O'Neill Camp, Inc. v. Stuart, No. CV04-0103655 S (CT 9/1/2005)

• Decision Date: 01 September 2005
• Docket Number: No. CV04-0103655 S,CV04-0103655 S
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: O'Neill Camp, Inc. et al. v. Brett Stuart Opinion No.: 90149

Page 1

Unpublished Opinion

O'Neill Camp, Inc. et al. v. Brett Stuart Opinion No.: 90149

No. CV04-0103655 S

Superior Court of Connecticut

Judicial District of Middlesex at Middletown

September 1, 2005

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

RICHARD A. WALSH, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, O'Neill Camp, Inc., (OCI) is the owner of real property at Lake Pocotopaug in East Hampton, Connecticut. The defendant Stuart's parcel abuts the O'Neill parcel on the South, and therefore the plaintiff's southerly boundary is the defendant's northerly boundary. One of the issues in the case is the location of the common boundary line. The disputed land is shown as a cross hatched area on Plaintiffs' Exhibit #3.

There are three plaintiffs in this case; OCI, 1971 OCI, and O'Neill Cove Association Inc. The plaintiff, 1971 OCI, was incorporated as OCI under Connecticut laws in 1971, and forfeited in 1987 for failure to file reports with the Secretary of State. A second OCI was formed in 1991, to replace the forfeited original OCI, having the same officers as (1971) OCI. On January 19, 2005, the "original" OCI was reinstated and it amended its name to 1971 OCI.

In the First Count of their amended complaint of April 18, 2005, the plaintiffs allege that (1971) OCI acquired the O'Neill parcel by deeds of May 3, 1971 and December 14, 1972; that by a declaration of February 11, 1999, (1991) OCI declared itself a condominium pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes §47-200 et seq.; and that the plaintiff O'Neill Cove Association, Inc. manages the common elements of the property pursuant to Connecticut law. The plaintiffs further allege that Connecticut's Marketable Record Title Act (MRTA) extinguishes the defendant's claimed interest in the disputed area, and they seek judgment defining the common boundary as shown on a 1971 survey, Exhibit # 2. The plaintiffs also allege that they have acquired title to the disputed area by adverse possession (Second Count). In the Third Count they allege Trespass and in the Fourth Count they allege that they have acquired a prescriptive easement in the disputed area.

In their AD DAMNUM, the plaintiffs seek to quiet title to the disputed area.

In his Answer dated May 17, 2005, the defendant denies the plaintiffs' claims of title by deed and by adverse possession, denies the claim of trespass and the claim to a prescriptive easement. The defendant also denies that the plaintiffs submitted the property to the Common Interest Ownership Act. The defendant has raised two special defenses; the first that the plaintiff, O'Neill Cove Association, Inc., lacks authority to maintain this litigation; and the second that the plaintiff 1971 O'Neill Camp, Inc., lacks standing. On Page 2 of his Post-Trial Brief the defendant concedes that the plaintiff (1991) OCI has record title to the O'Neill Parcel.

II. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE

In his FIRST SPECIAL DEFENSE, the defendant alleges that neither 1971 O'Neill Camp, Inc. nor (1991) O'Neill Camp, Inc. had authority or ability to submit the property at issue to the Common Interest Ownership Act (CIOA), and that O'Neill Cove Association, Inc. is without authority to institute this litigation.

In his SECOND SPECIAL DEFENSE, the defendant alleges that 1971 OCI is without standing in this litigation.

In his Post-Trial Brief dated June 30, 2005 (pages 27-28), the defendant limits his argument on the Special Defenses to two points:

1. The common interest community was not properly formed, and that therefore O'Neill Cove Association has no standing to maintain this action.

2. Title cannot be quieted in 1971 O'Neill Camp, Inc. because (1991) OCI owns the property. The defendant claims that O'Neill Cove Association, (OCA), has no authority to bring this lawsuit, because at the time of submission to CIOA in 1999, (1991) O'Neill Camp, Inc. (OCI), didn't own the parcel and therefore couldn't have properly submitted it, which would mean that OCA therefore has no standing to institute litigation under CIOA.

