Neely v. Charlotte

• Decision Date: 19 June 1890
• Citation: 33 S.C. 136,11 S.E. 636
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Neely. v. Charlotte, C. & A. Ry. Co.

11 S.E. 636

33 S.C. 136

Neely.

v.Charlotte, C. & A. Ry. Co.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

June 19, 1890.

Killing Stock—Instruction.

Gen. St. S. C. § 1483, requires railway corporations to ring a bell or sound a whistle at a distance of 500 yards from all crossings, in the neglect of which, section 1529 makes them liable for injuries to person or property resulting from collisions at such crossings, unless the person injured was guilty of gross or willful negligence. In a suit to recover the value of a cow, it was error to submit to the jury the question whether the accident occurred near enough to the crossing to come under the law of crossings, without defining such law.

Appeal from common pleas circuit court of York county; Pressley, Judge.

Geo. W. S. Hart, for appellant.

W. B. Wilson, Jr., for respondent.

Simpson, C. J. The action below was brought to recover $125, alleged to be the value of a cow of plaintiff killed on defendant's railroad track at or near a crossing a short distance from Rock Hill depot. The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff of $125. In the charge of his honor, discussing section 1529, Gen. St., in which it is provided that, "if a person is injured in his person or property by collision with the engines or cars of a railroad corporation at a crossing, " etc., he construed the words "at a crossing" to mean at or near a crossing; and he left it to the jury to decide whether or not the cow was killed near enough to the crossing to render the defendant liable under section 1529, Gen. St. This charge is the basis of the only exception of defendant in the appeal. Section 1483, Id., requires railroad corporations to ring a bell or sound a steam-whistle at a distance of at least 500 yardsfrom the place where the railroad crosses any public highway or street or traveled place, to be kept ringing or whistling until the engine has crossed such highway or street or traveled place, in the neglect of which, by section 1529, supra, the corporation is made liable for any injury resulting from a collision at such crossing, unless it is shown that, in addition to a mere want of ordinary care, the person injured, etc., was at the time of the collision guilty of gross or willful negligence, etc. Now, there can be no doubt but that the object of these sections was to prevent collisions which might occur between persons attempting to cross the track of the railroad and the locomotive and cars approaching the crossing at the same moment; and the...