Neeley v. Incorporated Town of Mapleton

• Decision Date: 21 October 1908
• Citation: 117 N.W. 981,139 Iowa 582
• Parties: JENNIE NEELEY, Appellee, v. INCORPORATED TOWN OF MAPLETON, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

117 N.W. 981

139 Iowa 582

JENNIE NEELEY, Appellee, v. INCORPORATED TOWN OF MAPLETON, Appellant

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

October 21, 1908

Appeal from Monona District Court.-- HON. DAVID MOULD, Judge.

ACTION for damages for personal injuries resulting from a fall upon a defective sidewalk. Judgment for plaintiff in the sum of $ 550, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

T. B Lutz and A. Kendall, for appellant.

Prichard & Newby and H. Chrisman, for appellee.

OPINION

EVANS, J.--

On March 9, 1906, while going toward her home in the defendant town in company with her son, the plaintiff fell upon a sidewalk and received the injuries of which she complains. Her fall was the result of tripping over a loose board, her son having stepped upon one end of it and thrown the other end of it in such a way as to catch the feet of the plaintiff.

I. This action was not commenced until after the expiration of ninety days from the date of the alleged injury. The defendant pleads the statute of limitations, and avers that no written notice was served on defendant specifying the time, place and circumstances of the injury within sixty days from the happening thereof, as required by section 3447 of the Code. It appears from the plaintiff's petition and from the evidence that on March 17, 1906, eight days after the accident, one Chapman, acting on behalf of the plaintiff delivered to G. G. Harris, the town clerk, a writing as follows: "Mapleton, Iowa. March 17, 1906. The Incorporated Town of Mapleton, Iowa Debtor to Mrs. Jennie Neeley. March 9, 1906, Damages $ 1,000. Said damages having been sustained by reason of a fall (or falling) of the said Jennie Neeley on a defective sidewalk on Third street in front of lot one in block twenty-two in said town, on the 9th day of March, 1906; said fall having severely cut and bruised the said Jennie Neeley and endangering her life." This writing was not signed by any person. At the first regular meeting of the council in April, the clerk presented this paper to the town council, and a record thereof was made in the minutes of the council proceedings in the following words: "The bill of damages to the amount of $ 1,000 was presented on behalf of Mrs. Jennie Neeley. On motion Hammond and Scott and City Attorney Lutz were appointed to investigate the same." Members of the council called upon the plaintiff and investigated her injuries, and investigated the place of the accident, having first called upon plaintiff's husband to point out the place more definitely. The defendant now urges the insufficiency of the written notice referred to, having urged proper objections to it at all stages of the trial, and having saved exceptions to the adverse rulings of the court.

Its principal contention is that the notice is fatally defective for want of signature, and this presents the most doubtful question in the case. This court has heretofore held that the absence of signature to an original notice was fatal to the notice as such. Hoitt v. Skinner, 99 Iowa 360, 68 N.W. 788. It has applied the same rule to a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court. Doerr v. Life Ass'n, 92 Iowa 39; State Savings Bank v. Ratcliffe, 111 Iowa 662, 82 N.W. 1011. It was held in these cases that the jurisdiction of the court was dependent upon the legal sufficiency of the notice. On the other hand, the notice under consideration was in no sense jurisdictional, and the tendency of the courts is to construe the requirements of the statute liberally in favor of this kind of a notice; and this is especially so if it has accomplished the purpose intended. It has been said by this court that the purpose of such a notice is to convey to the town council prompt information of the time, place, and circumstances of the injury, so that an investigation may be had while the facts are fresh, and, if the notice furnished conveys such information and has caused such investigation by the town council, it has answered all the purposes of the statute. Owen v. Ft. Dodge, 98 Iowa 281, 67 N.W. 281; Pardey v. Mechanicsville, 112 Iowa 68, 83 N.W. 828. See, also, ...