O'Neil v. Union Nat. Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 06 June 1947 |
| Docket Number | 32194. |
| Citation | 27 N.W.2d 837,148 Neb. 469 |
| Parties | O'NEIL v. UNION NAT. LIFE INS. CO. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
Unless the policy specifically provides otherwise, the term 'due proof of death' as used in a policy of life insurance does not require any particular form of proof which the insurer might arbitrarily demand, but such a statement of facts which, if established in court, would require payment of the claim or some portion thereof.
Baylor Bloss & Evnen and Davis, Stubbs & Healey, all of Lincoln, for appellant.
Frank A. Peterson, of Lincoln, for appellee.
Heard before SIMMONS, C.J., and PAINE, MESSMORE, YEAGER, CHAPPELL, and WENKE, JJ.
This is an action to recover on a policy of life insurance payable to the insured's estate. The trial court dismissed the action without prejudice to a new action after the filing of a proper proof of loss. The plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff as the administratrix of the estate of James F. O'Neil deceased, brought the action against the defendant insurance company to recover $2,500, the face amount of the policy held by the deceased with the defendant company.
The policy contained the following provision:
On December 22, 1943, the administratrix wrote the defendants in part as follows: 'This letter will inform you of the death of Capt. James F. O'Neil, while in military service in Italy, November 4th.' The defendant contends, and the trial court held, that the letter was insufficient to constitute a proof of death under the terms of the policy. In so holding we think the trial court was in error.
The only requirement of the policy before us relative to proof of death is that 'due proofs of the death of the Insured must be furnished.' Under such a policy provision the proof of death need not be made on forms provided by the insurance company, nor does the company have the right to prescribe any particular manner of making proof. If the proof of death is sufficient in law, the insurance company is obliged to accept it.
The general rule is: 'Unless the policy specifically provides otherwise, no particular form of proof of loss is required other than one adequate to enable an insurer to consider its rights and liabilities.' 29 Am.Jur., § 1120, p. 840. An authoritative annotator states the rule as follows: 'The term 'due proof,' as used in a policy providing for the payment of disability benefits, or waiver of premiums, upon receipt of 'due proof' of disability, does not require any particular form of proof which the insurer might arbitrarily demand, but such a statement of facts reasonably verified as, if established in court, would prima facie require payment of the claim.' 109 A.L.R. 826. In support of the foregoing rule we find cited the cases of McAndrews v. Prudential Ins. Co., 132 Neb. 332, 271 N.W. 857, 109 A.L.R. 821; Schollman v. Prudential Ins. Co., 130 Neb. 662, 266 N.W. 75; and Wray v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 129 Neb. 703, 262 N.W. 833. In the McAndrews case we said [132 Neb. 332, 271 N.W. 859]: 'It is true that the term 'due proof of disability,' as used in the policy, does not require any particular form of proof which the insurer might arbitrarily demand, but only a statement of fact as, if established in court, would require payment of the claim.'
The rule is no different in a suit on a life policy than on a policy providing for disability benefits. The principle involved is the same. Under the cited rule the proof of death is sufficient. If the administratrix can establish in court the facts set forth in her letter to the company, a prima facie case would be made. Consequently, the facts recited in the letter constitute a sufficient proof of death within the provisions of the policy presently before us. This being true, the furnishing of proof of death as a condition precedent to the bringing of suit has been met.
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed.
CARTER, J., participating on briefs.
I concur in the result of the majority, but on a somewhat different basis of reasoning.
The policy required only that due proof of death be furhished. As I view it, under the provisions of the policy and the facts and circumstances presented, plaintiff furnished sufficient proof of death because, by its conduct, defendant waived more formal proof. Defendant duly had in its possession all of the information which could be contained in more formal proof.
Partial liability under the policy was thereafter admitted. Defendant refused only to pay the full amount of the claim and simply attempted by its action to arbitrarily impose upon plaintiff the duty not of making due proof of death but of making proof of the cause of death. It sought thereby to establish its limited liability under the war clause in the policy, a burden which plaintiff was not obliged to assume.
Proof of the cause of death need not be given although the insurer arbitrarily demands it, if the policy does not by its terms require specific information to be furnished as to the cause of death. Due proof of death, as distinguished from satisfactory proof of death, means only reasonable evidence of the death of the insured as will give assurance that the event has happened, but a failure to furnish a particular type of formal proof of death does not bar recovery when the policy does not require it, and the company has in its possession all the information which could be contained in such formal proof. 45 C.J.S., Insurance, § 1064, page 1289, § 1067, page 1302; 29 Am.Jur., Insurance, § 1120, p. 840; § 1123, p. 842.
Under the circumstances of this case, it is my belief that defendant waived more formal proof than that presented by admitting and recognizing partial liability for death of the insured, and proposing settlement therefor, upon its own terms. See 7 Couch, Cyc. of Ins. Law, § 1579, p. 5572; 45 C.J.S., Insurance, § 1073, page 1314. The burden was on defendant, having admitted validity of and liability upon the policy for that purpose, to plead and prove that insured died while engaged in military service and that his death occurred at such time and in such manner that defendant's liability was thereby limited under the provisions of the war clause in the policy. That matter was purely defensive, and the burden was not on plaintiff in any manner to establish it for defendant. 46 C.J.S., Insurance, § 1319, page 441.
Justice demands a determination of the case on its merits in the present action, and I concur in the conclusion of the majority that the cause should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
With the concluding statement in the opinion of the majority, I cannot agree. This statement reads as follows:
Before discussing this point, I desire to make a more complete statement of the facts of the case.
This is a suit to recover on a life insurance policy payable to the insured's estate. Action was brought by the widow as administratrix to recover from the insurance company the full face amount of the policy. A jury was waived. The trial court dismissed the action, without prejudice to a new action, on compliance with proof of loss requirements, and the administratrix appealed.
An amended petition was filed on April 10, 1945, in which plaintiff administratrix brought suit for a judgment for the full sum of $2,500 with interest at the rate of six percent from November 4, 1943. Attached to this amended petition is a copy of the policy sued upon, which is marked 'Exhibit A.' The policy is dated March 12, 1937; the name of the insured is James Francis O'Neil, who was 25 years of age at that time. The policy was issued by the Union National Life Insurance Company of Lincoln for $2,500.
Under the paragraph of this policy entitled 'Incontestibility,' the third provision reads as follows:
Under the 'General Conditions' printed in this policy, it is provided that
The company in its answer admitted the issuance of the policy and that the policy was in full force and effect at the time of the commencement of this action. It further alleged that at no time has this defendant denied liability under the policy, but at all times it has recognized it to be in full force and effect. The defendant company further alleged that said policy provides that its benefits are payable upon receipt of due proofs of death, and alleges that no such proofs of death have been furnished to the company prior to the commencement of this action.
For a reply the plaintiff administratrix admitted that...
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