Neb. Loan & Bldg. Ass'n v. Perkins

• Decision Date: 06 February 1901
• Citation: 61 Neb. 254,85 N.W. 67
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
• Parties: NEBRASKA LOAN & BUILDING ASS'N v. PERKINS ET AL.

61 Neb. 254

85 N.W. 67

NEBRASKA LOAN & BUILDING ASS'N

v.PERKINS ET AL.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Feb. 6, 1901.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The purpose of section 19, art. 2, Const. 1866, which declares that “no bill shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title,” was not to prohibit comprehensive titles, but rather to prevent surreptitious legislation, and to obviate the evils following from the practice of including in one bill more than a single subject, in no wise related to one another.

2. Where a bill indicates the subject of proposed legislation, the essential requirements of the constitution are met, although such title is not a complete abstract of the bill.

3. The title to an act of the legislature of 1873 entitled “An act to enable associations of persons for raising funds to be loaned among their members for building them homesteads and other purposes, to become bodies corporate” (Gen. St. 1873, c. 11), with sufficient clearness indicates the subject of legislation.

4. Said act of 1873 is complete in itself, and embraces a single subject of legislation.

5. A statute complete in itself is not repugnant to the constitution, though it may conflict with some other statute.

6. The legislature may not prescribe what construction the courts shall place upon a law. The interpretation of statutes is for the judiciary.

Appeal from district court, Douglas county; Keysor, Judge.

Action by the Nebraska Loan & Building Association against Sarah E. and Cyrus V. Perkins. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.John L. Kennedy, for appellant.

Howard B. Smith, for appellees.

NORVAL, C. J.

Suit was commenced in the district court of Douglas county by the Nebraska Loan & Building Association against Sarah E. Perkins and Cyrus V. Perkins to foreclose a certain mortgage given by the latter to the former; also to cancel certain shares of the stock of said association pledged by said Sarah E. Perkins as security for the payment of the same debt. On the trial a decree was rendered in favor of defendants, the court having found that the debt was fully paid. Plaintiff was a building and loan association organized under the law of 1873 (Gen. St. 1873, c. 11) entitled “An act to enable associations of persons for raising funds to be loaned among their members for building them homsteads and other purposes, to become bodies corporate.” The contract in question was entered into prior to the amendment of said law in 1891. The court below could not have found that said debt was paid, unless the contract was tainted with usury, and it could not have been usurious unless the act of 1873 was unconstitutional; and that it is unconstitutional is the contention of counsel for defendants, who insist in their brief that the act is void for the following alleged reasons: (1) That it contains more than one subject, which are not clearly expressed in its title. (2) That said act, in effect, amends the general interest law, also the general corporation law of the state, without containing the sections so amended, and without repealing the same. (3) Because a portion of the act has been by this court held void, and it is claimed such portion was a material inducement to the legislature to pass the act as a whole. (4) Because that portion of the act which provides that although the dues, fines, premiums, and other charges paid by members may aggregate a greater amount than the legal rate of interest on loans made them, such payments shall not be construed to make such transactions usurious, is an attempt on the part of the legislature to usurp the powers of the courts, and therefore void. These objections we will examine and discuss in their order. If any one of them is tenable, the lower court was right in rendering the decree it did. If none of them can be sustained, the decree must be reversed.

The evils which the framers of the constitution of 1866 sought by section 19, art. 2, thereof to obviate were surreptitious legislation, and a then common practice of including in one bill various subjects in no wise related to one another, by means of which a sufficient number of votes could be mustered to the support of provisions which, if entertained on their individual merits, would fail of passage. It was not intended thereby to prohibit comprehensive titles. State v. Stuht, 52 Neb. 209, 71 N. W. 941;Paxton & Hershey Irr. Canal & Land Co. v. Farmers' & Merchants' Irr. & Land Co., 45 Neb. 884, 64 N. W. 343, 29 L. R. A. 853;State v. Bemis, 45 Neb. 724, 64 N. W. 348;Van Horn v. State, 46 Neb. 62, 64 N. W. 365;Boggs v. Washington Co., 10 Neb. 297, 4 N. W. 984. If each piece of legislation must be confined to a single subject, it is evident that, so far as that one bill is concerned, there is little opportunity for trading votes on one portion in order to secure votes on some other,--certainly much less than under the old custom, which permitted the inclusion in a bill of any number of subjects, regardless of their relations or congruity. If the title must clearly express the subject, the smuggling into a bill of legislation inimical to public welfare is rendered more difficult; for a legislator or citizen who reads the title of a pending bill is apprised of the subject of legislation, although not necessarily of the specific contents of the bill, and thus put upon inquiry as to its contents. It is not essential that the title chosen by the legislature be the most appropriate. If it indicates the scope and purpose of the act, it is sufficient. State v. Bemis, ubi supra; In re White, 33 Neb. 812, 51 N. W. 287. Neither is it necessary that the title inform its readers of the specific contents of the bill. If it indicates the subject of the proposed legislation, it meets all essential requirements. It needs not that it be a complete abstract and epitome of the contents of the bill. If no portion of the bill is foreign to the subject of legislation, as indicated by the title, however general the latter may be, it is in harmony with the constitutional mandate. Boggs v. Washington Co., ubi supra; Hopkins v. Scott, 38 Neb. 661, 57 N. W. 391;State v. Moore, 48 Neb. 870, 67 N. W. 876. It is to be presumed that both legislators and citizens generally are familiar with the institutions sought to be encouraged by the legislation here attacked, and more or less so with the methods by them employed in attaining their objects. Any person reading the title of this act would infer that the object of the bill was to encourage the multiplication of these concerns, that shareholders might, through their instrumentality, secure themselves homes. He would further infer that the bill would disclose the usual provisions relative to organizations of that class. He would expect to find provisions relative to the manner in which money was to be obtained, the conditions upon which its use might be secured by those desiring it, the consideration exacted for such use, and all such matters as are usual to institutions of that nature. Every one knows that, in order to obtain money for any purpose, some inducement must be offered those who have it by those who have it not. This inducement usually takes the form of interest. It is as much to be expected that in such legislation provisions regarding interest will exist, as that there will be found prescribed the rules and conditions for admission of members. If regulations concerning interest are to be anticipated, regulations concerning the rate of interest could scarcely be called surreptitious. Nor would it be a matter of surprise if the reader of such a title should, on a more...