The defendant also claims that title cannot be quieted in 1971 OCI, because on February 13, 2005, 1971 OCI conveyed the property to (1991) OCI.

Because the question of standing potentially challenges the court's jurisdiction, it must be addressed.

We begin our analysis by underscoring that a party must have standing to assert a claim in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. Ramos v. Vernon, 254 Conn. 799, 808, 761 A.2d 705 (2000). "Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 258 Conn. 313, 347, 780 A.2d 98 (2001). "This court has often stated that the question of subject matter jurisdiction, because it addresses the basic competency of the court, can be raised by any of the parties, or by the court sua sponte, at any time." Daley v. Hartford, 215 Conn. 14, 27-28, 574 A.2d 194, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982, 111 S.Ct. 513, 112 L.Ed.2d 525 (1990). "[T]he court has a duty to dismiss, even on its own initiative, any appeal that it lacks jurisdiction to hear." Sasso v. Aleshin, 197 Conn. 87, 89 495 A.2d 1066 (1985). Moreover, "[t]he parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court, either by waiver or by consent." Sadloski v. Manchester, 228 Conn. 79, 83, 634 A.2d 888 (1993), on appeal after remand, 235 Conn. 637, 668 A.2d 1314 (1995). "Standing [however] is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate non-justiciable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v. New Milford, 259 Conn. 402, 409-10, 788 A.2d 1239 (2002).

Webster Bank v. Zak, 259 Conn. 766, 774-75 (2002).

The Common Interest Ownership Act (CIOA), codified at General Statutes §47-200 et seq., is applicable to most types of common interest communities created in the Sate of Connecticut on or after January 1, 1984. General Statutes §47-214. The CIOA also replaces the Condominium Act of 1976. General Statutes §47-214. "CIOA was enacted by the Connecticut legislature in 1984 in order to provide developers, lenders and title insurers with flexibility and certainty in establishing common interest communities, as well as providing prospective unit owners and unit owners' associations with consumer protection rights such as disclosure and warranty guidelines . . . CIOA was modeled upon the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, 101, 7 U.L.A. 231 (Rev., 1992)." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ward v. TRC Realty Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV89 0357578 (July 14, 1992, Schaller, J.) (1 Conn. L. Rptr. 28); R. Burke, Connecticut Real Property Law, 51 ("[CIOA] is based almost entirely on the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act"). Stuart claims that the association does not have authority under the CIOA to institute litigation because the condominium known as O'Neill Camp, Inc. was not properly formed. Stuart specifically points out that because the plaintiff (1991) OCI did not become the record owner of the O'Neill parcel until February of 2005, it was unable to submit the parcel to the CIOA in 1999.

The CIOA provides that, "`Condominium' means a common interest community in which portions of the real property are designated for separate ownership and the remainder of the real property is designated for common ownership solely by the owners of those portions. A common interest community is not a condominium unless the common elements are vested in the unit owners." General Statutes §47-202(8). "A common interest community may be created pursuant to this chapter only by recording a declaration executed in the same manner as a deed . . . The declaration shall be recorded in every town in which any portion of the common interest community is located and shall be indexed in the grantee's index in the name of the common interest community and the association and in the grantor's index in the name of each person executing the declaration." General Statutes §47-220(a). "`Declarant' means any person or group of persons acting in concert who (A) as part of a common promotional plan, offers to dispose of his interest in a unit not previously disposed of or (B) reserves or succeeds to any special declarant right." General Statutes §47-202(12). "`Declaration' means any instruments, however denominated, that create a common interest community, including any amendments to those instruments." General Statutes §27-202(13).

"Definition (12), `Declarant,' is designed to exclude persons who may be called upon to execute the declaration in order to ratify the creation of the common interest community, but who are not intended to be charged with the responsibilities imposed on all declarants by the Act if that is all they do. Examples of such persons include holders of pre-existing liens and in the case of leasehold common interest communities, ground lessors . . . Other persons similarly protected by the narrow wording of this definition include real estate brokers, because they do not offer to dispose of their own interest in a unit. Similarly, unit owners reselling their units are not declarants because these units were `previously disposed of' when originally conveyed. If the association, itself, or in conjunction with another declarant, is offering units for sale to others, and if those units have not previously been sold or...