O'Neil v. O'Connell

• Decision Date: 19 October 1945
• Citation: 189 S.W.2d 965,300 Ky. 707
• Parties: O'NEIL v. O'CONNELL, Secretary of State, et al.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

189 S.W.2d 965

300 Ky. 707

O'NEIL v. O'CONNELL, Secretary of State, et al.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

October 19, 1945

Appeal from Circuit Court, Franklin County; W. B. Ardery, Judge.

Action by Russell O'Neil against Charles K. O'Connell Secretary of State, and Otto C. Martin, for injunctive relief to the end that plaintiff be declared the nominee for the office of commonwealth's attorney in the Thirty-Eighth Judicial District, to be voted on at the November election wherein the defendant Martin filed a counterclaim and cross-petition seeking to be declared the nominee. The circuit court declared the defendant Otto C. Martin to be the nominee, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Prichard & Ardery, of Frankfort, for appellant.

Eldon S. Dummit, Atty. Gen., M. J. Sternberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., and William Wallace, of Lexington, for appellees.

STANLEY Commissioner.

The courts have been called upon to resolve an inter-party contest for the Republican nomination for the office of Commonwealth's Attorney in the Thirty-Eighth Judicial District, to be voted on at the coming November election. Honorable A. J. Bratcher, who had been nominated in the late primary, resigned the nomination upon his appointment as Judge of the District. Kentucky Revised Statutes 119.020(3) prescribes that when such vacancy occurs, 'the governing authority of the party may provide for filling the vacancy.' The certificate of the nomination shall be filed as one made at a primary election. In this instance it was with the Secretary of State. KRS 119.080. The District Committee of the Republican party, consisting of the men and women chairmen of the several county executive committees of Butler, Edmonson, Muhlenberg and Ohio Counties, which compose the judicial district, took 21 ballots upon the nomination being sought by Russell O'Neil, of Muhlenberg, and Otto C. Martin, of Ohio County, with a tie between the two remaining unbroken. On the twenty-second ballot the chairman of the committee cast an additional ballot for O'Neil claiming the right to do so in order to break the deadlock, and declared him to be the nominee. A certificate of his nomination was filed with the Secretary of State. Martin appealed to the State Central Committee of the party. After a hearing, that body ruled that it had jurisdiction of the matter and that the action of the chairman of the district committee in voting twice in attempting to break the tie vote was void. It further ordered that the action of the chairman and secretary of the committee in certifying O'Neil's nomination 'to be and is now declared void and invalid.' It was resolved by the State Central Committee that since 22 ballots had been taken by the district committee without a choice being made, there was a deadlock, and no nomination having been made by that committee, it was declared that the State Central Committee, as the supreme governing authority, had 'jurisdiction, power and authority' to make the nomination. Thereupon, a vote was taken in which 11 ballots were cast for Martin and 6 for O'Neil. Martin was thereupon declared the nominee and the chairman and secretary of the State Central Committee were directed to certify that fact to the Secretary of State, which they did.

O'Neil filed this suit against the Secretary of State and Martin, praying proper injunctive relief to the end that he, the plaintiff, be declared the nominee. The Secretary of State, in answering, set forth the facts and prayed the advice of the court as to which of the two nominees he should certify to the county court clerks as the Republican candidate for the office. Martin's answer, counterclaim and cross-petition was to the end that he be declared the nominee. A stipulation of facts was made, as substantially related above, with the addition of details concerning the regularity of the meeting and the formation of the two political committees, and the filing of some affidavits. A copy of the official rules of the Republican Party of Kentucky and its committees was agreed upon. The Circuit Court declared Martin to be the nominee and granted the appropriate remedy. O'Neil appeals.

The decision of the case turns upon which of the two committees is the 'governing authority' of the Republican Party within the intent of the statute under the present circumstances. That is our only concern. It is a question of identity; but of identity according to the organization of the Republican Party.

Political parties are regarded as a necessity in our republican form of government. 29 C.J.S., Elections, § 84. The recent tragic and calamitous experiences in and with Germany teach us that the people should have great liberty in forming and conducting political parties, free from governmental interference and control. In this state their existence, organization and committees are recognized throughout our statutes, but no attempt is made to regulate or control their internal affairs and operations. As creations of free men, political parties are privileged to make their own rules and regulations and to establish machinery for making their organizations effective. They have plenary powers as to their government and other affairs in the absence of restrictive statutes, and the courts have no power in the absence of statute conferring jurisdiction to interfere with those operations, unless a legal right has been conferred by previous party action. 18 Am.Jur., Elections, § 143; 29 C.J.S., Elections, §§ 84, 85, 87, 88; Commonwealth v. Combs, 120 Ky. 368, 86 S.W. 697; Neal v. Young, Ky., 75 S.W. 1082; Davis v. Hambrick, 109 Ky. 276, 58 S.W. 779, 22 Ky.Law Rep. 815, 51 L.R.A. 671.

The law as to judicial treatment of disputes within voluntary associations in general applies to political parties. It is a basic doctrine that the courts in solving such disputes are guided by the highest authority within such organizations, no fraud or no property right being involved. 4 Am.Jur., Associations and Clubs, § 17. We hold, as do all the courts so far as we are advised, that the courts will not determine rights of conflicting claimants growing out of the government of a political party. Party differences, like family or church disputes, should be settled within the organization or by its dominating authority. Cain v. Page, Ky., 42 S.W. 336; Davis v. Hambrick, supra; Smith v. Howard, 275 Ky. 165, 120 S.W.2d 1040. In a different category are cases where the officers of a party in performing a ministerial act by virtue of a statute do not conform to it. Smith v. Howard, supra. And the courts will protect nominations properly made by a political party and enjoin revocation. Young v. Beckham, 115 Ky. 246, 72 S.W. 1092; Neal v. Young, Ky. 75 S.W. 1082; Meagher v. Howell, 171 Ky. 238, 188 S.W. 373.

We look to the organization of the Republican Party in Kentucky so far as it is pertinent here. The County Executive Committees, composed of the chairmen of the precinct committees, are charged with certain responsibilities and given certain privileges. A District Committee exists as above described for districts which are composed of more than one county. Except for Congressional District Committees, no duties or responsibilities are described for district committees. The State Central Committee consists of eight members from the state at large, and two members from each Congressional district, and the chairman of such district committee. The party rules adopted 'by virtue of the power and authority conferred by the Republican Party of Kentucky in State Convention assembled' declare that subject to any such convention the State Central Committee 'shall be the supreme governing body of the party in the state.' Among other things it has 'immediate charge and full control of the political affairs and subordinate organizations' of the party in the state. It is authorized to 'adopt such measures as may best promote the success of the Republican Party and the election of its nominees.' It is expressly provided that this committee is empowered to create or to abolish existing committees 'and make such rules for the organization and government of the Republican Party as are in its judgment necessary to the best interests of the party.' Also, that 'any ruling by a subordinate committee which affects the party interests or the rights of any candidate for nomination, or the right of any person to hold any place in the party organization shall be subject to appeal.' Controversies arising in lesser governmental units are appealed first to intermediate committees. It is then provided: 'A ruling of any subordinate committee or Congressional district committee that affects the party's interest may be appealed to the State Central Committee. The decision of the State Central Committee shall be final and binding on all questions, and said committee may order any appeal which lies to a subordinate committee or chairman to be taken directly to the State Central Committee.'

It is noted that KRS 118.200, in prescribing the method of filling vacancies occurring after the ballots for the regular election have been printed, provides that in such a case it shall be by 'the chairman of the state, district or county political organization.' It is a logical construction of KRS 119.020(3) that the 'governing...