Neil C., In re

• Decision Date: 01 September 1986
• Docket Number: No. 93,93
• Citation: 521 A.2d 329,308 Md. 591
• Parties: In re NEIL C. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 591

308 Md. 591

521 A.2d 329

In re NEIL C.

No. 93, Sept. Term, 1986.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

March 2, 1987.

Nancy B. Shuger, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Paul A. McGuckian, Co. Atty. for Montgomery County, Alan M. Wright, Sr. Asst. Co. Atty., Rosemary Ross, Acting Asst. Co. Atty., on the brief), for appellant Montgomery County Dept. of Social Services.

Jeffrey Hannon, Silver Spring, for appellant Mother of Neil C.

Rochelle Schneider, Rockville, for appellee.

Argued Before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, COLE, RODOWSKY, COUCH, McAULIFFE and ADKINS, JJ.

MURPHY, Chief Judge.

In Bowling v. State, 298 Md. 396, 470 A.2d 797 (1984), we held that the dismissal of a child in need of assistance (CINA) petition for insufficient evidence of sexual abuse precluded the State from criminally prosecuting the child's father for the same conduct. This case presents the converse of Bowling: Does the defendant's acquittal in the criminal case of child abuse and sex offense charges require the dismissal of the juvenile CINA petition based on the same conduct?

I.

The Montgomery County Department of Social Services (Department) received a complaint that Michael had sexually abused his son, Neil. After an investigation, criminal charges were filed against Michael on August 1, 1985; one week later, the Department filed a CINA petition based on the alleged sexual abuse of Neil. The Department later amended the CINA petition to add a count alleging that enmeshed family relationships and emotional conflicts resulted in lack of proper care and attention to Neil's welfare. ¹ Adjudication began on September 6, 1985 and involved a total of nine hearings, the last on March 27, 1986.

On February 13, 1986, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County acquitted Michael on the criminal charges. He then moved to dismiss the abuse count of the CINA petition based on Bowling v. State, supra. The juvenile court granted his motion, and the Department appealed. We granted certiorari prior to argument in the Court of Special Appeals.

II.

In Bowling v. State, supra, we held that collateral estoppel barred a criminal prosecution after the dismissal of a CINA petition based on identical facts. 298 Md. at 405, 470 A.2d 797. In that case, Bowling's daughter accused him of sexual abuse, and the Charles County Department of Social Services filed a CINA petition based on her allegations. After a hearing, the circuit court dismissed the juvenile petition because the State had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that sexual abuse had occurred. Thereafter the State indicted Bowling for sexual abuse of his daughter. Id. at 398-400, 470 A.2d 797. Because the State failed to prove the allegations of abuse in the CINA hearing, we held that it could not try again in the criminal proceedings. Id. at 405, 470 A.2d 797.

We first noted that collateral estoppel applies in criminal as well as civil cases. We then listed the three requirements that ordinarily must be met in order to apply the doctrine in a criminal case: 1) The first proceeding terminated in a final judgment; 2) the defendant was a party to both proceedings, and 3) the issue that the defendant seeks to preclude the State from relitigating must have been necessary to the decision in the first proceeding. We determined that the dismissal of the CINA petition satisfied these requirements, and thus, the State was estopped from prosecuting Bowling on the criminal charges. Id. at 401-03, 470 A.2d 797.

Implicit in this analysis was our recognition that the State has a greater burden of proof in a criminal proceeding than in a CINA case. If the State could not demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Bowling had sexually abused his daughter, then it could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the abuse had occurred. Thus, the State's failure to meet the lower standard of proof in the CINA case precluded the criminal prosecution. See id. at 404-05, 470 A.2d 797.

Michael argues that if the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had abused his son, it should not be afforded another opportunity to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the abuse did occur. We disagree.

Clearly Michael has satisfied the first two requirements stated in Bowling, supra: The acquittal in the first proceeding was a final judgment, and he was a party to both proceedings. The third requirement is not met, however. His acquittal on the criminal charges does not prove his innocence; rather it reflects the State's inability to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 1104, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984). In the CINA proceeding, the State must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Michael abused his son. Maryland Code (1973, 1984 Repl.Vol.), § 3-819(d) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article. Because the burden of proof is lower in the second proceeding, the issue to be determined by that proceeding is not identical with that determined by the acquittal. See Maryland St. Bar Ass'n v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 535-36, 325 A.2d 718 (1974); Scott v. State, 238 Md. 265, 276, 208 A.2d 575 (1965).

This conclusion is consistent with our previous decisions. For example, in Scott, supra, we upheld the revocation of Scott's probation despite his acquittal on the criminal charges on which the court based its decision to revoke probation. We noted that the court could revoke probation if it were reasonably satisfied that the probationer had violated the terms of probation. Because the violation did not have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, Scott's acquittal did not preclude the revocation. 238 Md. at 276, 208 A.2d 575. Similarly, in Frank, supra, we rejected Frank's assertion that his acquittal in a criminal case precluded disbarment proceedings based on the same conduct because, inter alia, the disciplinary proceeding used a lower standard of proof than the criminal proceeding. 272 Md. at 535-36, 325 A.2d 718 (quoting In re Pennica, 36 N.J. 401, 177 A.2d 721, 730 (1962)).

The United States Supreme Court has also refused to apply collateral estoppel in civil proceedings following acquittals on criminal charges. E.g., 89 Firearms, supra; One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938). In all three cases, the Court specifically found that the lower burden of proof in the subsequent civil proceeding precluded the application of collateral estoppel. 89 Firearms, supra, 465 U.S. at 362, 104 S.Ct. at 1104; Cut Stones, supra, 409 U.S. at 235, 93 S.Ct. at 492; Mitchell, supra, 303 U.S. at 397, 58 S.Ct. at 632.

Michael attempts to distinguish 89 Firearms and Cut Stones because they involved in rem rather than in personam actions. Certainly the seizure of physical objects in each case technically gave the court jurisdiction. See 89 Firearms, supra, 465 U.S. at 363, 104 S.Ct. at 1105. The actions of the objects' owners, however, provided the basis for the seizure and subsequent forfeiture action as well as the prior criminal proceeding. See id. at 363-64, 104 S.Ct. at 1105-06. Unless the forfeiture amounted to punishment rather than a civil sanction, the government could pursue the forfeiture despite the owner's prior acquittal. Id. at 362, 104 S.Ct. at 1104. Thus, the Court did not consider the different...