Neal v. United States

• Decision Date: 14 January 2014
• Docket Number: Case No.: 1:12-cv-01327-AWI-BAM
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: PORCHA NEAL, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, CHARLES RENFRO, DARRYL THOMAS, KIMBERLY A. SANCHEZ, KATHLEEN A. SEVATIUS, Defendants.

PORCHA NEAL, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, CHARLES RENFRO, DARRYL THOMAS,KIMBERLY A. SANCHEZ, KATHLEEN A. SEVATIUS, Defendants.

Case No.: 1:12-cv-01327-AWI-BAM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: January 14, 2014

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Porcha Neal ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil rights complaint to challenge the propriety of her arrest, continued incarceration, and the adequacy of her medical treatment while incarcerated. Explained in greater detail below, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend her complaint in a manner consistent with this order.

II. BACKGROUND

An arrest warrant was issued for Plaintiff around June 14, 2007 in United States v. Major, et al., No. 07-cr-00156-LJO (E.D. Cal. 2007). Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 14, Doc. 8. Plaintiff was arrested by two unidentified Fresno Police officers and charged with conspiracy to interfere with commerce byrobbery. Id. That same day, Plaintiff was interrogated by Defendant ATF Agent Darryl Thomas ("Thomas") and Fresno Police Officer Charles Renfro ("Renfro"). Plaintiff alleges there was no probable cause or reasonable suspicion for her arrest.

On June 21, 2007 a detention order was issued requiring Plaintiff to remain in custody pending trial. Id. ¶ 16. During the detention hearing, Plaintiff alleges Defendant prosecutors Kimberly A. Sanchez ("Sanchez") and Kathleen A. Sevatius ("Sevatius") made false statements resulting in Plaintiff's continued incarceration. Plaintiff remained incarcerated from June 15, 2007 until December 23, 2009, at which point Plaintiff was acquitted of all criminal charges against her. Id. ¶¶ 16, 22.

During her incarceration, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel the U.S. Marshall to transport her for outside dental treatment. Id. ¶ 17. Specifically, Plaintiff sought an out-patient root canal procedure. However, the motion was denied, and the custodial medical staff performed a tooth extraction procedure.

After Plaintiff's acquittal, she filed a complaint in this Court which was dismissed with leave to amend. (Doc. 4.) Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC") alleging the following claims: (1) Unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); (2) violation of the Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174) and the Sixth Amendment; and (3) violation of the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680), predicated on violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The former two claims are alleged against the individual defendants, whereas Plaintiff's claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act is alleged against the United States of America.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Screening Standard

Pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code Section 1915(e)(2), the Court has reviewed the complaint for sufficiency to state a claim. The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the Plaintiff has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a claim, leave to amend may begranted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim, the Court looks to the pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 'detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)).

To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully" is not sufficient, and "facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability" falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

B. Unreasonable Search, Seizure, Detention and Arrest

1. The First Claim Fails to State a Claim

The first claim alleges defendants detained and arrested plaintiff without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 15, 24. The Court takes judicial notice that in plaintiff's underlying criminal case, 07CR0156, a grand jury returned an indictment indicting plaintiff with counts of Conspiracy to commit robbery, brandishing a firearm, and interference with commerce. (Case 07CR0156, Doc. 1, p.26.) Judicial notice may be taken "of court filings and other matters of public record." Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); "[W]e 'may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.'" Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007). The filing of a valid grand jury indictment establishes probable cause for plaintiff's arrest and vitiates a Fourth Amendment claim. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) ("The Fourth Amendmentrequires that arrest warrants be based upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation-a requirement that may be satisfied by an indictment returned by a grand jury ....") (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (noting that "th[is] Court has held that an indictment, fair upon its face, and returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause and requires issuance of an arrest warrant without further inquiry"). Accordingly, this first claim for detention and arrest without probable cause will be dismissed without leave to amend.

2. Renfro, Thomas and Doe Defendant Officers Have Qualified Immunity

Further, the court must dismiss a claim if the claim seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). A two-step approach is used determine whether qualified immunity applies. First, the court determines whether a constitutional right was violated. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Second, the court determines whether that right was clearly established. Id. Courts are permitted to choose which step in the analysis to apply first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). These same analysis for qualified immunity applies to actions under both Bivens and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978). Therefore, the same discussion applies to Renfro and Thomas.

Applying the "clearly established" test first, the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would have known his conduct was unlawful. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Plaintiff's FAC alleges that the United States District Court issued a warrant for her arrest on or about June 14, 2007. Pl.'s Am. Compl. ¶ 14. Subsequently, two unidentified Fresno Police officers arrested her. Id. at ¶ 15. After spending twelve hours in a holding cell, Plaintiff was interrogated for two hours by Renfro and Thomas. Id. Plaintiff does not make any allegations that Defendants Renfro, Thomas or Doe Officers took any action unrelated to the arrest warrant, or that these Defendants engaged in improper conduct in executing the arrest warrant.

Even if a constitutional right was violated, a reasonable officer would not have known that arresting and interrogating a suspect pursuant to a valid arrest warrant violated any Constitutional rights. See Armstrong v. Asselin, 734 F.3d 984 (9^th Cir. 2013) ("where the search or seizure is executed pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate issued the warrant 'is the clearestindication that the officers acted in an objectively reasonable manner.'") Indeed, when executing an arrest warrant, an officer can be protected by qualified immunity even if the warrant itself was unconstitutional. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563 (2004). Affording Plaintiff's allegations every benefit of the doubt, Plaintiff's FAC demonstrates that Defendants Renfro, Thomas and Doe Officers did nothing more than carry out the orders of a United States Magistrate Judge. This circumstance entitles them to qualified immunity. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Renfro, Thomas and Doe Defendant officers are dismissed without leave to amend.

3. Defendant Prosecutors Sanchez and Servatius Have Absolute Immunity

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant prosecutors Sanchez and Servatius violated her right to be free from unreasonable search, seizure, detention, and arrest under the Fourth Amendment by making false statements during Plaintiff's detention hearing, resulting in Plaintiff's continued incarceration.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court must dismiss the case at any time if the action seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is absolutely immune from such relief. Absolute immunity gives certain officials absolute protection from civil liability. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268, 269 (1993). Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity...