Nebola v. Minnesota Iron Company
| Decision Date | 19 July 1907 |
| Docket Number | 15,252 - (195) |
| Citation | 112 N.W. 880,102 Minn. 89 |
| Parties | JOHN NEBOLA v. MINNESOTA IRON COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for St. Louis county to recover the sum of $24,800 for personal injuries. From an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint, Dibell, J., defendant appealed. Affirmed.
Limitation of Actions.
In determining whether a cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, the day on which it accrued is excluded.
Limitation of Actions -- Disability.
Where a personal injury caused by the actionable negligence of another and resulting insanity occur on the same day, the two events are legally simultaneous, for the law will not take notice of fractions of a day; and the disability of insanity existed at the time the cause of action accrued, within the meaning of the statute of limitations.
Howard T. Abbott, for appellant.
John Jenswold, Jr., for respondent.
The only question involved in this case is whether plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations. The facts, as disclosed by the complaint, are as follows: Plaintiff, while in the employ of defendant, met with an accident on January 12, 1899, sustaining severe injuries to his person, particularly to his head, whereby and from which immediate insanity resulted and continued until September 25, 1906, when his mental capacity was fully restored. The action was commenced on January 25, 1907. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it appeared on the face thereof that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations, in that it was not brought within six years from the date when the cause of action accrued. The court below overruled the demurrer, and defendant appealed.
Section 5147, G.S. 1894, which was in force when plaintiff's cause of action accrued, provides that, if a person entitled to bring an action (mentioned in other sections of the chapter of which this forms a part) is at the time the cause of action accrues either (1) within the age of twenty-one years, or (2) insane, or (3) imprisoned, etc., "the time of such disability is not a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action, except that the period within which the action must be brought cannot be extended more than five years by any such disability, except infancy, nor can it be so extended in any case longer than one year after the disability ceases." The disability referred to in this statute operates to suspend the period of limitations only when it existed at the time the cause of action accrued; for it is settled by all the authorities that when once the statute has commenced to run no sort of disability, unless expressly so provided, will arrest its progress. Counsel for defendant invokes this rule, and contends that, as plaintiff's cause of action arose from defendant's alleged negligence, the injury resulting therefrom, insanity, followed the negligence, and there must, of necessity, have been an appreciable time between it and the injury; hence, that the statute of limitations commenced to run immediately upon the happening of the accident, and was not suspended by the insanity of plaintiff arising therefrom. If this position is well taken, it follows that the plaintiff's cause of action accrued prior to his insanity, and the action is barred. We are unable to concur with defendant for two reasons:
1. The theory upon which statutes of limitations are enacted is that disputes and controversies between persons ought to be ended and rights adjusted, when relief is sought through the medium of the courts, within a reasonable time after they arise, and the periods prescribed for the commencement of actions are deemed to afford ample opportunity to all litigants to apply to the proper tribunals for redress. In the enactment of the statutes recognition is taken of the fact that in many instances persons entitled to bring an action may be laboring under some disability, such as infancy, insanity, and other causes; and, to the end that they may have the same opportunity to right their wrongs as those not under disability, exception is made in their behalf to the effect that, where the disability exists when the cause of action accrues, the statute shall not run during the continuance of the same, within the further limits of the restrictions contained in the exception. The exceptions thus ingrafted upon the operation of the statute are remedial, and should be liberally construed.
It may be stated as a sound general proposition that a cause of action accrues the moment the right to commence an action comes into existence; and, conversely, the right to commence an action arises the moment the cause of action accrues. But the statute does not require necessarily that the disability which suspends its operation shall arise or exist at the same moment of time. If such were to be its...
To continue reading
Request your trial