Neal v. Reliance Elec. & Engineering Co., Master Elec. Div.

• Decision Date: 03 July 1963
• Citation: 26 O.O.2d 12,196 N.E.2d 128,118 Ohio App. 501
• Parties: , 26 O.O.2d 12 NEAL et al., Appellants, v. RELIANCE ELECTRIC AND ENGINEERING CO., MASTER ELECTRIC DIV., Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 501

118 Ohio App. 501

196 N.E.2d 128, 26 O.O.2d 12

NEAL et al., Appellants, v. RELIANCE ELECTRIC AND ENGINEERING CO., MASTER ELECTRIC DIV., Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Montgomery County.

July 3, 1963.

Sharts, Singer & Brown and Frank, Thomas, Brumbaugh & Corwin, Dayton, for appellants.

Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling, Dayton, for appellee.

CRAWFORD, Judge.

Twenty-five plaintiffs, appellants herein, brought this action for declaratory judgment on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated, estimated in the briefs to number approximately 1,000.

The original petition was filed December 30, 1961. The amended petition alleges that defendant corporation, appellee herein operating its plant in Dayton, entered into collective bargaining agreements with Local 2154, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, of which plaintiffs are members, and with its predecessor locals; that the current agreement, dated July 1, 1960, covers the period through June 1962; and that the agreement provides for automatic renewal, in the absence of notice of termination, of seniority rights, pension benefits, group life insurance, and hospitalization and medical benefits.

It is alleged further that on July 27, 1961, defendant gave notice that it was moving its entire plant to Columbus, Indiana; that by reason thereof plaintiffs and others similarly situated have been deprived of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreements; that they are suffering unemployment; that they were not offered jobs at defendant's Columbus, Indiana, plant with seniority rights; that they have acquired vested seniority rights extending beyond the termination dates of the collective bargaining agreements; and that as a result of the removal plaintiffs and those similarly situated have been deprived of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreements, including the right to have jobs offered to them at defendant's new plant with vested seniority rights, and are deprived of the benefit of certain insurance agreements.

The prayer is for an order declaring the rights of the plaintiffs under the collective bargaining agreements, declaring that plaintiffs and those similarly situated have acquired vested seniority rights entitling them to employment at defendant's Columbus, Indiana, plant, or, in the alternative, for an order declaring them entitled to recover damages from the defendant.

Defendant demurred for failure to state a cause of action, improper joinder of parties plaintiff and improper class action. The latter two objections are essentially alike. The demurrer was sustained for misjoinder of parties plaintiff, without reference to the question of whether there was a failure to state a cause of action.

The single assignment of error is that 'The trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer of appellee to the amended petition of the appellants for misjoinder of parties plaintiff.' Therefore, we address ourselves to that question.

The contention of the defendant is stated in its brief as follows:

'The sole issue on this appeal is whether the employees under a collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the employees' union can properly bring a class action and/or join as party plaintiffs other employees to determine the various rights arising under said bargaining agreement, and in this connection it is immaterial whether the relief sought is injunctive relief or a declaratory judgment.

'The type of relief sought by these plaintiffs is a collateral question to be decided only after the basic question of joinder of parties has been determined.

'It is the position of the appellee that the trial court was completely correct in disposing of the case on the question of misjoinder of the parties for the reason that the Supreme Court has stated in definite terms, as cited above in the Masetta case, that the interpretation or enforcement of rights under a collective bargaining agreement is not the proper subject of a class suit.'

It is incorrect to say that plaintiffs are pursuing their various rights; they are seeking to have determined their common right. And the type of relief sought does have a vital bearing upon the question of joinder.

The case referred to by defendant is Masetta v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co. (1953), 159 Ohio St. 306, 112 N.E.2d 15. That was not an action for declaratory judgment; it was for injunctions both mandatory and prohibitive, accounting, and damages. Of course, an action in which plaintiff seeks specific and individual remedies for himself, adapted to his particular claims, is wholly different from one in which a class has a common interest. That case, therefore, does not answer our question as to joinder of parties.

Any views expressed there which might ultimately have a bearing upon the merits of this case are presently beside the point.

Neither do the two Ohio cases emphasized by the plaintiffs give a complete answer to the question of joinder, dealing as they do with controversies quite different in nature and effect from that presented here. Heidtman v. City of Shaker...