O'NEIL v. Nelson
Decision Date | 23 April 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 23149.,23149. |
Citation | 422 F.2d 319 |
Parties | Joe J. B. O'NEIL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis S. NELSON, Warden, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Derald E. Granberg, Albert W. Harris, Deputy Attys. Gen., Thomas C. Lynch, Atty. Gen., State of Cal., for appellant.
Joe J. B. O'Neil, in pro. per.
Before BROWNING and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges, and SOLOMON*, District Judge.
O'Neil is a California prisoner, convicted on two counts under the California Penal Code, kidnapping for purposes of robbery (§ 209) and robbery in the first degree (§ 211), and vehicle theft (Cal.Veh.Code § 10851). On April 25, 1968, O'Neil filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court, which granted the writ. The warden appeals (28 U.S.C. § 2253).
The District Judge made his ruling on the basis of the record of the California trial. This is what that record shows. O'Neil was tried with his alleged partner in the crimes, Roosevelt Runnels. The prosecution presented three witnesses, the victim and two policemen. The victim testified that while he was waiting for his wife in a grocery store parking lot the defendants entered his car at gunpoint. They took about eight dollars from his wallet, forced him to drive several blocks from the market and get out of his car, and then drove away.
One of the policemen testified that later the same evening he had responded to a call from a liquor store operator who was suspicious of a white Cadillac circling the block outside his store. When the squad car followed the Cadillac, one of its occupants threw a gun out of the window. The police stopped the car and arrested its occupants. The car belonged to the victim; its occupants were the defendants.
The other policeman testified (over objection) to a statement made to him by O'Neil's co-defendant Runnels two days after the arrest. Runnels' purported statement coincides almost exactly with the victim's story so far as they overlap, but gives considerable credit to O'Neil for masterminding and directing the day's work. Runnels is alleged to have said that O'Neil came to his place in the afternoon before the robbery and asked him if he wanted "to make a couple of hits," and that after the occurrence in question they decided to drive over to rob the liquor store, and were circling outside waiting for the customers to leave when they were arrested.
Both defendants relied almost entirely on an alibi. Each took the stand and testified that they had been at O'Neil's house at the time of the robbery, and that they had been given the car to drive by an acquaintance without warning that it did not belong to him. Several defense witnesses corroborated parts of the story. Runnels flatly denied having made the statement to the policeman, both on direct and cross examination.
O'Neil's counsel did not cross-examine Runnels. He was trying to establish the same alibi to which Runnels was testifying and obviously did not want to ask about the veracity of an out-of-court statement that both he and Runnels wished to convince the jury had never been made. The efforts of the prosecutor to trip up Runnels were to no avail; he flatly and consistently denied having made the statement. Presumably, if O'Neil's counsel had cross-examined on the subject, the result would have been the same.
Before the officer testified about the statement of Runnels, the court instructed the jury as follows:
"Before you relate the conversation, I will instruct the jury that this statement is to be received and considered by the jury only as to the Defendant Runnels, the one who was making the statement, and is not to be considered by the jury in any manner as against his co-defendant, Defendant O\'Neil."
At the close of the prosecutor's case, there was presented the exact situation that was condemned by the Supreme Court in Bruton v. United States, 1968, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L. Ed.2d 476, made fully retroactive in Roberts v. Russell, 1968, 392 U.S. 293, 88 S.Ct. 1921, 20 L.Ed.2d 1100. The warden argues, however, that the Bruton error was cured because Runnels took the stand and so was available for cross-examination by counsel for O'Neil. Thus there was an opportunity to confront and cross-examine Runnels, lack of which is the basis for the Bruton decision. See Parker v. United States, 9 Cir., 1968, 404 F.2d 1193.
We think that in this case the error was not cured. The Court in Bruton relied heavily on its earlier opinion in Douglas v. Alabama, 1965, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934. It is significant to note the use made of that case in Bruton. In Douglas, the statement of a convicted comrade in the crime (Loyd) was introduced to "refresh the memory" of Loyd when the state called him to the stand. It was presented in questions, piece by piece, over strong objection and despite Loyd's absolute refusal to testify. In Bruton this near-misconduct (or dereliction of judicial duty) aspect of the case was not relied upon and the Court said:
"
It is true that in O'Neil's case Runnels did take the stand and was thus available for cross-examination. But he did not "affirm the statement as his"; he flatly denied making it. Under these circumstances, while the statement was admissible against Runnels, both as an admission or confession and for impeachment, it never became admissible against O'Neil. Yet it remained in the record, and Bruton tells us that the court's instruction to the jury is, as a matter of law, ineffective.
The damage done by the out-of-court statement was just what it would have been had Runnels refused to take the stand at all.
The only circuit that has squarely faced the question presented by this case is the Sixth. In Townsend v. Henderson, 6 Cir., 1968, 405 F.2d 324, a co-defendant's confession was admitted in a trial for jailbreaking. In reversing denial of habeas corpus, the court said:
(405 F.2d at 329)
See also West v. Henderson, 6 Cir., 1969, 409 F.2d 95.
A number of circuits, including this one, have considered the application of Bruton in cases in which a co-defendant has taken the stand after the introduction of his out-of-court statement. But the cases that have rejected challenges under the Bruton rule have been careful to emphasize that effective cross-examination was possible, and usually, that it actually occurred.
In Santoro v. United States, 9 Cir., 1968, 402 F.2d 920, the three co-defendants whose out-of-court statements were introduced took the stand and were examined and cross-examined at length:
(402 F.2d 922.)
In Rios-Ramirez v. United States, 9 Cir., 1969, 403 F.2d 1016, cert. denied, 394 U.S. 951, 89 S.Ct. 1292, 22 L.Ed.2d 486, we said:
In Ignacio v. People of the Territory of Guam, 9 Cir., 1969, 413 F.2d 513, we summarized our holdings in Santoro and Rios-Ramirez:
"In both Rios-Ramirez and Santoro we found the rule of Bruton inapplicable because the co-defendants whose out-of-court statements were used to incriminate petitioners Rios-Ramirez and Santoro all took the stand and testified regarding the subject of their extrajudicial declarations." (413 F.2d at 515)
Ignacio, however, was decided on harmless error grounds.
Parker v. United States, 9 Cir., 1968, 404 F.2d 1193, is not to the contrary. There we pointed out that "joint trials of persons charged together with committing the same offense or with being accessory to its commission are the rule, rather than the exception. There is a substantial public interest in this procedure. * * * (404 F.2d at 1196) In rejecting the Bruton argument we said:
(citing Santoro and Rios-Ramirez.)
We also rejected Parker's argument that he had no right to cross-examine his co-defendant. Most of the evidence about which Parker was complaining came from the mouths of the co-defendants on the witness stand. That which came from the recital by F.B.I. agents of out-of-court statements was of minor importance. In essence, Parker is a harmless error case.
In United States v. Elliott, 9 Cir., 1969, 418 F.2d 219, there was no out-of-court statement. The defendant was objecting to the...
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