Neill v. Royce
| Decision Date | 29 December 1941 |
| Docket Number | 6391 |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
| Parties | NEILL v. ROYCE (ROYCE, Intervenor) |
Appeal from District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County; B. P Leverich, Judge.
Action by Florence Royce Neill against O. W. Royce to secure support money for plaintiff's children, which defendant had failed to pay according to a former divorce decree. Ida C Royce, the defendant's second wife, intervened. From the judgment, the intervenor appeals.
Affirmed.
J Grant Iverson, of Salt Lake City, for appellant.
W. D. Beatie and T. C. Hanson, both of Salt Lake City, for respondents.
From a decree in equity for the plaintiff in the sum of $ 1,341, Ida C. Royce, intervenor, appeals.
Intervenor is the second wife of O. W. Royce, defendant. Florence Royce Neill was the first wife of defendant. Intervener's appeal arises out of an action by plaintiff to secure support money for her children which defendant had failed to pay according to a former divorce decree. At the time of filing her action, plaintiff had issued a restraining order against defendant restraining him from disposing of any of his assets. A copy of this order was served upon the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Provo, Utah, wherein defendant and intervener held a joint savings account.
Intervener, the second wife, filed a complaint in intervention alleging that the funds restrained at the bank in the joint savings account were her separate property; that she was apprehensive of their loss, and praying that she be declared owner thereof and for the release of the same.
At the first trial of the case, evidence as to the question of ownership of the joint savings account was excluded on the theory that it violated the parol evidence rule. The court granted a motion for new trial and admitted evidence as to the joint savings account.
At the second trial, Ida C. Royce, intervener, and O. W. Royce, defendant, testified in substance to the following facts:
Intervener stated that she had been previously married and upon the death of her first husband on June 26, 1936, was left a widow with two children. That she had realized out of insurance policies, soldiers bonus, and collection of accounts receivable approximately $ 2,500 net from her late husband's estate. She further testified that since August 5, 1936, down to August 2, 1940, she had from time to time loaned to the defendant in excess of $ 1,000 of the monies received principally from her deceased husband's estate. No accurate records were kept by either party as to these loans. It would appear that they were used by the defendant in speculative ventures in purchasing livestock.
They were married on October 14, 1937. The parties maintained a joint checking account at the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Provo. On August 2, 1940, defendant stated to his wife that on the following day he would withdraw $ 1,000 from their joint checking account and deposit it in a savings account in her name. According to their testimony, Mrs. Royce insisted that it be made a joint savings account rather than an account in her name alone. The purpose being, according to the testimony, that in case of her death the money would be immediately available for the education of the children by her former marriage without the cost and trouble of probate.
The following day, August 3, 1940, both parties went to the bank. There they signed a joint tenancy agreement with the bank. Defendant on being questioned whether or not he read the agreement stated, "I don't think I did." On being further questioned by the court, defendant admitted he knew the nature of a joint account but maintained that he had not thought of the savings account in the same way as a checking account. Defendant testified that he had given the pass book to his wife saying,
The lower court reached the same conclusion at the second trial as it had at the first trial. It found the defendant in arrears in support money, and that said joint account was not the sole and separate property of the intervener; further, that the defendant was the owner of the $ 500 deposited by him in court at the time of the second trial to purge him of contempt which $ 500 was obtained from the joint savings account in question.
Respondent urges upon this court the case of Holt v. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 P.2d 715, 718, as being controlling here. In that case this court stated that "where there is a joint agreement executed by the parties which clearly declares the intention to create a joint interest of each in the deposit or credit, the courts will sustain such intention thus expressed, especially where the contract is not attacked for fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity." Again later in the opinion, this court stated that
"Where such intention [joint tenancy] is clearly expressed in a written contract executed by the parties, which remained unaltered, and there is no fraud, undue influence, mistake, or other infirmity alleged, the question of intention ceases to be an issue and the courts are bound by the agreement." (Italics added.)
In passing it is well to note for historical reasons that in the case of Holt v. Bayles, supra, the California cases so strongly relied upon by this court in that opinion arise under a statute in California making the joint tenancy agreement, in case of the decease of one of the codepositors, conclusive evidence as to their intention. However, prior to the enactment of this statute by the legislature, in the case of Kennedy v. McMurray, 169 Cal. 287, 146 P. 647, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 515, the California court had by judicial legislation already arrived at this conclusion. Perhaps it would have been better from a point of legal accuracy for this court in the Holt case to have based its decision on the Kennedy case rather than the cases subsequent to the statute.
In the instant case, however, we do not have a suit between a codepositor and the representatives of the deceased codepositor. We have a suit by a third party against the interest of one of the living codepositors. This court having made the written instrument conclusive evidence in the case of a deceased codepositor, Holt v. Bayles, supra, the question arises what presumption will the law purport into a joint tenancy agreement where both parties to the written instrument are still alive.
To understand more clearly the attitude of this court towards a joint savings account, it is advisable to glance quickly through the history of joint tenancy in law and equity.
The historical background of a joint tenancy has an interesting and fluctuating record. In the early English common law the general rule was that in the absence of an express provision severing the interests, a transfer of estates was deemed by law a joint tenancy rather than a tenancy in common. The law favored joint tenancy at this early time for the reason that a tenancy in common tended to split the feudal tenures, thus rendering it difficult to collect these feudal military services. Fisher v. Wigg, 1 Salk. 391; Ward v. Everet, 1 Ld. Raym. 422; 2 Blk. Comm. 180, 193. As a result much nicety arose in the wording of grants so as to avoid the presumption of the law.
When the military tenures were abolished and converted into free and common socage by the statute 12 Chas. II, (1660) C. 24, Sec. 1, the reason for such presumption of joint tenancy ceased to exist. We find a court of equity as early as 1747, Haws v. Haws, 3 Atk. 524, expressing the view that joint tenancies were no longer favored because "they introduce inconvenient estates, and do not so well provide for families, therefore this court leans against them, and so, I believe, do the courts of law now, though they favored them formerly. * * *" York v. Stone, 1 Salk. 158, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 293, Par. 1; Stones v. Heurtly, 1 Ves. 165.
A joint tenancy being considered "an odius thing in equity," York v. Stone, supra, it was not long before the courts of law expressed a similar view. Hence, in the absence of express words to...
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