Neague v. Cynkar
Decision Date | 01 May 2001 |
Docket Number | PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES,DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS,No. 99-4533,99-4533 |
Citation | 258 F.3d 504 |
Parties | (6th Cir. 2001) JONATHAN NEAGUE, BY HIS MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND CAROL NEAGUE; CAROL NEAGUE; JOHN NEAGUE,, v. PAUL CYNKAR; WORTHINGTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT; WORTHINGTON CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION (99-4552); DANIEL MURPHY; CITY OF WORTHINGTON (99-4533), Argued: |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
John W. Leibold, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.
Steven Lee Smith, Smith & Colner, Columbus, Ohio, John C. Albert, Crabbe, Brown, Jones, Potts & Schmidt, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellants.
John W. Leibold, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.
Before: Norris and Siler, Circuit Judges; Steeh, District Judge.*
Defendants Paul Cynkar and Daniel Murphy appeal from the partial denial of their motions for summary judgment. Specifically, these defendants take issue with the district court's conclusion that they were not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to plaintiff Jonathan Neague's allegation that they deprived him of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. For the reasons that follow, we hold that the undisputed facts fail to support a claim of excessive force as a matter of law and that the defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
At the time that the dispiriting events that gave rise to this suit occurred, Jonathan Neague was a seventh grader at Worthingway Middle School. He was involved in two fights at school, for which he was required to attend detention on three Saturdays. On May 12, 1995, the principal of the school, defendant Cynkar, called Jonathan into his office and asked him if he was aware of a letter from his mother, Carol Neague, objecting to the Saturday detentions. Jonathan said he wanted to call his parents, but the principal replied that he had already tried unsuccessfully to reach them. Although the succession of events is not necessarily clear, Jonathan agrees that the following things happened: the principal told Jonathan to sit down; Jonathan replied that the principal was a "faggot" and "F-you." When the principal said he was going to tape record the meeting, Jonathan knocked the tape recorder out of his hands, ducked under the principal's arm, and ran out of the office.
Principal Cynkar had his secretary call 911; in the meantime, Jonathan went to the cafeteria and resumed eating his lunch, which had been interrupted by the principal's summons. When the police arrived, Principal Cynkar told them what had happened, including an alleged "chest-butting" by Jonathan. The police officers proceeded to the cafeteria with Principal Cynkar, who asked Jonathan to come to the office. When this request went unheeded, Officer Kim Hurst said, "Come on Jonathan, let's go," whereupon Jonathan stepped on her foot and walked quickly out of the cafeteria. As Jonathan passed Sergeant Murphy, Murphy took his arm and held it behind Jonathan's back.
When the group reached the principal's office, Sergeant Murphy asked Principal Cynkar if he should handcuff Jonathan; Cynkar said yes, and the sergeant did so. Sergeant Murphy stated that he was afraid Jonathan might assault the principal again. According to Jonathan, the handcuffs stayed on for thirty-three minutes; he struggled a bit while handcuffed; and he asked the police to loosen the cuffs, which they did. Jonathan's parents arrived shortly thereafter, and Principal Cynkar, who did not press criminal charges, suspended Jonathan for ten days.
Jonathan's parents appealed the suspension and, after a hearing, the suspension was reduced to eight days. The Neagues appealed the decision to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which found for the defendants.
Plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants in federal court on June 2, 1995. Their second amended complaint alleged that defendants violated Jonathan's rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; that the defendants inflicted severe emotional distress; that they committed assault and battery; that "the intentional restraint of freedom . . . was done with indifference to . . . the statutory civil rights of Plaintiff"; and that the school district failed to adequately train and supervise principal Cynkar.
Because the proceedings in the district court have not been terminated by the issuance of a final order, our jurisdiction is limited to the consideration of whether defendants Cynkar and Murphy were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) ( ). Furthermore, a defendant may not appeal a summary judgment order on a qualified immunity claim "insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a 'genuine' issue of fact for trial." Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 320 (1995). In this case, the district court identified a factual determination that must be resolved by a jury: whether it was reasonable for Sergeant Murphy to handcuff Jonathan under the circumstances.
While the existence of a genuine issue of material fact typically precludes appeal, the undisputed facts support a finding of qualified immunity as a matter of law and therefore review by this court is appropriate.1 As this court has noted, the district court's reasoning that there was an issue of fact does not immunize issues of law underlying the qualified immunity analysis. See Sanderfer v. Nichols, 62 F.3d 151, 153 n.2 (6th Cir. 1995) ( ).
Government officials in civil cases are protected from liability if their conduct does not "violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "[T]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that his or her conduct violates that right." Wegener v. City of Covington, 933 F.2d 390, 392 (6th Cir. 1991). To be clearly established, a right must have been decided by the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state in which the alleged violation occurred. Id.
This court has held that the right to be free from excessive force is a clearly established Fourth Amendment right. Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1342 (6th Cir. 1993). As the district court recognized, such claims turn on whether the officer's actions were "objectively reasonable." Id. (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989)).
Moreover, a viable excessive force claim can be premised upon handcuffing. Id. ( ); see also Martin v. Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1312-13 (6th Cir. 1997) ( ); Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 640-41 (6th Cir. 2001) (same). We recently explained how to determine whether an officer was "objectively reasonable" in these terms:
. . . In determining whether excessive force was used, courts must ask whether the officer's actions, in light of the totality of the circumstances, were objectively reasonable. Because this is a test of objective reasonableness, the underlying motivations of the officer in making the...
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