Neher v. Hobbs

• Decision Date: 18 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 92A04-0008-CV-316.,92A04-0008-CV-316.
• Citation: 752 N.E.2d 48
• Parties: Amy N. NEHER, Appellant-Defendant, v. Gregory D. HOBBS and Emma J. Hobbs, Appellee-Plaintiffs.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

752 N.E.2d 48

Amy N. NEHER, Appellant-Defendant, v. Gregory D. HOBBS and Emma J. Hobbs, Appellee-Plaintiffs.

No. 92A04-0008-CV-316.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

April 18, 2001.

Publication Ordered June 8, 2001.

Transfer Granted September 6, 2001.

Branch R. Lew, Kerry M. Hultquist, Hunt, Sudehoff, Kalamaros, LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Dennis H. Geisleman, Dennis R. Brown, Law Office of Dennis H. Geisleman, Fort Wayne, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

ROBB, Judge.

Amy Neher appeals the trial court's grant of a Motion to Correct Errors in favor of Gregory and Emma Hobbs setting aside the jury verdicts and ordering a new trial in the Hobbs' action against Neher. We reverse and remand with instructions.

Issues¹

Neher raises the following restated issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court's special findings of fact sufficiently complied with the requirements of Trial Rule 59(J)(7); and

2. Whether the damage award was inadequate, thereby warranting a new trial pursuant to Trial Rule 59(J)(7).

Facts and Procedural History

The facts reveal that on October 11, 1995, an automobile driven by Neher collided with a G.T.E. van driven by Gregory in Whitly County, Indiana. Gregory was operating the van within the scope of his employment as a service technician or "troubleshooter" for G.T.E. On October 10, 1997, Gregory and his wife Emma filed suit against Neher alleging negligence and loss of consortium and services. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury entered a verdict on the negligence claim in favor of Gregory against Neher but awarded zero ($0.00) damages. With regard to the loss of consortium and services claim, the jury entered a verdict against Emma in favor of Neher. Thereafter, the Hobbs filed a Motion to Correct Errors with the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the Hobbs' motion and ordered that the judgment be vacated and a new trial be held pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 59(J)(7). This appeal ensued. Additional facts will be provided when necessary.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review Trial Rule 59(J)

The trial court granted Hobbs' Motion to Correct Errors and ordered a new trial pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 59(J). When considering a Motion to Correct Errors and a request for new trial, a trial court is governed by Indiana Trial Rule 59(J)(7), which provides in part: "[T]he court shall grant a new trial if it determines that the verdict of a non-advisory jury is ... clearly erroneous as contrary to or not supported by the evidence...." The trial judge sits as a "thirteenth juror" and must determine whether in the minds of reasonable men a contrary verdict should have been reached. Precision Screen Mach., Inc. v. Hixson, 711 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). The trial judge, as a "thirteenth juror," hears the case along with the jury, observes the witnesses for their credibility, intelligence and wisdom, and determines whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Id.

Once the trial court has granted a new trial, we will reverse this decision only for an abuse of discretion. Schuh v. Silcox, 581 N.E.2d 926, 927 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991). An abuse of discretion will be found when the trial court's action is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it and the inferences which may be drawn therefrom. DeVittorio v. Werker Bros., Inc., 634 N.E.2d 528, 530 (Ind.Ct.App.1994). We review the record only to see if: (a) the trial court abused its discretion; (b) a flagrant injustice has occurred; or (c) the appellant has presented a very strong case for relief from the trial court's order granting a new trial. Hixson, 711 N.E.2d at 70. However, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id. The trial court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial. Schuh, 581 N.E.2d at 927. The trial court's action in granting a new trial is given a strong presumption of correctness. Keith v. Mendus, 661 N.E.2d 26, 32 (Ind. Ct.App.1996), trans. denied.

Therefore, it is our duty to affirm the trial court's order for a new trial unless it is clearly demonstrated by Neher that the trial court abused its discretion.

II. Sufficient Findings of Fact

Neher first contends that the trial court erred in setting aside the jury verdicts and granting a new trial because special findings of fact required by Trial Rule 59(J)(7) were insufficient. We disagree.

