O'Neal v. Mann

• Decision Date: 26 January 1927
• Docket Number: 9.
• Citation: 136 S.E. 379,193 N.C. 153
• Parties: O'NEAL et al. v. MANN et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

136 S.E. 379

193 N.C. 153

O'NEAL et al. v. MANN et al.

No. 9.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

January 26, 1927

Appeal from Superior Court, Hyde County; Grady, Judge.

Controversy without action between C. S. O'Neal and others and T. J Mann and others. From the judgment, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.

Law declaring drainage district as political subdivision of state held not to affect district established prior to enactment (Pub.Laws 1909, c. 442, amended by Pub.Laws 1921, c. 7; Pub.Loc.Laws 1923, c. 439).

Controversy without action, involving the validity of chapter 611 Public-Local Laws 1925, entitled, "An act excluding certain lands from Mattamuskeet drainage district."

The court was of opinion, first, that the enactment of said act was a valid exercise by the General Assembly of its legislative power; and, second, that lands of defendants theretofore included within said district, having been excluded therefrom by said act, are not liable for assessments made by the board of drainage commissioners for the maintenance of said district.

Judgment was thereupon rendered, perpetually restraining and enjoining said board of drainage commissioners from collecting any assessments made upon said lands, since the ratification of said act, and also from levying any further assessments thereon.

From this judgment, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.

W. L Spencer, of Swan Quarter, for appellants O'Neal and others.

C. B. Spencer, of Swan Quarter, for appellant New Holland Corporation.

S. S. Mann, of Swan Quarter, for appellant Jennette.

Small, MacLean & Rodman, of Washington, N. C., for appellant Board of Drainage Com'rs.

Ward & Grimes, of Washington, N. C., for appellees.

Stephen C. Bragaw, of Washington, N. C., amicus curiae.

CONNOR J.

This appeal was docketed at the spring term, 1926, of this court, after the call of appeals from the first district, and shortly before the expiration of said term. By consent of counsel, it was submitted without oral argument, upon printed briefs of both sides. Rule 10. A brief in support of the judgment of the superior court was filed by Hon. Stephen C. Bragaw, with the permission of the court, as amicus curiae.

An examination of the record disclosed that the question presented for decision was of grave importance, not only to the parties to this controversy, but also to owners of lands included in other drainage districts, established under the laws of this state. The validity of an act of the General Assembly is involved by the contention of plaintiffs that said act is an exercise of judicial and not of legislative power, and is therefore in contravention of section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution of North Carolina, in which it is declared that "the legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers of the government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other." At the conclusion of the spring term, the appeal was continued, upon an adversari, to the fall term 1926. It was ordered that the appeal should then be heard upon oral arguments. These arguments have been heard; we have been greatly aided in the consideration of the appeal and in the decision of the question presented, not only by the well-prepared and exhaustive briefs filed, but also by the oral arguments of the learned counsel who appeared in behalf of the respective parties to this controversy, in response to our request.

The question presented for our decision is this: Has the General Assembly of this state the power, by the enactment of a public-local statute, to exclude from a drainage district, established and organized under the laws of this state, certain lands described in the statute, and theretofore included within the district by the final order of the clerk of the superior court, made in the proceeding for the establishment of said district, upon the recital in the statute that said lands have not received the benefits contemplated at the time the district was established? Are lands so excluded relieved of liability for assessments thereafter made for the purpose of maintaining the district, with the result that assessments made upon the lands remaining therein for that purpose are necessarily increased?

If it shall be held that the General Assembly has such power, it is manifest that it will be invoked, as it has been in the instant case, by those whose lands have been included in a drainage district, established by law, upon a finding by the court that the same will be benefited by the establishment of the district, and who thereafter wish to have said lands relieved of assessments for the maintenance of the district, upon the contention that the results from the establishment of the district were not as contemplated by the parties to the proceeding, and as the court, by whose order the district was established, found that they would be.

