O'Neill v. Burns

• Decision Date: 25 January 1967
• Docket Number: No. 34747,34747
• Citation: 198 So.2d 1
• Parties: William G. O'NEILL, John J. Crews, Jr. and A. J. Thomas, Jr., Appellants, v. Haydon BURNS, Governor of the State of Florida et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1

198 So.2d 1

William G. O'NEILL, John J. Crews, Jr. and A. J. Thomas, Jr., Appellants, v. Haydon BURNS, Governor of the State of Florida et al., Appellees.

No. 34747.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 25, 1967.

William G. O'Neill, Ocala, for appellants.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Fred M. Burns and Wilson W. Wright, Asst. Attys. Gen., James S. Quincy, Gainesville, and Joseph A. Wanick, Miami Beach, for appellees.

ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING

CALDWELL, Justice.

The petitions for rehearing have been considered. ¹ Our original opinion of October 26, 1966, has been revised in certain particulars and the petitions for rehearing have been addressed to the opinion as revised. When so considered the petitions are denied.

This cause is here on appeal from the decree of the Chancellor sustaining the constitutionality of Chapter 65--277, Laws of Florida, an Act appropriating $50,000 to the Junior Chamber International. The appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief against appellees, contending the Act was unconstitutional in that it constituted a pledge or a loan of the credit of the State of Florida in violation of § 10, Article IX of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. Appellants also contend the title of the Act is deficient and that the Act constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.

The Legislature of the State of Florida, regular session of 1965, enacted Chapter 65--277, as follows:

'Section 1. There is hereby appropriated from the general revenue of the state of Florida the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) to the board of commissioners of state institutions to be paid to junior chamber international for the creation of permanent headquarters in the state of Florida, provided however, that such sum shall not be paid to junior chamber international until a municipality of the state of Florida pledges an equal or greater sum of money or value in lands and buildings and that the location within the municipality is a site suitable to junior chamber international for a permanent headquarters building.'

The Junior Chamber International, an organization of Junior Chambers of Commerce, is a non-profit corporation. Its purpose, as set forth in its Constitution, is 'To develop and advance the purposes of junior chamber, to coordinate the activities of its members to achieve this, and to promote the extension of membership to all young men.' The purpose of the Junior Chamber organizations is: 'To develop the individual abilities and stimulate the joint efforts of young men for the purpose of improving the economic, social and spiritual well-being of mankind, by developing responsible citizenship, training programs to develop leadership, planning and executing programs for individual and community development, promotion of economic development and the furtherance of understanding, goodwill and cooperation among all peoples.'

The decree of the Chancellor includes a painstaking statement of all pertinent facts and a scholarly treatment of applicable precedent. Inasmuch as our decision turns on the first point, whether the Ligislative Act in question violates the provisions of § 10, Article IX, of the Florida Constitution, ² we will not discuss at length points two and three, having to do with the sufficiency of the title and delegation of authority.

In his consideration of whether the Act constituted violation of § 10, Article IX of the Florida Constitution, the Chancellor pointed to Bailey v. City of Tampa, ³ a case holding the City could validly convey to the Tampa Board of Trade a parcel of land upon which the Board of Trade agreed to construct a building. The Court found these facts: ⁴

'In addition to the facts shown by that part of the contract here quoted, the record disclosed that the Tampa board of trade had already perfected its arrangements and secured plans and specifications which had been approved by the city of Tampa for the erection of an 18-story office building on the lands described in said contract, free of cost to said city, but at a cost of not less than $400,000 to the Tampa board of trade, the said building to be modern in every respect, with a useful life of at least 75 years; that a very large portion of said building was to be turned over for the use and disposal of said city at the time of completion, and that within 35 years the whole of said building, including the lands on which it was located, reverted free of cost to the city, except such office space as may be necessary for the Tampa board of trade to carry out the purpose of its organization and to operate consistent with public interest. It is also shown that in design, utility, and appearance the said building must be constructed to respond to the various demands of the city of Tampa, and, if not constructed within 3 years, the contract to be void and the lands reconveyed to the city.'

