O'Neal Ford, Inc. v. Davie, 88-307
| Decision Date | 30 May 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-307,88-307 |
| Citation | 770 S.W.2d 656,299 Ark. 45 |
| Parties | O'NEAL FORD, INC., Appellant, v. Orlando DAVIE, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Christopher O. Parker, Little Rock, for appellant.
David Rees, Paul J. Teufel, Jonesboro, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment which was returned against the appellant, O'Neal Ford, Inc. (O'Neal), in a deceit action. The appellee, Orlando Davie, purchased a vehicle from O'Neal after receiving a negative response to his question whether the vehicle had been wrecked. O'Neal personnel knew the car had been wrecked. The jury awarded $4,000 in compensatory damages and $35,000 in punitive damages. The trial court entered a remittitur reducing the punitive damages to $20,000. O'Neal argues that there was no substantial evidence to support the $4,000 award, that the court admitted irrelevant and prejudicial evidence showing the condition of the car shortly after it had been wrecked and declared a total loss by its insurer, and that the case should have been transferred to chancery. Mr. Davie cross-appeals from the remittitur, arguing that the court did not find passion or prejudice on the part of the jury or that the court's conscience was shocked by the $35,000 award. We hold that the evidence was substantial to support the $4,000 award, that the questioned evidence was admissible, that the court was correct in not transferring to chancery, and that the full punitive damages award should be reinstated. Thus, we affirm on appeal and reverse on cross-appeal.
The car was a 1985 Cadillac Fleetwood. It had been owned by a Ms. Hurdle when it was involved in a frontal collision. Mr. Howell, claims manager for Nationwide Insurance Companies, testified the car had massive damage to the front end and frame and he did not think the car would be rebuilt. Kim Morgan purchased the car from a salvage pool and sold it to Mr. Moxley who took it to Mr. Boatman who described the car as "totaled." Boatman rebuilt the car, and then Moxley sold it to O'Neal. The repair included replacing some three feet of the frame. Mr. Pack, an O'Neal salesman, sold the car to Ms. Norris who kept it a short time and traded it back to O'Neal. Pack testified he knew the car had been wrecked.
Davie testified he asked if the car had been wrecked before he purchased it. The O'Neal salesman with whom he dealt said it had not, although another O'Neal representative told him it had some paint and body damage. Davie ultimately signed a document recognizing that there had been "frame and body work." Although the form he signed had a place to show the dollar amount of the value of the repair work, it was left blank.
Given Davie's testimony that he was told the car had not been wrecked and the admitted knowledge on the part of Pack that the car had been wrecked, we find substantial evidence of misrepresentation. The primary thrust of O'Neal's first point, however, is that the amount of the compensatory award is not supported by substantial evidence.
Davie presented the expert testimony of Mr. Bourland that the value of a wrecked and rebuilt vehicle like the one in question was $10,000. He testified that if the car had been "without damage" it would have been worth $15,000 to $15,500. He testified if the car had not been wrecked and rebuilt but had had only paint and body work, it would have been worth $13,000. His ultimate testimony thus was that the difference between the value of the car as represented and its actual value was $3,000, although he said on cross-examination that "[i]f Nathan Pack paid $11,500 for the car that is what it was worth."
We find there was substantial evidence to support the $4,000 award, given Bourland's opinion that the car was worth $10,000 and the fact that O'Neal's price for the car to Davie was $13,995. Perhaps the better rule of damages in a misrepresentation case is the difference between the actual value of the chattel and its value had it been as represented. We said that in Greiner Motor Co. v. Sumpter, 244 Ark. 736, 427 S.W.2d 8 (1968). We recognized, however, that we had also approved a measure of damages constituted of the difference between the actual value of the chattel and the contract price, citing Union Motor Co. v. Turbiville, 223 Ark. 92, 264 S.W.2d 592 (1954), and Note, 1 Ark.L.Rev. 308 (1947). The latter was obviously the basis of the jury award in this case, and there was substantial evidence to support it, given Bourland's initial opinion of the value of the car and the evidence showing the extent of the damage to the car before it was repaired.
The trial court was asked to preclude the introduction of evidence about the condition of the car before it was rebuilt on the ground that the O'Neal personnel had no idea how badly it had been wrecked. The judge refused to permit Davie to present evidence about personal injuries suffered by Ms. Hurdle in the collision, but did permit pictures of the wrecked car to be introduced.
Davie had the burden of proving his damages resulting from the...
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