Ndudzi v. Castro
| Decision Date | 18 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. SA-20-CV-0492-JKP |
| Parties | MARIANA NDUDZI, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. RAY CASTRO, Warden of South Texas Detention Center, et al., Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
The Court has under consideration Respondents' Motion to Dismiss the Habeas Petition (ECF No. 11). With Petitioner's response (ECF No. 12) and Respondents' reply (ECF No. 13), the motion is ripe for ruling.1 Respondents have also filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority (ECF No. 14) to provide another case from outside the Western District of Texas that supports their position. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part.
On April 22, 2020, while detained in the South Texas Detention Complex ("STDC") located in Pearsall, Texas, Mariana Ndudzi, by and through counsel, filed an Emergency Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Declaratory Relief (ECF No. 1) asserting jurisdiction under the general grant of habeas authority, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and under federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.2 She paid the $5 fee for filing a habeas action.
Petitioner, an Angolan asylum-seeker fleeing state-sponsored gender violence, has been in Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") detention for more than a year. ECF No. 1 at 1. She asserts two claims: (1) a violation of substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment due to the conditions of her confinement and failure to provide adequate medical care; (2) a violation of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment as applied to her due to her detention that has become unconstitutionally prolonged. Id. 45-49. She seeks the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and an order for her immediate release from STDC with appropriate precautionary public health measures on grounds that her continued prolonged detention violates due process. Id. at 1, 49. She seeks a declaration that Respondents' continued immigration detention of individuals at increased risk for severe illness, including persons of any age with underlying medical conditions that may increase the risk of infection from COVID-19, violates due process. Id. at 49. She asks the Court to require ICE to release the individual facility plans mandated under its detention standards that address the management of infectious and communicable diseases. Id. If the Court decides that immediate release is not appropriate, she seeks release under an alternative to detention, such as an ankle monitor. Id. at 50. Finally, she seeks an award of costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. Id.
Given the emergency nature of the filing based upon its content, the Court found that the circumstances warranted an expedited response. See ECF No. 4. The Court thus ordered Respondents to file a response to the petition within fourteen days. See id. On May 12, 2020, Respondents filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). See ECF No. 11. Within their motion, Respondents reveal that Petitioner has been transferred to a detention facility in Laredo, Texas, which lies within the Southern District of Texas. In response, Petitioner urges the Court to not find her claims moot and, in some respects, seems to refocus claims on her new holding facility. Respondents have filed a reply brief and the motion is ripe for ruling.
As an initial matter, the Court addresses the nature of this action and the claims asserted. Petitioner, through counsel, filed this case as a habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 while also invoking federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. But despite the apparent mixed nature of the jurisdiction asserted, Petitioner has only paid the $5 filing fee permitted for habeas applications. The statute governing filing fees in district court clearly states: "The clerk of each district court shall require the parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in such court, whether by original process, removal or otherwise, to pay a filing fee of $350, except that on application for a writ of habeas corpus the filing fee shall be $5." 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The payment of the $5 habeas filing fee relegates this action to habeas relief only. One cannot pay the minimal habeas fee and pursue non-habeas relief.3
Not only is the fee structure different for habeas and non-habeas actions, there are also often vast procedural differences between the two types of actions. See Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corr. of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 269-71 (1978) (recognizing some differences); Banister v. Davis, ___ S. Ct. ___, ___, No. 18-6943, 2020 WL 2814300, at *12 (U.S. June 1, 2020) (Alito, J. dissenting) (). In contrast to a non-habeas action, habeas is governed by several statutes relevant here. The jurisdictional grant of authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus lies within 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and it extends to those "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Section 2242 governs the form and contents of applications for a writ of habeas corpus. Section 2243 governs issuance of the writ and provides that "[t]he court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as law and justice require." Section 2246 governs presentation of evidence, including via affidavit. Section 2247 addresses documentary evidence. And Section 2248 addresses the conclusiveness of allegations of the parties.
The proper respondent for a habeas action is "the person who has custody over [the petitioner]," 28 U.S.C. § 2242, whereas a defendant in a non-habeas action would be someone who has wronged the plaintiff. In fact, "in habeas challenges to present physical confinement - 'core challenges' - the default rule is that the proper respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner [(or detainee)] is being held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory official." Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). Because the custodian may not be a proper defendant and most defendants would not be the proper respondent, a mixed habeas and non-habeas action creates potential confusion.
In addition, special rules apply to habeas petitions filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (). See Rule 1(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts ("Habeas Rules"). Moreover, Habeas Rule 1(b) provides that the federal district courts "may apply any or all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not covered by Rule 1(a)." The Habeas Rules provide "practical instruction regarding the appropriate procedures for responding to a federal habeas corpus petition." See White v. Cockrell, No. 3:00-CV-1951-L, 2001 WL 1335779, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2001) ().
Further, the Habeas Rules may supplant the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Habeas Rule 12 (); Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(4) (). As clarified in the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 12 (formerly Rule 11):
Rule 11 [(now 12)]. . . allow[s] the court considering the petition to use any of the rules of civil procedure (unless inconsistent with these rules of habeas corpus) when in its discretion the court decides they are appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case. The court does not have to rigidly apply rules which would be inconsistent or inequitable in the overall framework of habeas corpus. Rule [12] merely recognizes and affirms their discretionary power to use their judgment in promoting the ends of justice.
When a filing contains both habeas and non-habeas claims, "the district court should separate the claims and decide the [non-habeas] claims" separately from the habeas ones given the differences between the two types of claims. Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (citing Serio v. Members of La. State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1119 (5th Cir. 1987)). As a practical matter, this separation entails severing the non-habeas claims and permitting the petitioner/plaintiff to pursue them in a separate case. See Milton v. Davis, No. 1:17-CV-085-C, 2018 WL 10447170, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2018); Shumpert v. Gaunt, No. W-16-CA-101-RP, 2016 WL 2859641, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 16, 2016); Dewey v. Quarterman, No. CIV.A H-07-0394, 2007 WL 332986, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2007). Such severance is not warranted in this case. As addressed later, all non-habeas claims asserted in this action became moot when Petitioner was transferred to a different detention facility. Given that transfer, asserted habeas claims are the only potentially live claims that remain in this action.
As highlighted in White, one particularly significant difference between habeas and a typical civil action is the manner in which the respondent or defendant may respond to the initial filing. See 2001 WL 1335779, at *3-4. Whereas a defendant in a typical non-habeas action has the choice to file an answer or other response, like a motion to dismiss, respondents in habeas cases may be limited by court order as to the nature of their response. See Habeas Rule 4 (...
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