Tangren v. Ingalls

• Citation: 367 P.2d 179,12 Utah 2d 388
• Decision Date: 30 November 1961
• Docket Number: No. 9297,9297
• Parties: d 388 O. A. TANGREN, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Adeline M. INGALLS, Defendant and Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Utah

Page 179

367 P.2d 179

12 Utah 2d 388

O. A. TANGREN, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Adeline M. INGALLS, Defendant and Respondent.

No. 9297.

Supreme Court of Utah.

Nov. 30, 1961.

John E. Stone, O. A. Tangren, Peter L. Flangas, Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Romney, Boyer & Ronnow, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

CROCKETT, Justice.

The subject of controversy in these actions is two savings accounts, one of $10,000 in Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association, and the other of $10,247.09 in American Savings & Loan Association. They are claimed by the appellant, O. A. Tangren, executor of the estate of Ben Stewart who originally owned said accounts, and by respondent, Adeline M. Ingalls, whose name was placed on the accounts as joint tenant about 10 months prior to Mr. Stewart's death. From orders of the district court ruling summarily before trial that the respondent Ingalls was entitled to the funds, the executor appeals.

The two savings accounts had originally belonged to, and had been maintained by, the deceased, Ben Stewart. On April 2, 1959, new account cards were made out in the joint names of Ben Stewart and Adeline M. Ingalls. The cards contained the recital that either party could withdraw the funds and that they were joint tenants with right of survivorship. Ten months later, February 3, 1960, an action was filed against Adeline M. Ingalls on behalf of Ben Stewart seeking an adjudication that the accounts were his sole property, and that she had no interest therein. Both banks were notified not to pay out the funds. On February 7, 1960, four days after that action was filed, Ben Stewart died. Appellant executor was later substituted as plaintiff.

On March 16, 1960, Adeline Ingalls commenced separate actions against both banks to recover the funds in said accounts and joined the executor as the defendant in each action. The banks paid the money into court for disposition pursuant to Rule 67, U.R.C.P. The executor filed denials and counterclaimed, asserting ownership of the estate to the money. Respondent Ingalls filed a motion to dismiss the executor's action against her, and motions for summary judgment in her two actions against the banks and the executor. The motions in all three cases were combined for hearing, and the court granted the respondent's motions, sustaining her claim to the funds in the bank accounts.

Joint tenancies in bank accounts with right of survivorship have long been recognized as the authorities referred to below attest. However, in spite of recitals on the account cards, for reasons peculiar to such accounts, courts have been somewhat liberal in permitting proof as to what the true ownership of the funds is. ¹ It is well known that such accounts are often used for some special purpose of the parties in which their real intention is to obtain the convenience such an account affords, rather than to create a true joint tenancy ownership and right of survivorship in the funds. Another factor having an important bearing on the rights of the parties inter se is that the deposit card is basically an agreement with the bank. It is prepared by the bank, is signed by the parties at its request, and for the bank's protection. Therefore, its recitals need not necessarily be regarded primarily as an agreement between the parties, nor as reflecting the true relationship between them.

It is of passing interest to note that in earlier times in cases dealing with such accounts, this court indicated a view that a survivor claiming the fund after the death of the original owner had the burden of showing that the latter intended to make a gift of the fund. ² But that view is long since outmoded as will hereafter appear.

The subject of the ownership of money held in a joint bank account was considered by this court in the case of Neill v. Royce. ³ Plaintiff, a divorced wife, in pursuing unpaid support money, had procured a restraining order against the account held in the name of the defendant Royce and his second wife. The latter intervened, claiming the entire fund. On a first trial the court rejected proof proffered as to the intent of the parties in establishing the account as violative of the parol evidence rule. But it granted a new trial and admitted such evidence; then found the defendant husband to be the owner of one-half the fund and the plaintiff prevailed to that extent. Upon appeal this court sustained. In discussing the status of such accounts, the court expressed the view that an agreement on the account card is presumptively valid and should be given effect unless the presumption is overcome. It quoted with approval this statement by Cardozo, C. J., in his concurring opinion in Moskowitz v. Marrow:

'The plain implication is that as between the depositors themselves, the form of the deposit gives rise to a presumption and nothing more, * * *.' ⁴

And with respect thereto our court said:

'This presumption, injected by courts of equity since ancient time, continues and can be overcome by the intervener only by clear and convincing proof to the contrary.'

