Nell v. Dayton

• Decision Date: 07 May 1890
• Parties: MARIA B. NELL <I>vs.</I> MAY I. DAYTON and Husband.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

43 Minn. 242

MARIA B. NELLvs.

MAY I. DAYTON and Husband.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 7, 1890.

Plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Hennepin county against defendant May I. Dayton and her husband, Lyman C. Dayton, (plaintiff's son by a former husband, Lyman Dayton,) to avoid the deed mentioned in the opinion. The defendants appeal from an order of Young, J., refusing a new trial.

Shaw & Cray, for appellants.

S. A. Reed and Hale & Peck, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

This action was brought to have a deed of certain real estate, executed by plaintiff to defendant May I. Dayton, adjudged void on the grounds, first, that it was obtained by duress, and without consideration; and, second, that the plaintiff was a married woman, and her husband did not join with her in the conveyance. The court found that, while the means used by the defendant Lyman C. Dayton to induce plaintiff to execute the deed were unfilial and reprehensible, yet they did not in law constitute duress; but he further found that the deed was void because the plaintiff was a married woman, and her husband did not join in the conveyance. Gen. St. 1878, c. 69, § 2; Place v. Johnson, 20 Minn. 198, (219;) Yager v. Merkle, 26 Minn. 429, (4 N. W. Rep. 819;) Tatge v. Tatge, 34 Minn. 272, (25 N. W. Rep. 596, and 26 N. W. Rep. 121;) Gregg v. Owens, 37 Minn. 61, (33 N. W. Rep. 216.) The court also finds that no consideration was ever paid by the defendant, or received by the plaintiff, for the conveyance. The evidence is undisputed that the land was the property of the plaintiff; that at the time of the execution of the deed she was a married woman; and that her husband did not join with her in the conveyance.

The main contention of the defendants is that plaintiff is estopped by her conduct from asserting her coverture as a ground of avoiding her deed; and much of the argument of counsel is directed to the question whether a married woman can ever be thus estopped from asserting her incapacity, by reason of coverture, to execute a sole deed of her real estate. It is unnecessary for us to consider or decide this question; for, conceding that a married woman may be thus estopped, and assuming as true every fact favorable to the defendants which there is any evidence tending to prove, there is nothing in this case to create any such estoppel against the plaintiff. Taking as true that plaintiff concealed her marriage, and represented herself to the defendants as being a single woman, and that they received the deed under the belief that she was such, yet there is not a particle of evidence that the defendants, or either of them, ever paid any consideration for the deed, or have ever parted with anything of value for it, or in any manner changed their situation for the worse in reliance upon it. It is not pretended that defendants ever paid, or that plaintiff ever received, any monied consideration for the conveyance. It is claimed, however, that it was executed in pursuance of the written contract, Exhibit I, the title being conveyed to May I. Dayton, instead of Lyman C. Dayton, at his direction, and that this contract shows a valuable consideration for the deed. It must be conceded that if...