Neal, In re

Decision Date10 June 1957
Citation6 Misc.2d 751,164 N.Y.S.2d 549
PartiesIn the Matter of Willie Mae NEAL, Child under sixteen years of age. Children's Court, Wayne County
CourtNew York Children's Court

Charles J. Dittmar, Williamson, for petitioner.

Reuben Davis, Rochester, for respondent.

HURLEY, Judge.

The petitioner is vice principal of the Williamson Central School, Williamson, New York. He brings this proceeding to adjudicate the respondent, Willie Mae Neal, a delinquent, claiming that she has been guilty of disorderly conduct pursuant to Section 720 of the Penal Law, and is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the control of lawful authority.

The facts alleged are that on or about the 29th day of April, 1957, the respondent, Willie Mae Neal, a student at the Williamson Central School, upon entering the school bus for transportation to her home, ate some fruit while on the said bus contrary to the specific directions of the bus driver. That when the bus driver went to the place where she was sitting in the bus and attempted to remove her, she bit the bus driver on the hand or wrist whereupon the bus driver slapped her.

That thereafter the bus driver returned to the school with the bus and reported the incident to the vice principal of the school. That thereafter the vice principal of the school entered the bus and requested the respondent and her sister to go to the principal's office to dispose of the matter. That instead of leaving the bus as requested, respondent refused to leave the bus but instead insisted on her right to stay in the bus. That she refused all requests to leave and was required to be ejected from the bus. That during this period of time the respondent resisted the requests not only of the vice principal, but of others in a position of authority in the school. That as a result of these occurrences, other children in the bus, particularly the very small children became upset and began to cry. It is alleged that these acts amount to disorderly conduct under Section 720 of the Penal Law and further that they indicate such a disregard on the part of the respondent for the reasonable requests and demands of the school authorities as to make her a delinquent child as defined in Section 2, Subdivision 2 of the Children's Court Act.

The respondent denies that she bit the driver of the bus, claims that the acts did not amount to disorderly conduct and that at most the acts of the respondent constitute an isolated case of simple disobedience at a time when the respondent was under a great strain as a result of being struck by the bus driver.

While a point has been made by the respondent that she was unfamiliar with any rule or regulation established by the school authorities prohibiting children on the school bus from eating while riding on the school bus, I am satisfied from the admission of the respondent herself that at the time she entered the bus to ride home she was eating some fruit. That as she entered the bus, the driver told her that she must put it away and not eat it on the bus. That subsequently, after the bus started and had gone some distance, she was again told by the bus driver to put the fruit away which she refused to do. That thereafter either the respondent or her sister started again eating the fruit. The bus driver stopped the bus and went to the seat where the respondent was sitting and told the respondent that she would have to put the fruit away or get off the bus. That respondent then stated in words of substance that they were taxpayers and didn't have to get off the bus.

Apparently at this time the bus driver became exasperated and put his hands on the respondent's shoulder, apparently to remove her from the bus. There is considerable testimony to the effect that the respondent bit the bus driver, whereupon...

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2 cases
  • Drews v. State
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • 18 Enero 1961
    ... ... with the public order and lead to a breach of the peace,' and that such a refusal 'can be justified only where the circumstances show conclusively that the police officer's direction was purely arbitrary and was not calculated in any way to promote the public order.' See also In re Neal, 6 Misc.2d 751, 164 N.Y.S.2d 549 (where the refusal of a school girl to leave a school bus when ordered to do so by the authorities was held to be disorderly conduct, largely because of its effect on the other children); Underhill, in the passage cited above, concludes that 'failure to obey a ... ...
  • Gair v. Peck
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • 14 Junio 1957

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