michael W. Jones, Judge. Reversed.
Teresa Stinson, Elizabeth Linton; Weintraub Tobin Chediak Coleman Grodin Law Corporation and Brendan J. Begley for Defendant and Appellant.
DLA Piper US, Stanley J. Panikowski, Gaspard Rappoport and Amanda McCaffrey for Former School District Superintendents as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael L. Newman, Assistant Attorney General, Srividya Panchalam, Benjamin T. Conway Carly J. Munson and Alexis M. Piazza, Deputy Attorneys General for the Attorney General of California as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.
C Athena Roussos; Mary M. Sechser for Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
Abigail Trillin, William S. Koski; Cynthia L. Rice, Reina Canale, Phyllis Shafton Katz; Nedra Shawler and Joyeta Basu for Youth &Education Law Project Stanford Law School, California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., and Legal Services for Children as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
Alexandra Santa Ana, Mona Tawatao; Stephanie Horwitz, Michael Harris; Victor Leung; Linnea Nelson, Brandon Greene; Jonathan Markovitz and Bardis Vakili for Equal Justice Society, National Center for Youth Law, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California and ACLU Foundation of San Diego &Imperial Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
Mary Louise Frampton as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
Orbach Huff &Henderson and Sarah L.W. Sutherland for Plaintiff and Respondent.
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on December 22, 2022, be modified as follows:
On page 24, the following footnote is added to the end of the first full paragraph, before part III of the Discussion:
In a petition for rehearing, the District argues it should have an opportunity to conduct a new hearing on I.O.'s proposed expulsion from his middle school-even though, at this point, I.O. has long since graduated from his middle school. The District argues a rehearing would be appropriate under section 48923, subdivision (a), which provides: But the District did more than exclude relevant and material evidence; it also failed to conduct the appropriate inquiry under section 48915. For that reason, we reject the District's reliance on section 48923, subdivision (a). (See § 48923, subd. (c) [].)
This modification does not change the judgment. Respondent's petition for rehearing is denied.
FOR THE COURT: ROBIE, Acting P.J., BOULWARE EURIE, J., HOCH, J. [*]
California law requires school districts to expel a student in a limited set of circumstances, including, for instance, when the student furnishes a firearm, brandishes a knife at another person, or possesses an explosive. State law also grants school districts discretion to expel a student if they make two findings. First, the school district must find the student committed one of several statutorily enumerated acts, including, as relevant here, that the student possessed a dangerous object or an imitation firearm. Second, the school district must find either (1) "[o]ther means of correction are not feasible or have repeatedly failed to bring about proper conduct" or (2) "[d]ue to the nature of the act [or violation], the presence of the pupil causes a continuing danger to the physical safety of the pupil or others." (Ed. Code,[1] § 48915, subd. (b); see id., subd. (e).)
In this case, Natomas Unified School District (the District) expelled a student, I.O., under its discretionary authority. At an expulsion hearing, the District heard evidence that I.O. brought two unloaded BB guns and a sealed bag of plastic BBs to his middle school, showed the guns to two friends, and fired one of the unloaded guns at the ground. The District also heard evidence that one of the friends who saw the guns feared testifying at the expulsion hearing because I.O. and his mother had asked the student's family to speak about I.O.'s character. Based on this evidence, the District found I.O. unlawfully intimidated a witness. It further found he should be expelled. It reasoned that he committed an expellable offense in possessing the BB guns and posed a continuing danger to himself or others-a conclusion it reached after preventing I.O. from presenting character witnesses and excluding his evidence tending to show his classmates did not believe he posed a danger.
On I.O.'s appeal from the trial court's judgment in the District's favor, we reverse for two reasons. First, we find the District's "continuing danger" finding was flawed. In the District's view, it could consider only I.O.'s immediate misconduct when evaluating whether he posed a continuing danger to himself or others. But under the relevant standard, the District should have considered all the relevant facts, including evidence of I.O.'s general character. Because the District misunderstood the appropriate inquiry, it improperly limited I.O.'s ability to present a defense and excluded relevant evidence. Second, we find the District's witness intimidation finding was flawed. To support a claim of witness intimidation in a school disciplinary proceeding, the evidence must show the student either intended to prevent another student from testifying or to retaliate against another student for testifying. But no evidence in this case shows I.O. had any improper intent. For these reasons, we reverse.
Children in California have a right to a public school education. (Levi v. O'Connell (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 700 707; see also Cal. Const., art IX, § 5 [].) But this right is not absolute. Section 48900 et seq. describes the grounds and procedures for expelling a student-the most serious form of student discipline. (See § 48925, subd. (b) [].)
Under these provisions, the expulsion process begins with a school's principal or a school district's superintendent recommending expulsion for one of the grounds listed in section 48900 et seq. (§§ 48900, 48915 subds. (a)(1), (b), (c), (e).) Three of these grounds, two of which are largely identical, are relevant here. First, a principal or superintendent generally must recommend a student's expulsion if the student possessed "any . . . dangerous object of no reasonable use to the pupil." (§ 48915, subd. (a)(1)(B).) Second, a principal or superintendent may recommend a student's expulsion if the student "[p]ossessed, sold, or otherwise furnished a . . . dangerous object" without school permission. (§ 48900, subd. (b).) And third, a principal or superintendent may recommend a student's expulsion if the student "[p]ossessed an imitation firearm" - meaning, "a replica of a firearm that is so substantially similar in physical properties to an existing firearm as to lead a reasonable person to conclude that the replica is a firearm." (Id., subd. (m).)
Should a principal or superintendent recommend a student's expulsion, the school district must then schedule a hearing on the proposed expulsion. (§ 48918, subd. (a)(1).) The district must also, at least 10 days before the hearing, notify the student of the time and place of the hearing (id., subd. (b)(1)), provide a "statement of the specific facts and charges upon which the proposed expulsion is based" (id., subd. (b)(2)), and, among other things, inform the student of the student's right "to confront and question all witnesses who testify at the hearing, to question all other evidence presented, and to present oral and documentary evidence on the pupil's behalf, including witnesses" (id., subd. (b)(5)).
Following a hearing on a student's proposed expulsion, the school district's governing board must decide whether to expel the student, with the required findings varying depending on the charges. (§ 48918, subd. (a)(2).) If a principal or superintendent recommends a student's expulsion for possessing a dangerous object (§§ 48915, subd (a)(1)(B), 48900, subd. (b)), the school district's governing board may order expulsion if it makes two findings. First, it must find the student committed the alleged act. Second, it must find "one or both of the following": (1) "[o]ther means of correction are not feasible or have repeatedly failed to bring about proper conduct," or (2) "[d]ue to the nature of the act, the presence of the pupil causes a continuing danger to the physical safety of the pupil or others." (§ 48915,...
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