Navarro-Ayala v. Governor of Puerto Rico

• Decision Date: 12 May 2016
• Docket Number: Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)
• Parties: Roberto Navarro-Ayala, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Governor of Puerto Rico, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

186 F.Supp.3d 128

Roberto Navarro-Ayala, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Governor of Puerto Rico, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 74-1301 (FAB)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed May 12, 2016

Manuel A. Rodriguez-Banchs, Rodriguez Banchs, CSP, Rafael E. Rodriguez-Rivera, Carlos V. Garcia-Gutierrez, Civil Action and Education Corporation, Judith Berkan, Berkan & Mendez, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Beatriz Annexy-Guevara, Department of Justice, Carlos Del-Valle-Cruz, Del Valle Law, Eduardo A. Vera-Ramirez, Eileen Landron-Guardiola, Landron & Vera LLC, Janitza M. Garcia-Marrero, Baerga & Quintana Law Office, San Juan, PR, Arlene R. Perez-Borrero, Perez Borrero & Associates Law Office, PSC, Luquillo, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge

In 1974, Roberto Navarro-Ayala ("Navarro"), represented by his mother, filed this civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of himself and other patients of the Rio Piedras Psychiatric Hospital ("RPPH") claiming that the conditions and care provided by RPPH were insufficient in violation of the patients' rights pursuant to the United States Constitution. (Docket Nos. 0 at pp. 2-3; 594 at p. 3.) Defendants are the governor of Puerto Rico, the secretary and assistant secretary of the Puerto Rico Department of Health, the director of RPPH, and their successors (collectively "the Commonwealth"). (Docket No. 0 at p. 2.)

On June 8, 2015, the Court appointed attorney Judith Berkan to represent the San Patricio Community Support Group (in Spanish, Grupo de Apoyo Comunitario San Patricio) ("Grupo"),¹ (Docket No. 630), and ordered the Commonwealth to pay her interim attorney's fees for work performed on behalf of Grupo, a prevailing party, (Docket No. 673). Before the Court is defendants' motion for reconsideration of the Court's order approving attorney's fees, (Docket No. 678), which Grupo opposes, (Docket No. 680). For the following reasons, defendants' motion for reconsideration is DENIED .

Procedural History

Navarro filed suit on November 25, 1974. (Docket No. 0 at p. 2.) Between 1974-1977, the Court held several hearings which resulted in the Court accepting the parties' joint stipulation on June 3, 1977. See Docket No. 0 at pp. 3-5. The Court monitored and ensured the Commonwealth's compliance with the joint stipulation through reports from Court-appointed Monitor, Professor David Helfeld, and additional Court orders, with special attention paid to the deinstitutionalization of RPPH. See Docket 0 at pp. 9-35. In the early 1990s, several appeals were taken to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Navarro – Ayala v. Hernandez – Colon, 3 F.3d 464 (1st Cir.1993) ; Navarro – Ayala v. Nuñez, 968 F.2d 1421 (1st Cir.1992) ; Navarro – Ayala v. Hernandez – Colon, 951 F.2d 1325 (1st Cir.1991) (" Navarro I"). In Navarro I, the First Circuit Court of Appeals found that this suit was a class action even though it had not been certified as one because it "was instituted by a complaint seeking class relief, implicitly granted class relief, and was conducted for years as a de facto class action." Navarro I, 951 F.2d at 1334. The First Circuit Court of Appeals defined the class as "all persons who were patients when suit was brought and all persons who may in the future receive treatment or habilitation at [RPPH]." Id. at 1337.

In 1996, the Court ordered acceptance of the "Plan for aSystem [sic] of Mental and Health Treatment/Rehabilitation Services" ("the 1996 Rehabilitation Plan"). (Docket No. 0 at p. 33.) In 1997, following discussions regarding the 1977 consent decree, the Court noted that the Commonwealth had made significant improvement in patient care at RPPH in compliance with the 1977 consent decree and returned $95,000 in fines previously assessed to the Commonwealth. (Docket Nos. 425; 432; 439; 443; 594 at p. 4; 604 at p. 2.) Such progress had been made by 1999 that RPPH achieved accreditation by Medicare and a nation-wide health care commission. (Docket No. 604 at p. 2.)

In March 2000, the Court approved a joint stipulation and ordered that all money RPPH received from Medicare was to be used for operating the facility. (Docket No. 476.) In August 2000, the Court approved a second joint stipulation dismissing the case under specified conditions, including continued accreditation and a yearly budget of at least $18,929,000 for patient care at RPPH. (Docket Nos. 494; 604 at p. 2.) In 2002, the Court approved another joint stipulation, which dismissed the case but kept in place the Court's March 2000 and August 2000 orders. (Docket No. 503.)

