Neeley v. Martin

Decision Date30 October 1916
Docket Number(No. 224.)
PartiesNEELEY v. MARTIN et al.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Suit by Jeff Neeley, to confirm title to land, contested by A. B. Martin and others. Decree for defendants, appointing a master to state an account of the betterments, taxes, etc., and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Appellant filed his petition in the chancery court of Prairie county to confirm title to certain tracts of land therein described. The appellees asked to be made parties, and contested the petition as to certain tracts of the land. To these tracts it appears that appellant and the appellees deraigned title from one Jesse Martin, deceased. Appellant grounded his claim of title through a sale of the land made by the administrator under the orders of the probate court and a deed by the administrator to the purchaser, one H. P. Vaughan, and also a deed to Vaughan from the widow of Jesse Martin, to whom the lands had been allotted as dower, and mesne conveyances from Vaughan to appellant, and by adverse possession of himself and those under whom he claimed. Appellees claimed that they were the owners of the lands through inheritance as the sole and only heirs of Martin. The facts are substantially as follows: Jesse Martin died on the 25th of September, 1872, leaving his widow, Narcissa Martin, and his children, Elizabeth Lanford (née Martin), an adult, Joseph Martin, A. B. Martin, Henry Martin, and Artimissa Martin, minors, surviving him. Joseph Martin died, leaving a widow, Annie Martin, and one child, Viola Martin, who has since died. Also Henry Martin died, leaving a widow, but without issue. Artimissa Martin married one C. C. McDaniel. A. B. Martin, Elizabeth Lanford, and Artimissa McDaniel, at the time of the decree, were the sole and only heirs of Jesse Martin, deceased. Jesse Martin, at the time of his death, lived with his wife and minor children upon a portion of the lands in controversy as his homestead. At the February term, 1874, of the probate court the lands in controversy were allotted to Narcissa Martin as dower in the estate of her deceased husband. Soon after the allotment of dower the widow and minor children moved away from the homestead to Faulkner county, where they resided for about 20 years. On the 20th day of January, 1877, the reversionary interest in the lands in controversy, together with other lands, were sold by the administrator de bonis non under an order of the probate court for the purpose of paying the debts of the estate of Jesse Martin, deceased, and were purchased by one H. P. Vaughan, who received his deed the 31st day of December, 1879. On the 4th day of October, 1877, Narcissa Martin, the widow, conveyed her dower interest in the lands in controversy to H. P. Vaughan. Appellant obtained his claim of title through mesne conveyances from Vaughan. Vaughan went into actual possession of the land in 1879, and he and those claiming under him, including the appellant, have been in the actual possession of the land since that time, paying taxes and making improvements thereon. Narcissa Martin, the widow of Jesse Martin, died on the 4th day of January, 1906, and appellant filed his petition to confirm title at the November, 1906, term of the court. The court found that the sale of the lands in controversy by the administrator de bonis non of the estate of Jesse Martin, deceased, under the order of the probate court to pay the debts of the estate, was void, and entered a decree, confirming and quieting title in the appellees, and appointed a master to state an account of the betterments, taxes, and rents, and directed him to report at the next term, and the appellant duly prosecutes this appeal. Any other facts necessary will be stated in the opinion.

Roy D. Campbell, of Cotton Plant, for appellant. W. A. Leach, of Lonoke, for appellees.

WOOD, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The deed from Narcissa Martin, the widow of Jesse Martin, deceased, to H. P. Vaughan recites that for the consideration named she sold the lands allotted to her as dower (describing the lands in controversy), and at the conclusion of the deed is this recital:

"I am only selling whatever claim or interest I have therein, said lands having been previously sold for taxes."

In Killeam v. Carter, 65 Ark. 70, 44 S. W. 1032, we said:

"The law wisely grants to the widow the privilege of occupying the homestead so long as she desires. But it is a privilege purely personal to her, which she can neither convey to nor share with another. She may enjoy the rents and profits only so long as she intends it as a home. Strictly speaking, she has no estate in the land itself, but only the privilege of occupancy. Alienation by her confers no rights, but it means abandonment, and the termination of her right of homestead. Not so with an estate for life. That terminates only upon the death of the life tenant."

The deed of Narcissa Martin to H. P. Vaughan constituted an abandonment of her homestead, and at the same time it conveyed to Vaughan the only estate which she held in the lands, to wit, her dower interest, which vested in Martin an estate in the lands...

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