Neal v. US
Decision Date | 12 March 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 87-1087.,87-1087. |
Citation | 571 A.2d 222 |
Parties | Anthony NEAL, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. |
Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Thomas G. Ross for appellant.
Rachel Adelman-Pierson, Asst. U.S. Atty., Arlington, Va., with whom Jay B. Stephens, U.S. Atty., and Michael W. Farrell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., were on the brief for appellee.
James Klein, Washington, D.C., and Elizabeth G. Taylor filed an amicus curiae brief for the Public Defender Service, on behalf of appellant.
Before ROGERS, Chief Judge, and NEWMAN and STEADMAN, Associate Judges.
Neal contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to discharge him from the court's probation order, dismiss the charge against him, and expunge the record, as provided under D.C.Code § 33-541(e) (1988 Repl.), rather than to enter an adjudication of guilt against him. Because Neal's probation term had expired at the time he filed his motion and the trial court had done nothing to extend the term, we find that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an adjudication of guilt. Accordingly, we reverse with instructions to discharge Neal from probation, dismiss the charge against him, and expunge the record.
On April 29, 1986, Anthony Neal entered a guilty plea to the charge of Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance, a misdemeanor under D.C.Code § 33-541(d).1 As a first-offender under that statute, Neal qualified for a sentence of probation without adjudication of guilt under D.C.Code § 33-541(e)(1) (1988 Repl.) § 33-541(e)(1), which is discretionary with the trial court, entitles such first-offenders to have the charge against them dismissed, without entry of adjudication of guilt, and the record expunged, upon successful completion of a probation term not to exceed twelve months.2 On June 13, 1986, Neal was sentenced to twelve months of supervised probation, conditioned upon his obtaining employment and treatment for drug dependency. On May 7, 1987, the District of Columbia Probation Department filed a violation notice in the trial court, indicating that Neal had missed several appointments, had not maintained regular employment, and, although he had initially tested negative for drug use during urine surveillance, had tested positive for PCP and cocaine in January and in April 1987. Neal's probation officer recommended that the court issue an order requiring Neal to show cause why his probation should not be revoked. However, no action was taken by the trial court in response to the report and recommendation, and no show cause order was issued.
On June 12, 1987, the close of Neal's probationary term, he filed a motion for discharge of probation, dismissal of the charge, and expungement of the record. The government opposed Neal's motion and asked the court to strike the probation without entry of adjudication order and to adjudicate Neal guilty. After holding a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied Neal's motion and entered an adjudication of guilt against him on August 20, 1987.
After oral argument, we ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs on two issues: whether the trial court's order denying discharge and expungement and entering adjudication of guilt was appealable, and whether the trial court retained jurisdiction to enter an adjudication of guilt beyond the expiration of Neal's probationary term. We also invited the Public Defender Service to file a brief amicus curiae.3 We find that the order is appealable and that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter an adjudication of guilt.4
An order entering adjudication may be appealed, provided it is final. In a case such as this, since no further litigation in the trial court was contemplated by these parties, the requirement of finality is met. See West v. United States, 346 A.2d 504, 505 (D.C.1975) (). Moreover, this court specifically has held that orders under § 33-541(e) are appealable. Mozingo v. United States, 503 A.2d 1238, 1240 (D.C. 1986) ( ). Finally, this case involves revocation of a probation order, and this court has heard appeals from such orders before. Wallace v. United States, 475 A.2d 401 (D.C.1984); Dent v. District of Columbia, 465 A.2d 841 (D.C. 1983).5
Under D.C.Code § 24-104 (1989 Repl.), which governs discharge, continuance, modification, and revocation of probation, the jurisdiction of a trial court to revoke probation is limited by the probationary term.6 It is settled law that no action to revoke probation may be taken beyond the last day of the probation term, unless the court has acted in some way within the term to extend the term or preserve its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wallace v. United States, supra, 475 A.2d 401 ( ); Dent v. District of Columbia, supra, 465 A.2d 841 ( ); Cooper v. United States, 48 A.2d 771 (D.C. 1946) ( ). Compare Jones v. United States, 560 A.2d 513 (D.C. 1989) ( ). Moreover, it is the court itself which must take the action; actions by the probationer are not enough. Sumpter v. United States, 564 A.2d 21 (D.C.1989) ( ). Similarly, we now hold that actions by governmental agencies, like the filing of a report by the Probation Department in this case, do not extend the reach of the court's jurisdiction beyond the expiration of the probationary term.
The government contends that these principles and precedents do not apply here, because—the government says—the language of § 33-541(e)(1), under which Neal's probation was granted, expressly or implicitly extends the court's jurisdiction beyond the probationary term. In support of this contention, the government points to the following language in the statute:
If during the period of probation such person does not violate any of the conditions of the probation, then upon expiration of the period the court shall discharge such person and dismiss the proceedings against him or her.
D.C.Code § 33-541(e)(1) (1988 Repl.) In the government's view, the words "If during the period of probation such person does not violate any of the conditions of probation" set up a condition precedent, which must be satisfied before the court can act, "upon expiration of the period" to "discharge such person." Thus, it is argued, this language implies that, once the probationary term has expired, the court has the power to determine whether the condition is satisfied and, if such is not the case, to refuse to discharge the person.
The government's argument seems to depend upon an unfounded assumption that § 24-104 does not apply to probations granted under § 33-541(e), either because § 33-541(e) creates an exception to § 24-104 or because it establishes a separate and independent probationary structure, presumably affecting only first-offenders. We reject this assumption and with it the government's reading of § 33-541(e)(1). Although we have held that the probation statutes are broadly drawn and necessarily must lend themselves to flexibility, Wright v. United States, 315 A.2d 839 (D.C.1974), there is nothing in the language or legislative history of § 33-541(e)(1) to suggest that the legislature intended to create a separate or specially defined probationary structure for first offenders under § 33-541(d).
We hold that the denial of discharge and dismissal and the entry of an adjudication of guilt was a revocation of probation within the meaning of D.C.Code § 24-104. Since the trial court in this case took no action during the probation period to preserve its jurisdiction, its power to revoke Neal's probation ended on the last day of his probationary term. Accordingly, the trial court's order entering adjudication of guilt is reversed, and the case is remanded for discharge of probation, dismissal of the charge against Neal, and expungement of the record.7
Reversed and remanded.
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