If chapter 611, Public-Local Laws 1925, was enacted by the General Assembly in the valid exercise of its legislative power, and the lands described therein are thereby excluded from said district for all purposes, except as provided therein, with respect to liability for bonds outstanding, it would seem to follow necessarily that they are relieved of all assessments thereafter made for the maintenance of said district, and that there was no error in the judgment restraining and enjoining the board of drainage commissioners from collecting assessments upon the lands of defendants which are embraced in the boundaries of the land excluded, levied since the ratification of said act, or from levying further assessments upon said lands. The only apparent purpose for the enactment of the statute was to relieve the lands described therein from liability for such assessments. If this purpose has been accomplished, it is agreed that it will result in an increase of the assessments upon the lands of plaintiffs, and upon the lands of others remaining in said district. Manifestly the rights of owners of lands remaining in the district are affected by the statute excluding certain lands therefrom; in order to justify this result, it is recited in the statute that the lands excluded have not received the benefits contemplated at the time the district was established. No opportunity has been afforded to those whose assessments will be increased, for a hearing upon the contention that the excluded lands have not been benefited by the organization of the district and the improvements made therein; there has been no investigation to determine the truth of the recital, relied upon as a justification of the statute. The burdens upon the lands of plaintiffs, which it was required by statute should be assessed in proportion to the benefits received by said lands, and which it was contemplated would be shared by the lands excluded, in proportion to the benefits which said lands would also receive, will necessarily be increased, if chapter 611, Pub. Loc. Laws 1925, shall be held valid. It is provided in the statute that the land excluded thereby "shall remain liable for its pro rata liability for said outstanding bonds of the said district." It is agreed that there are now no bonds of the district outstanding, all the bonds theretofore issued having been paid; the proviso, however, is evidence of a recognition by the General Assembly that the statute would otherwise affect vested rights of bondholders. There is no provision in the statute relative to the liability of the land excluded thereby for assessments authorized to be made for the maintenance of the district. It is contended by plaintiffs that owners of lands remaining in the district have vested rights with respect to the liability of the lands excluded for assessments, of which they cannot be deprived by an act of the General Assembly.

The Mattamuskeet drainage district was established by a proceeding authorized by and conducted in full compliance with the provisions of chapter 442, Public Laws 1909, which as amended is now article 5, subc. 3, of chapter 94 of the Consolidated Statutes 1919. This court has held that said act is constitutional, and that its enactment was a valid exercise of legislative power. Lumber Co. v. Drainage Com'rs, 174 N.C. 647, 94 S.E. 457; Drainage Com'rs v. Mitchell, 170 N.C. 324, 87 S.E. 112; Griffin v. Com'rs, 169 N.C. 642, 86 S.E. 575; Shelton v. White, 163 N.C. 90, 79 S.E. 427; Newby v. Drainage District, 163 N.C. 24, 79 S.E. 266; Sanderlin v. Luken, 152 N.C. 738, 68 S.E. 225; City of Kinston v. Loftin, 149 N.C. 255, 62 S.E. 1069. The state board of education, at that time the owner of the land known as "the lake bottom," was a party to the proceeding for the establishment of the district, as authorized by chapter 509, Public Laws 1909. The plaintiff New Holland Corporation is now the owner of said lake bottom, claiming under the state board of education; the other individual plaintiffs are owners of lands which are not embraced in the boundaries of the land excluded by the statute, but which were included in the district when established by the final order of the clerk of the superior court of Hyde county. Defendants are owners of lands included in the district when it was established; these lands are embraced within the land excluded by the statute.

If the proceeding under which Mattamuskeet drainage district was established was a judicial proceeding, in which the rights of all the parties were finally adjudicated, then each of said parties is bound by the orders and judgments made therein all matters which were required by statute to be finally determined before the district was established are, as to said parties, and as to those claiming under them, res adjudicata. They are estopped from thereafter questioning, by independent suit or otherwise, except by motion in the...