The plans and specifications had been prepared and approved and the size, cost, useful life of the building and completion date were established by the contract. Also, a large portion of the building was for the immediate use of the City and both building and lands would revert to the City after 35 years.

The Chancellor thought Raney v. City of Lakeland ⁵ similar to the case at bar. The Raney case involved a lease of certain municipal property by the City of Lakeland to the Garden Club of Lakeland for a nominal rental. The lessee was required to establish and maintain, as a public service to the citizens of Lakeland, a public library of specified purpose and an educational information service in the field of horticultural beautification. The building, including the library offices, auditorium, club room and exhibition facilities, was to be started within two years and revert to the City at the end of the term. The agreement included covenants against assignment and subletting and provided for cancellation upon breach of any covenant.

The Court, in the Raney case, supra, found the Garden Club of Lakeland was quasi-public in nature and that, under the lease, the club was obligated to render a public service, not limited to its own membership and was precluded from exploiting the land and improvements for private gain.

In the cause before us there is no obligation that the building or lands involved are to serve any public agency or the public generally. Neither is there a provision for reversion to the State, the source of the funds here in controversy.

Many other decisions of this Court have dealt with the proscription inherent in § 10, Article IX, of the Florida Constitution. In State ex rel. Barnett Nat. Bank of DeLand v. Thursby, ⁶ we approved the appropriation of funds by a county to a non-profit county fair association for the conduct of a fair. Overman v. State Board of Control ⁷ upheld an Act appropriating funds to the first accredited medical school established in the State. State v. Board of Control ⁸ validated an issue of university dormitory revenue certificates, and held the fact that individual students would benefit did not deprive the dormitories of public character. In State v. City of Miami, ⁹ the issuance of revenue certificates to finance construction of a warehouse to be leased to the Orange Bowl Committee, a non-profit organization, was upheld. State v. City of Tampa, ¹⁰ upheld the construction of a convention center by a municipality on land leased from a private corporation. But, in the case of City of West Palm Beach v. State, ¹¹ involving the construction of a civic center, marina, and other facilities to be leased to a private corporation having control over the project, this court held the arrangement was 'an improper subsidy of private enterprise with public money.' The Court distinguished its earlier decision in Panama City v. State, ¹² upholding the issuance of revenue bonds to construct a marina, on the grounds that in the Panama City case the City retained control of the project and leased the various units.

The question confronting us is whether the appropriation to Junior Chamber International is for a public purpose. The Chancellor found: 'The very fact of the location of the permanent headquarters at Miami Beach promotes tourism to that City and to Florida generally, but this alone would be merely incidental. It is really the tremendous volume of mailed and otherwise distributed material which publicizes Miami Beach and Florida and directly promotes its tourism that serves a public purpose which would authorize expenditure of state or local property, money, or the pledge or loan of their credit in its furtherance.' He correctly stated: 'It is only when there is some clearly identified and concrete public purpose as the primary objective and a reasonable expectation that such purpose will be substantially and effectively accomplished, that the state or its subdivision may disburse, loan or pledge public funds or property to a non-governmental entity such as a non-profit corporation,' and further, that 'There must be some control retained by the public authority to avoid frustration of the public purpose.'

We must disagree, however, with the Chancellor's application of the principles and authorities reviewed. A public purpose of primary, as distinguished from incidental, benefit to the public has not been shown in the case before us. The fact that Florida, as an address, may appear on letterheads and envelopes and will appear on postmarks of mail forwarded from the headquarters is obviously beneficial to the State but we do not believe that benefit to be more than incidental. Also, it does not appear that any semblance of control of the contemplated property is retained in the State.

To hold valid the appropriation here considered would necessitate an enlargement upon the philosophy established in the landmark cases of Bailey and Raney, supra, and would be tantamount to saying that like appropriations could validly be made to any national or international...