Nava v. Velardi
| Decision Date | 09 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 15cv1156-AJB(BLM) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | FABIAN NAVA, Plaintiff, v. P. VELARDI, J. SILVA M.D., AVELINO CANLAS, M.D., M. MELLON, M.D., ROGELIO ORTEGA, S. ROBERTS, KYLE SEELEY, J. WALKER, CLIFFTON, NURSE PAMELA VELARDI, ROBERT WALKER, AND DAVID CLIFTON, Defendants. |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST TO REOPEN DISCOVERY
This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Anthony J. Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(c) and 72.3(f) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the following reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.
On May 21, 2015, Plaintiff Fabian Nava, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants P. Velardi (nurse practitioner), J. Silva (medical doctor), Avelino Canlas (medical doctor), M. Mellon (medical doctor), Rogelio Ortega (medical doctor), S. Roberts (medical doctor), K. Seeley (Chief Medical Officer), J. Walker (medical doctor/administrator), and David Cliffton (physical therapist). ECF No. 1 ("Comp."). Plaintiff alleged claims under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 5-11. On March 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") against the same Defendants.1 ECF No. 13. Plaintiff again alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated as Defendants' failure to provide adequate medical care constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff further alleges that his First Amendment rights were violated as Defendants retaliated against him for pursuing his Eighth Amendment claims and Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights. Id. at 7-8.
On September 9, 2016, Defendants Silva, Ortega, Seeley, and Walker filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's FAC for failure to state a claim for relief. ECF No. 28. Plaintiff opposed the motion. ECF No. 35. On January 11, 2017, the Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. ECF No. 37. Specifically, the Court granted Defendant Ortega's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims, denied Defendants Silva, Seeley, and Walker's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims, denied Defendants Silva, Seeley, and Ortega's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation claims, and granted Defendant Walker's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's retaliation claims. Id. at 13. The Court also ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the claims against "Defendants Velardi, Canlas, Mellon, S. Roberts, J. Walker and Clifton should not be dismissed." Id. at 14. On April 24, 2017, the Court dismissed without prejudice Defendants Velardi, Canlas, Mellon, J. Walker, and Clifton due to Plaintiff's failure to show cause why the claims against them should not be dismissed. ECF No. 53.
On January 20, 2017, Defendants Silva, Ortega, Seeley, and Walker answered Plaintiff's FAC. ECF No. 38. On February 8, 2017, Defendant S. Roberts answered Plaintiff's FAC. ECF No. 43.
On December 18, 2017, Defendants Ortega, Roberts, Seeley, Silva, and Walker filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, (2) there are no genuine issues of material facts that could support a finding that Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights, (3) there is no evidence of retaliation, (4) there is no evidence to support a conspiracy claim, and (5) Defendants are immune from suit for monetary and punitive damages in their official capacities. ECF No. 58-2 ("MSJ"). On December 20, 2017, the Court issued a "Klingele/Rand Notice and Scheduling Order Re Defendants' Summary Judgment Motion" in which the Court advised Plaintiff of the requirements for opposing Defendants' summary judgment motion and set a briefing schedule for the MSJ. ECF No. 59. On March 28, 2018, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the MSJ. ECF No. 65. Defendants replied on April 9, 2018. ECF No. 66.
When a plaintiff appears pro se, the court must be careful to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). This rule of liberal construction is "particularly important" in civil rights cases. Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) .
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is proper.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the opposing party to provide admissible evidence beyond the pleadings to show that summary judgment is not appropriate. Id. at 322-24. The opposing party "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256 (citation omitted).
A court may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on a motion for summary judgment; rather, the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255. If direct evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with direct evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the judge must assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving party with respect to that fact. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1987)).
42 United States Code Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 327 (1986). A person acting under the color of law deprives another "of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, 'if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].'" Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). "The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation." Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff raises four claims for relief. FAC. First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violatedhis Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when they failed to properly treat his medical conditions. Id. at 17. Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when they failed to provide him with proper medication to manage his pain. Id. Third, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for filing various grievances related to his medical care. Id. at 18. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired against Plaintiff to violate his First Amendment rights. Id.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief preventing Defendants from (1) obtaining ACA accreditation, (2) future reprisals against Plaintiff, (3) denying adequate medical treatment or medication due to costs, and (4) forcing Plaintiff to endure severe pain as a result of incorrect footwear, $900,000 in compensatory damages, $900,000 in punitive damages, and an order requiring Defendants to promptly provide "proper orthotic boots, and pain medication as outlined in Defendants' own guidelines," the costs of preparing and filing the instant matter, and any other relief the Court deems appropriate. FAC at 10, 18-19.
Initially, Plaintiff requests that the Court defer its ruling on the motion for summary judgment so that he may conduct additional discovery to "contradict Defendants' facts relied upon [] and as a basis for denial of the motion." Oppo. at 14. Defendants reply that (1) the period for discovery is closed, (2) Plaintiff chose not to conduct any discovery during the appropriate time period, (3) Plaintiff was not diligent, (4) Plaintiff does not identify what discovery he intends to conduct or how, and (5) granting Plaintiff's request would be prejudicial to Defendants. Reply at 5.
Fact discovery closed in this matter on July 21, 2017. ECF No. 39 at 2. Expert discovery closed on November 17, 2017. Id.
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