Neal v. Corning Glass Works Corp.
Decision Date | 22 June 1989 |
Docket Number | No. C-3-88-070.,C-3-88-070. |
Citation | 745 F. Supp. 1294 |
Parties | Terry NEAL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CORNING GLASS WORKS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Theodore R. Shaman, Jr., Dayton, Ohio, for plaintiffs.
Scott F. Zimmerman, Mark A. Fontana, Pittsburgh, Pa., John E. Tate, Peter K. Newman, Dayton, Ohio, for defendant Corning Glass Works Corp.
Gregory C. Gibson, Dayton, Ohio, for defendant Dr. James Armacost.
DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DEFENDANT CORNING GLASS WORKS (DOC. # 22) AND SUSTAINING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY DEFENDANT JAMES O. ARMACOST, D.O. (DOC. # 35); JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT ARMACOST AND AGAINST PLAINTIFFS
This case involves claims arising from Plaintiff's termination from employment by Defendant Corning Glass Works Corporation (Corning). It is stipulated that on February 4, 1986, Plaintiff became incapacitated while working at Defendant Corning's Greenville plant and that, as a result, he was transferred by ambulance to Wayne Hospital Emergency Room, where he was examined and treated by Defendant James Armacost, D.O., who ordered that a blood sample and urine sample be taken from Plaintiff for a drug/alcohol screen, the results of which revealed the presence of Cannibinoids (Marijuana) in Plaintiff's urine. (Doc. # 36, pp. 7-8). Approximately one week later, Plaintiff was terminated from his employment "for violation of plant rules—working while under the influence of drugs," (Doc. # 23, p. 6) on the basis of the results of the test ordered by Defendant Armacost (Doc. # 1, ¶ 21).
On September 9, 1988, this Court filed a Decision and Entry (Doc. # 21) sustaining in part and overruling in part Defendant Corning's Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 8). The Court dismissed Plaintiff's claim under Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02 et seq. but held:
This Court is unable to state, at this time, that it agrees with the Defendant's position that Terry Neal's invasion of his right of privacy claim is nothing more than an indirect, albeit untimely, attempt to relitigate the merits of his discharge by the Defendant and, as such, is preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and, thus, is barred by the applicable six-month statute of limitations.
(Doc. # 21, p. 3). The Court then granted leave to Defendants to file an Amended Motion for Summary Judgment directed toward this issue (Doc. # 21, p. 4). This case is now before the Court on the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Corning (Doc. # 22) and on the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Armacost (Doc. # 35). For reasons briefly set forth below, the Motion of Defendant Armacost, to which Plaintiff filed no response, is granted and the Motion of Defendant Corning is overruled.
On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c).
On the record thus far, there are facts in evidence which suggest that with respect to the incidents at issue:
Plaintiff alleges that by disclosing drug screen results to Defendant Corning without Plaintiff's authority (Doc. # 1, ¶ 19), Defendant Armacost breached an implied contract of confidentiality (Doc. # 1, ¶ 22) and violated Plaintiff's common law right to privacy (Doc. # 1, ¶ 29). In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Armacost responds that there are no facts in evidence from which it could be reasonably inferred that there was a willful betrayal of a confidence by Defendant Armacost and that, therefore, Defendant Armacost is entitled to judgment in his favor as a matter of law (Doc. # 35, p. 6).
Under Ohio law, "a physician can be held liable for unauthorized disclosures of medical information." Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 39 Ohio St.3d 86, 98, 529 N.E.2d 449, 459 n. 19 (1988). The availability of a cause of action arises from the Ohio legislature's expression of public policy in O.R.C. § 4731.22(B), prohibiting physicians from willfully betraying a professional secret. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty, 237 F.Supp. 96, 101 (N.D.Ohio 1965). The Littleton court noted that "an exception exists for disclosures necessary to protect individual or public welfare." Littleton, at 459, n. 19. "Under a proper factual posture a plaintiff alleging unauthorized disclosure of medical information might have a claim for relief for invasion of his right to privacy." Knecht v. Vandalia Medical Center, 14 Ohio App.3d 129, 470 N.E.2d 230, 232 (1984).
The Knecht court also noted, however, that a cause of action for invasion of privacy will not lie where the unauthorized disclosure was privileged, and the court quoted the following definitions:
This Court must conclude that while the disclosure of Plaintiff's test results to Dr. Gullia was technically unauthorized by Plaintiff, Defendant Armacost's actions under the facts of this case could not reasonably be said to constitute a willful betrayal of a professional secret: Defendant Armacost disclosed the medical information only to the physician otherwise responsible for the treatment of Plaintiff for conditions manifested in the course of or affecting his employment — a physician also bound by O.R.C. § 4731.22(B)'s mandate of confidentiality. Under the analogy to trust law articulated in Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty, 237 F.Supp. at 102, Defendant Armacost as trustee made the res/information available only to another trustee—Dr. Gullia—who also owed Plaintiff a fiduciary duty.
Furthermore, the disclosure to the plant doctor of evidence of drug usage which may have affected Plaintiff's work might constitute a disclosure necessary to protect the individual's welfare in the work environment. See Littleton v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 529 N.E.2d at n. 19. The disclosure certainly falls under the qualified privilege which under Knecht bars recovery for invasion of privacy. 470 N.E.2d at 232. A reasonable jury could not find otherwise than that Defendant Armacost shared an interest in treating Plaintiff's medical condition with Dr. Gullia, that circumstances indicted the existence of a duty to disclose medical information, and that the disclosure of the test results at issue was reasonably calculated to protect their mutual interest.
Accordingly, this Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to material fact in that there was no willful betrayal of a confidence by Defendant Armacost. Accordingly, Defendant Armacost is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's claims of breach of implied contract of confidentiality and violation of Plaintiff's common law right to privacy. Since Plaintiffs have failed to establish a genuine issue as to the principal claims, the derivative claim of Plaintiff Jeannie Neal against Defendant Armacost for loss of consortium must fail as well and Defendant Armacost is entitled to summary judgment thereon as a matter of law.
Accordingly, judgment will enter in favor of the Defendant Armacost and...
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