We regard this rule as sound. However, it must be conceded that there has existed some uncertainty in our law with respect to the situation where one of the co-depositors in such an account has died before the controversy arose. This appears to be due in part at least to language employed in the Neill case just referred to in distinguishing it from the earlier case of Holt v. Bayles, ⁵ which it cited and stated, 'This court * * * made the written instrument conclusive evidence in the case of a deceased co-depositor.' But the court then pointed out that such rule had no application to the Neill case because the latter was a controversy between living persons, and ruled that as between them there is no such conclusive presumption. Nevertheless, the case of Holt v. Bayles, and this characterization of it, have been relied upon as supporting the proposition that where a joint tenancy bank account has been voluntarily created and one party dies, there is a conclusive presumption that there was a true joint ownership in the fund, and that the survivor is entitled to it. It is not to be disputed that there is language in the Holt case which might justify this idea, nor that it has been similarly characterized in later cases referred to below in this opinion. Nevertheless, we think it is a fair observation that an analysis of the whole case will reveal that the court was in fact concerned to some degree with the actual intent of the parties in creating the account and the equities existing between the litigants; and that appears to be true of all other cases from this court dealing with such joint bank accounts which have come to the writer's attention.

That this was so in the Holt case is manifest by the fact that Justice Folland, speaking for the court, directed attention to these facts: that although the $12,000 check which started the account was payable to and owned by Anna Bayles, it was also endorsed by her sister, Emma. He observed, 'From this fact alone, it may be urged, with good reason that Anna made a gift of the check to Emma. At least there is indicated intent on the part of Anna to transfer some interest in the fund to Emma.' (Emphasis added.) Insofar as its application to the instant case is concerned, it is also important to note that the opinion was dealing with a situation where all of the plaintiff's evidence had been presented, and the trial court had ruled in favor of the defendant donee, the sister, Emma Bayles.

The year following the decision in Neill v. Royce the court again confronted a case closely analogous to Holt v. Bayles. In Wood v. Kinter, ⁶ plaintiff's decedent, Louisa Wood, had received a check from her father's estate, had kept it for a month or two and then delivered it to the defendant, Mrs. Kinter, for deposit in the bank in a joint account. The court stated that the question was: 'Does the agreement in question constitute a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship in Mrs. Kinter? This question has been settled by this court by the cases of Holt et al. v. Bayles, 39 P. (2d) 715, and Columbia Trust Co. v. Anglum, 63 Utah 353, 225 P. 1089.' But in spite of thus paying lip service to the rule Holt v. Bayles is cited for, the court's opinion again clearly showed that it was concerned with the intention of the parties as shown by the evidence. It called attention to these facts:

'The evidence is further convincing that Mrs. Wood desired that Mrs. Kinter have this money upon her death. Mrs. Kinter had been helpful to her for a number of years, had been a close friend and neighbor, had assisted her, and Mrs. Wood had formed rather a deep attachment for her, and, because of the many acts of kindness of Mrs. Kinter * * * Mrs. Wood preferred to give this money to her rather than to leave it to any other person, and so expressed herself.' (Emphasis added.)

The question of the ownership status of joint savings accounts again came up in the divorce case of Greener v. Greener. ⁷ The parties had married late in life after having reared their families. After stress developed, the husband had withdrawn about $20,000 which he had originally owned, but which had been held by the parties in joint savings accounts, and transferred the funds to his son. This court unequivocally approved and applied the rule that there is a presumption of joint ownership arising from the agreement which can be overcome by clear and convincing evidence; and held that under such rule the evidence justified the trial court's finding that the husband had not intended to endow his wife with an interest in the funds. The court again gave a nod in passing to Holt v. Bayles and the idea that the presumption becomes conclusive after death, but proceeded to observe:

'However, since both of the parties in the instant care are still alive, we need not concern ourselves with the reasoning employed to support the...