Neizil v. Williams, 82-3-Civ-Oc.

Decision Date16 July 1982
Docket NumberNo. 82-3-Civ-Oc.,82-3-Civ-Oc.
Citation543 F. Supp. 899
PartiesGermain NEIZIL, Florian Blaise, Maxo Calixte, Aneze Ervilus, Siverni Mercius, Iridenan Meroni, Sainlisiere Nerestal, Wilbert Romelus and Prosper Volcy, Plaintiffs, v. Jesse Franklin WILLIAMS, a Farm Labor Contractor, and Bonham Brothers, Inc., a Virginia corporation, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

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Robert A. Williams, Florida Rural Legal Services, Inc., Immokalee, Fla., for plaintiffs.

Thomas Garwood, Jr., Akerman, Senterfitt & Edison, Christopher A. Detzel, Subin, Shams, Rosenbluth & Moran, Orlando, Fla., for defendants.

ORDER

CHARLES R. SCOTT, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, or, in the alternative, to dismiss defendant Bonham Brothers, Inc. as a party defendant, or, in the alternative, to transfer this action to the Western District of Virginia.

Plaintiffs are migrant farm workers residing in Leesburg, Florida. Defendant Williams is a farm labor contractor also residing in Leesburg, Florida. Defendant Bonham Brothers is a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business located in Chilhowie, Virginia.

Plaintiffs allege that defendant Williams recruited, hired and furnished plaintiffs for agricultural employment in violation of the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act (`FLCRA'). Plaintiffs further claim that defendant Bonham Brothers employed plaintiffs in violation of the FLCRA. Finally, plaintiffs allege that defendants Williams and Bonham Brothers violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (`FLSA') and the Wagner-Peyser Act, and breached their contracts of employment with plaintiffs.

Defendants first contend that this Court lacks in personam jurisdiction over defendant Bonham Brothers. Defendants assert that the only contact between defendant Bonham Brothers and the state of Florida was the transmittal of a job offer through the interstate clearance system, established by the Wagner-Peyser Act, to the Florida State Employment Service. Defendants note that although defendant Williams resides in Leesburg, Florida, the actual recruitment and hiring of plaintiffs by Williams took place in South Carolina. Defendants argue that under these facts, there are insufficient contacts between defendant Bonham Brothers and the state of Florida to invoke in personam jurisdiction.

Where a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction is based solely upon diversity of citizenship, in personam jurisdiction must be conferred under both the state long-arm statute and the due process standard of minimum contacts established by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). However, where a case arises under federal question jurisdiction, or under both diversity of citizenship and federal question jurisdiction, amenability to personal jurisdiction is governed exclusively by federal law, and, consequently, state law is irrelevant. Burstein v. State Bar of California, 659 F.2d 670, 672-73 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1981); Terry v. Raymond International, Inc., 658 F.2d 398, 402-03 (5th Cir. 1981); Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore and O. R. Co., 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954). In the case at bar, jurisdiction is predicated upon a federal question. Therefore, in determining whether in personam jurisdiction exists with respect to defendant Bonham Brothers, only the minimum contacts standard announced in International Shoe should be applied and the Florida long-arm statute should not be considered.

In International Shoe, the Supreme Court declared that:

... due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

326 U.S. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158. The Supreme Court has made it clear that:

... like any standard that requires a determination of "reasonableness," the "minimum contacts" test of International Shoe is not susceptible of mechanical application; rather, the facts of each case must be weighed to determine whether the requisite "affiliating circumstances" are present.

Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1696, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978).

The International Shoe standard has evolved into a two-step test. First, there must be some minimum contact with the state which results from an affirmative act of the defendant. Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 494 (5th Cir. 1974). Second, it must be fair and reasonable to require the defendant to appear in the forum state and defend the action. Id. The actual number of contacts within the state is not controlling. The Fifth Circuit has held that:

... while very little purposeful activity within a state is necessary to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement, we have, nevertheless, unequivocally required some activity by the defendant before permitting the exercise of in personam jurisdiction ... the jurisdictional touchstone being the presence of sufficient in-state business activity to indicate a purposeful enjoyment of the benefits and protections of that state's law.

Benjamin v. Western Boat Building Corp., 472 F.2d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1973).

Although generally single or occasional isolated acts of a corporation are insufficient to confer in personam jurisdiction, under certain circumstances such acts, "because of their nature and quality and circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit". International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, 326 U.S. at 318, 66 S.Ct. at 159. The Supreme Court in International Shoe noted that the quantity of contacts was not controlling and stated that:

Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.
* * * * * *
... to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protections of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 159.

Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing in personam jurisdiction by making a prima facie showing of facts upon which in personam jurisdiction may be predicated. Jetco Electronic Industries, Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1973); Poston v. American President Lines, Ltd., 452 F.Supp. 568 (S.D.Fla.1978). However, in ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction, the court must consider the pleadings and affidavits in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Poston v. American President Lines, Ltd., supra.

The amended complaint in the case at bar alleges generally that at all pertinent times defendant Bonham Brothers conducted business in Florida. Specifically, the amended complaint alleges that defendant Bonham Brothers prepared and submitted a "clearance order rural manpower job offer" form to the United States Department of Labor and the Virginia employment commission, indicating that the forms should be distributed in Virginia and Florida. The clearance order allegedly sought migrant farm workers to work for defendant Bonham Brothers and specified defendant Williams, a resident of Leesburg, Florida, as the preferred crew leader to perform the recruiting. The complaint further alleges that the clearance order was transmitted to the Leesburg office of the Florida State Employment Service which, in turn, notified defendant Williams who allegedly agreed to recruit farm workers for defendant Bonham Brothers. Finally, the complaint alleges that plaintiffs were actually recruited and hired by defendant Williams in South Carolina.

The facts alleged in the case at bar are very similar to those in Garcia v. Vasquez, 524 F.Supp. 40 (S.D.Tex.1981). In Garcia v. Vasquez, supra, a North Carolina employer issued a clearance order, similar to the form used by defendant Bonham Brothers, seeking migrant farm workers to work in North Carolina. The clearance order was transmitted to the Texas Employment Commission. A farm labor contractor learned of the clearance order and recruited and hired the plaintiffs in Minnesota. The plaintiffs, however, were residents of Texas. The North Carolina employer had no regular place of business or designated agent in Texas. The district court concluded that in personam jurisdiction existed, stating:

Due process requirements are also fulfilled. Defendant Keech purposefully issued the job information in North Carolina. The T.E.C. officials merely acted on his behalf in processing the information. The privilege of conducting activities in Texas was intentionally invoked by Keech. This cause of action plainly arises from and is connected with the alleged Texas transaction.

Garcia v. Vasquez, supra, at 42.

The reasoning in Garcia v. Vasquez, supra, is equally applicable in the case at bar. The complaint alleges that defendant Bonham Brothers utilized the interstate clearance system and the Florida State Employment Service for the purpose of recruiting and hiring migrant farm workers. Moreover, the complaint alleges that defendant Bonham Brothers specifically named defendant Williams, a Florida labor contractor, as the preferred crew leader to conduct the recruiting. As the court concluded in Garcia v. Vasquez, supra, the fact that the farm labor contractor actually recruited and hired plaintiffs in another state does...

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