Nauheim v. City of Topeka

• Decision Date: 02 September 2016
• Docket Number: No. 114,271,114,271
• Citation: 52 Kan.App.2d 969,381 P.3d 508
• Parties: Charles Nauheim d/b/a Kansas Fire and Safety Equipment, and Hal G. Richardson d/b/a Bueno Food Brand, Topeka Vinyl Top and Minuteman Solar Film, Appellants, v. City of Topeka, Kansas, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

52 Kan.App.2d 969

381 P.3d 508

Charles Nauheim d/b/a Kansas Fire and Safety Equipment, and Hal G. Richardson d/b/a Bueno Food Brand, Topeka Vinyl Top and Minuteman Solar Film, Appellants,

v.City of Topeka, Kansas, Appellee.

No. 114,271

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Opinion filed September 2, 2016

John R. Hamilton and David A. Brock, of Hamilton, Laughlin, Barker, Johnson & Jones, of Topeka, for appellants.

Shelly Starr, chief of litigation, assistant city attorney, for appellee.

Before Arnold–Burger, P.J., Schroeder, J., and Jeffrey E. Goering, District Judge, assigned.

Goering, J.

This case pertains to whether the City of Topeka (City) is required to pay relocation benefits pursuant to K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26–518 to two former tenants of properties purchased from their landlord by the City in connection with a drainage project. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the tenants failed to present evidence to establish (1) that they were “displaced persons” entitled to relocation expenses under the statute and (2) that the City's purchase of the land was “in advance of a condemnation action.” We find that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the City. We therefore reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts relevant to this appeal are straightforward. The tenants, Charles Nauheim and Hal Richardson, leased business property in Topeka from the James D. Henderson Living Trust (landlord). Nauheim and Richardson had been long term tenants of the landlord. In connection with a drainage project, the City approached the landlord seeking to purchase the property leased by the tenants. Negotiations between the City and the landlord commenced.

During negotiations, the City made clear its desire that the property be vacant prior to the City's acquisition of title. On July 31, 2013, the City's real estate officer, Robert Kennedy, emailed the landlord saying:

“The Deputy City Attorney is concerned that the lease will allow the tenant to stay beyond the 60–90 days and force the City to condemn their lease interest and force us to pay relocation expenses, etc. I know you are working on some kind of arrangement with them, so you may already have a resolution. But we will not be able to move forward until that lease interest is resolved.”

On August 16, 2013, the City's deputy attorney, Mary Feighny, emailed the landlord advising the landlord that the City did not want to have to exercise its eminent domain power to purchase the leasehold interest of a different tenant's business should that tenant refuse to relocate. On October 24, 2013, Kennedy again emailed the landlord advising, “I suppose, if we do not close this transaction, that the City will then have to condemn to get these properties. That is not a sure thing, as City management has been very reluctant to use condemnation [as] the City Council is not happy to see that going on.”

Jennifer Harrell was the project engineer for the City during this time frame. Kennedy negotiated the purchase of the property under her direction. According to Harrell, acquisition of the landlord's property was contingent upon it being vacant at the time of closing.

Ultimately, the City was able to acquire the property from the landlord without exercising its power of eminent domain. The tenants were required to relocate. No federal funds were used to pay for any part of the drainage project.

The tenants filed suit against the City to recover, pursuant to K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26–518, relocation expenses they incurred when the landlord cancelled their leases on the subject property. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The district court entered summary judgment on behalf of the City, finding that the tenants failed to establish two key prerequisites for the recovery of relocation expenses under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26–518. First, the district court determined that the tenants were not “displaced persons” within the meaning of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26–518. Second, the district court found that the City did not acquire the subject property “through negotiations in advance of a condemnation action.” The tenants challenge both of these legal conclusions in their timely appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review is well settled. Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits or declarations show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60–256(c)(2).

“The trial court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. When opposing a motion for summary judgment, an adverse party must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact. In order to preclude summary judgment, the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case. On appeal, we apply the same rules and where we find reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment must be denied. [Citations omitted.]” Shamberg, Johnson & Bergman, Chtd. v. Oliver , 289 Kan. 891, 900, 220 P.3d 333 (2009).

Where the material facts are uncontroverted, as they are in this case, our review to determine whether summary judgment is proper as a matter of law is unlimited.

Stro da v. Joice Holdings , 288 Kan. 718, 720, 207 P.3d 223 (2009) (when material facts are undisputed, appellate review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is de novo). With this standard of review in mind, we now consider the issues raised by the tenants in the order they are presented.

ANALYSIS

Are the tenants “displaced persons” within the meaning of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26–518 ?

In their first issue on appeal, the tenants argue that the district court committed error in concluding as a matter of law that neither of them were a “displaced person” under K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 25–518. This is an issue of first impression in Kansas.

K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26–518(a) states:

“Whenever federal funding is not involved, and real property is acquired by any condemning authority through negotiation in advance of a condemnation action or through a condemnation action, and which acquisition will result in the displacement of any person, the condemning authority shall:

“(a) Provide the displaced person, as defined in the federal uniform relocation assistance and real property acquisition policies act of 1970, fair and reasonable relocation payments and assistance to or for displaced persons.”

The term “displaced person” is defined in the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4601 (2012) as follows:

“(6)(A): The term ‘displaced person’ means ...:

“(i) any person who moves from real property, or moves his personal property from real property—

(I) as a direct result of a written notice of intent to acquire or the acquisition of such real property in whole or in part for a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance; or

(II) on which such person is a residential tenant or conducts a small business, a farm operation, or a business defined in paragraph (7)(D), as a direct result of rehabilitation, demolition, or such other displacing activity as the lead agency may prescribe, under a program or project undertaken by a Federal agency or with Federal financial assistance in any case in which the head of the displacing agency determines that such displacement is permanent.” (Emphasis added.)

The parties agree that the relevant question here is whether, as a matter of law, the tenants are “displaced persons” in that their relocations were a “direct result” of the City acquiring their landlord's properties at issue. As expected, the parties disagree on the answer to that question. Resolution of this issue requires the interpretation of K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 26–518, which is a question of law subject to unlimited review on appeal. O'Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. , 294 Kan. 318, 331, 277 P.3d 1062 (2012). The rules of statutory interpretation are well known:

“When a statute is plain and unambiguous, we must give effect to its express language, rather than determine what the law should or should not be. We will not speculate on the legislative intent and will not read the statute to add something not readily found in it. If the statute's language is clear, there is no need to resort to statutory construction. [Citations omitted.]” Graham v. Dokter Trucking Group , 284 Kan. 547, 554, 161 P.3d 695 (2007).

The City's position on this issue, and ultimately the position taken by the district court, was that the tenants were not forced to relocate from the subject property as a direct result of the acquisition of that property by the City, but rather as the result of their dealings with the landlord. In the view of the City and the district court, the tenants' relocation from the subject property was an indirect consequence of the City's acquisition of the subject property. We disagree.

The uncontroverted facts in this case establish that the City's acquisition of the subject property was contingent upon the property being vacant at the time of closing. This condition precedent for the acquisition of the property was established by the City, not the landlord. Stated another way, the City was only a willing purchaser of the subject property if the property was vacant. There was no other reason for the landlord to force the tenants to relocate from the property other than the fact that it was a necessary prerequisite for the sale of the property to the City. To suggest that the tenants' relocation from the subject property under such circumstances was an indirect result of the City's...