Trial Rule 59(J)(7)² provides in pertinent part that:

The court, if it determines that prejudicial or harmful error has been committed, shall take such action as will cure the error, including without limitation the following with respect to all or some of the parties and all or some of the errors:

(1) Grant a new trial;

* * *

When a new trial is granted because the verdict, findings or judgment do not accord with the evidence, the court shall make special findings of fact upon each material issue or element of the claim or defense upon which a new trial is granted. Such finding shall indicate whether the decision is against the weight of the evidence or whether it is clearly erroneous as contrary to or not supported by the evidence; if the decision is found to be against the weight of the evidence, the findings shall relate the supporting and opposing evidence to each issue upon which a new trial is granted; if the decision is found to be clearly erroneous as contrary to or not supported by the evidence, the findings shall show why judgment was not entered upon the evidence.

The procedural requirements outlined in Trial Rule 59(J)(7) have been characterized as "paramount," and the process of entering the requisite findings as "arduous and time-consuming." State v. McKenzie, 576 N.E.2d 1258, 1260 (Ind.Ct.App.1991), trans. denied. The purpose of the special findings of fact is to provide the parties and the reviewing court with the theory of the trial court's decision. DeVittorio, 634 N.E.2d at 531. The findings may summarize the evidence so long as the summary is complete enough to facilitate appellate review. Malacina v. Malacina, 616 N.E.2d 1061, 1063 (Ind.Ct.App.1993).

The trial court's June 21, 2000, order on the Hobbs' Motion to Correct Errors provides in pertinent part:

1. On October 11, 1995, [Gregory], was operating a van in the scope of his employment in an easterly direction on U.S. Highway 30 in Whitley County, Indiana.

2. [Gregory's] company van was struck in the rear by a vehicle operated by [Neher].

3. [Gregory] sought to recover damages from [Neher] which he alleges resulted from the collision and for which he alleges [Neher] was at fault.

4. [Emma], his spouse, has a derivative claim against [Neher] for loss of consortium and services.

* * *

7. During the presentation of the case to the Jury, [Neher] conceded that [Gregory], was not at fault in the accident.

8. Further, evidence was presented to the Jury regarding stipulated Worker's Compensation benefits paid to [Gregory], as a result of the accident. [Gregory's] exhibit 322 sets forth this stipulation, which is attached hereto and incorporated herein.

9. The Jury found the Defendant at fault for the accident. By stipulation, medical expenses were incurred by [Gregory], and he was permanently impaired. These damages resulted from the accident.

10. The award of $0 damages to [Gregory], is contrary to the evidence, clearly erroneous, and contrary to law.

11. Harmful error has been committed as to [Gregory].

12. Regarding [Emma's] derivative claim, the Jury found that [Neher] was not at fault.

13. The verdict on the derivative claim is inconsistent with the Jury's determination of fault on the primary claim.

14. Harmful error has occurred as to [Emma].

R. 16-17. Where, as in the present case, the trial court grants a new trial on the basis that the decision of the jury is "clearly erroneous as contrary to or not supported by the evidence" then the findings need only "show why judgment was not entered upon the evidence." T.R. 59(J)(7); Wedmore v. Jordan Motors, Inc., 589 N.E.2d 1180, 1183 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), trans. denied.

Although the trial court may not have discussed the trial testimony and evidence line by line, we believe that the order sets forth a sufficient summary of the basis of its decision to set aside the jury verdicts and grant a new trial. We therefore hold that the trial court's order sufficiently complies with the requirements of Trial Rule 59(J)(7).

III. Damage Award

Neher also contends that the trial court erred in setting aside the jury's verdicts and granting a new trial pursuant to Trial Rule 59(J) because the damage award was within the scope of evidence and therefore adequate. We agree.

A. Standard of Review

The appellate court employs a strict standard when reviewing a claim that an award of damages is inadequate, and we will neither reweigh the evidence, nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Manzo v. Estep, 689 N.E.2d 474, 475 (Ind. Ct.App.1997). We consider only the evidence favorable to the award. Id. Moreover, we must not substitute our idea of a proper award for that of the jury. Prange v. Martin, 629 N.E.2d 915, 922 (Ind.Ct. App.1994), trans. denied. Further, we will not reverse a damage award so long as the damages are within the scope of the evidence. Burris v. Riester, 506 N.E.2d 484, 485 (Ind.Ct.App.1987), trans. denied. A verdict will be reversed only upon a finding that, based upon the evidence, the amount of damages awarded indicate that the jury was motivated by prejudice, passion, partiality, corruption or consideration of some improper element. Barrow v. Talbott, 417 N.E.2d 917, 922 (Ind.Ct.App. 1981). We will not deem a verdict to be the result of improper considerations unless it cannot be explained on any other reasonable grounds. Prange, 629 N.E.2d at 922. Thus, even where the evidence is variable or conflicting as to the nature, extent and source of the injury, the jury is in the best position to...