Nazario v. Sec'y

• Decision Date: 29 April 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 3:13-cv-786-J-34JRK
• Parties: JAVIER NAZARIO, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

JAVIER NAZARIO, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents.

Case No. 3:13-cv-786-J-34JRK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

April 29, 2016

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Javier Nazario, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action on July 3, 2013, by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition; Doc. 1) under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In the Petition, Nazario challenges a 2010 state court (Duval County, Florida) judgment of conviction for aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer, felony driving under the influence, and driving while license suspended or revoked. Respondents have submitted a memorandum in opposition to the Petition. See Respondents' Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Response; Doc. 7) with exhibits (Resp. Ex.). On September 26, 2013, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause and Notice to Petitioner (Doc. 5), admonishing Nazario regarding his obligations and giving Nazario a time frame in which to submit a reply. Nazario submitted a brief in reply. See Response (Doc. 11). This case is ripe for review.

II. Procedural History

On September 22, 2010, in Case No. 2010-CF-9756, the State of Florida charged Nazario with aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer (count one), felony driving under the influence (count two), and driving while license suspended or revoked (count three). Resp. Ex. A, Information. On November 10, 2010, Nazario entered a plea of guilty and negotiated sentence. Resp. Exs. B; I, attached Ex. C, Transcript of the Plea Hearing (Plea Tr.). That same day, the trial court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of seven years for count one, a term of imprisonment of five years for count two, and a jail term of seventy-three days for count three, such terms to run concurrently with each other. Resp. Ex. C, Judgment; Plea Tr. at 12. Nazario did not appeal his judgment and sentence.

On August 23, 2011, Nazario filed a pro se motion for correction of sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Resp. Ex. D. That same day, he filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Resp. Ex. E. In his request for post-conviction relief, he asserted that counsel was ineffective because she failed to investigate and prepare a defense. On November 2, 2011, Petitioner filed a motion to strike his Rule 3.800 and 3.850 motions and sought permission to file an amended Rule 3.850 motion. Resp. Ex. F. On November 7, 2011, Nazario filed a pro se amended motion for post-conviction relief (amended Rule 3.850 motion). Resp. Ex. G. In his request for post-conviction relief, he asserted that his plea was involuntarily entered by "illegal inducement" because counsel lied when she told him that it would be in his best interest to enter the plea (ground one), and counsel was ineffective because she told him that "the State had enough evidence to establish a prima facie case of guilt against him on all charges" (ground two). Resp. Ex. G. On June 19, 2012, the trial court denied his Rule 3.800 motion and his original and amended Rule 3.850 motions. Resp. Ex. H. On September 12, 2012, the trial court vacated its June 19, 2012 order, and denied the amended Rule 3.850 motion. Resp. Ex. I. The court denied Nazario's motion for rehearing on October 5, 2010. Resp. Exs. J; K. On Nazario's appeal, the parties did not file briefs. On March 11, 2013, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial per curiam without issuing a written opinion, see Nazario v. State, 111 So.3d 885 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Resp. Ex. L, and later denied Nazario's motion for rehearing on April 29, 2013, see Resp. Exs. M; N. The mandate issued on May 15, 2013. Resp. Ex. O.

III. One-Year Limitations Period

The Petition appears to be timely filed within the one-year limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Response at 5-7.

IV. Evidentiary Hearing

"In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition's factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). "It follows that if the record refutes the applicant's factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing." Id. The pertinent facts of this case are fully developed in the record before the Court. Because this Court can "adequately assess [Petitioner's] claim[s] without further factual development," Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003), an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

V. Standard of Review

The Court will analyze Nazario's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Section 2254(d) states:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, asdetermined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) "bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). As the United States Supreme Court stated, "AEDPA erects a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court." Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16 (2013). This standard of review is described as follows:

Under AEDPA, when the state court has adjudicated the petitioner's claim on the merits, a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," id. § 2254(d)(2). "Under § 2254(d)(1)'s 'contrary to' clause, we grant relief only 'if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.'" Jones v. GDCP Warden, 753 F.3d 1171, 1182 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). "Under § 2254(d)(1)'s 'unreasonable application' clause, we grant relief only 'if the state court identifies thecorrect governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.'" Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495).

For § 2254(d), clearly established federal law includes only the holdings of the Supreme Court - not Supreme Court dicta, nor the opinions of this Court. White v. Woodall,-U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014). To clear the § 2254(d) hurdle, "a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786-87, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). "[A]n 'unreasonable application of' [Supreme Court] holdings must be 'objectively unreasonable,' not merely wrong; even 'clear error' will not suffice." Woodall, 134 S.Ct. at 1702 (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003)). A state court need not cite or even be aware of Supreme Court cases "so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002); accordRichter, 131 S.Ct. at 784.

"AEDPA thus imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 176 L.Ed.2d 678 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). And when a claim implicates both AEDPA and Strickland, our review is doubly deferential. Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 788 ("The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). [A petitioner] must establish that no fairminded jurist would have reached the Florida court's conclusion. SeeRichter, 131 S.Ct. at 786-87; Holsey v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 694 F.3d 1230, 1257-58 (11th Cir. 2012). "If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 786....

Taylor v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 760 F.3d 1284, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 2323 (2015); see also Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1230 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 2126 (2015).

For a state court's resolution of a claim to be an adjudication on the merits, so that the state court's determination will be entitled to deference for purposes of federal habeas corpus review under AEDPA, all that is required is a rejection of the claim on the merits, not an opinion that explains the state court's rationale for such a ruling. Hittson, 759 F.3d at 1232 ("[T]here is no AEDPA...