In 2003, the Court opened an investigation and reappointed Professor Helfeld as the Monitor in response to a letter from employees of San Patricio Mental Health Center ("SPMHC") alleging deficiencies in patient care at that facility, with special emphasis on RPPH's budget and SPMHC's continued existence as a public institution. (Docket No. 508 at pp. 1-2.) Following five reports by the monitor, the Court concluded its investigation finding the Commonwealth in "substantial compliance with the consent decree and the January 28, 2002 order." (Docket No. 604 at pp. 3-4.) The Court noted that the budget allowance and usage at RPPH would exceed the required $18,929,000 and that outpatient services at SPMHC would not be closed or privatized.² Id. The Court also instructed the Commonwealth to ensure continued accreditation, to continue providing outpatient services at SPMHC, and to increase RPPH's annual budget to $23,000,000. Id. at pp. 4–5.

Again in 2013, the Court received a letter from mental health staff members alleging violations by the Commonwealth, specifically understaffing, an insufficient budget, and a possible loss of accreditation. (Docket No. 606 at pp. 1-2.) On September 26, 2014, Grupo moved to reopen the case, complaining of understaffing and threats of closing SPMHC. (Docket No. 608.) In response, the Court has reopened the case, (Docket No. 631), appointed Daniel E. Wathen as the monitor, (Docket No. 657), and held several hearings regarding the alleged violations, (Docket Nos. 622; 647; 656). Additionally, the Court appointed attorney Judith Berkan ("Berkan"), a civil rights attorney with forty years of experience, (Docket No. 668 at p. 2), to represent plaintiff Grupo, (Docket No. 630), and ordered the Commonwealth to pay her attorney's fees, (Docket No. 673). The Commonwealth did not oppose Grupo's original motion for payment of attorney's fees, (Docket No. 668), but now seeks reconsideration of the Court's order for payment, (Docket No. 678).

Legal Standard for Motions for Reconsideration

"The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically provide for the filing of motions for reconsideration." Sanchez – Perez v. Sanchez – Gonzalez, 717 F.Supp.2d 187, 193–94 (D.P.R.2010) (Besosa, J.) (quoting Sanchez – Medina v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 265 F.R.D. 29, 32 (D.P.R.2010) ). A district court, through its inherent power, can reconsider interlocutory orders until the entry of judgment. SeeMun. of San Sebastian v. Commonwealth of P.R., 116 F.Supp.3d 49, 53 (D.P.R.2015) (Besosa, J.) (citing Fernandez – Vargas v. Pfizer, 522 F.3d 55, 61 n. 2 (1st Cir.2008) ); see alsoGeffon v. Micrion Corp., 249 F.3d 29, 38 (1st Cir.2001). Here, defendants move the Court to reconsider an interlocutory³ order awarding attorney's fees.

A district court will alter its original order only if 10it "evidenced a manifest error of law, if there is newly discovered evidence, or in certain other narrow situations." Biltcliffe v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 772 F.3d 925, 930 (1st Cir.2014) (quoting Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New England, Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir.2007) ). Because defendants here present no newly discovered information, the Court reviews its grant of attorney's fees to attorney Berkan for a "manifest error of law."

Discussion

The "American Rule" for attorney's fees prescribes that each party will bear its own attorney's fees "unless there is express statutory authority to the contrary." De Jesus Nazario v. Morris Rodriguez, 554 F.3d 196, 199 (1st Cir.2009) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975) ). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a court has discretionary authority to compel payment of reasonable attorney's fees to the "prevailing party"⁴ in an action enforcing 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). When evaluating fee requests, "the Court needs to determine whether: (1) a party is in fact a ‘prevailing party;’ (2) the compensation sought is reasonable (i.e. [,] calculation of the lodestar); and (3) there are any additional but exceptional considerations that may require [the court] to adjust [the fee amount] upward or downward." Rosario – Urdaz v. Rivera – Hernandez, 451 F.Supp.2d 305, 307–08 (D.P.R.2006) (Casellas, J.) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433–34, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) ).

I. Prevailing Party

A plaintiff prevails "when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." Lefemine v. Wideman, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 9, 11, 184 L.Ed.2d 313 (2012) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111–12, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992) ). A party need not succeed in every claim to be a prevailing party, but must "prevail[ ] on the merits of at least some of his claims." Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603–04, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) (noting that even awards of nominal damages are sufficient for awarding attorney's fees); see alsoHensley, 461 U.S. at 426–27, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (awarding attorney's fees to patients of a psychiatric hospital who won on five of their six claims, including a claim for breach of constitutional rights based on substandard treatment); De Jesus Nazario, 554 F.3d at 199 ("[P]laintiffs may be considered...