Nelson v. Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co., Ltd.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1937
• Citation: 38 Del. 165,189 A. 591
• Court: Delaware Superior Court
• Parties: JAMES R. NELSON and JOSEPH ERNEST RICHARDS v. CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL ALCOHOL COMPANY, LTD., a Corporation organized and existing under the Laws of the Dominion of Canada

189 A. 591

38 Del. 165

JAMES R. NELSON and JOSEPH ERNEST RICHARDS v. CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL ALCOHOL COMPANY, LTD., a Corporation organized and existing under the Laws of the Dominion of Canada

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County

February 5, 1937

Superior Court for New Castle County, No. 36, September Term 1934.

Case heard on petition of the Canadian Industrial Alcohol Company Limited, and rule issued thereon to show cause why a judgment should not be marked satisfied on the record thereof.

The petition, in substance, alleged that in a trial between the plaintiffs and the defendant company before this court and a jury, on April 13th, 1935, the jury found a verdict in favor of the said plaintiffs, and against the defendant company for $ 100,000; that the Canadian Industrial Alcohol Company Limited, the defendant, immediately moved for a new trial, and in arrest of judgment; that on September 13th, 1935, those motions were denied by the trial court ([Del. Super.] 7 W. W. Harr. [37 Del.] 113, 180 A. 664), and judgment on the verdict found by the jury was duly entered in this court in favor of the said James R. Nelson and Joseph Ernest Richards, the plaintiffs, and against the Canadian Alcohol Company, Limited, the defendant, for $ 100,000 and costs; that that judgment was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State (8 W. W. Harr. [38 Del.] 64, 188 A. 39) upon a writ of error issued thereon; that on December 3rd, 1936, Canadian Industrial Alcohol Company, Limited, the defendant, paid to the attorneys of record of the plaintiffs the amount or sum of $ 100,000; that on the same day that company paid to the Prothonotary of New Castle County $ 107.75, which amount covered all costs on that judgment in this court, and, also, all costs in connection with the writ of error on that judgment and the affirmance thereof in the Supreme Court. The petition in question, also, contained a prayer that the plaintiffs be directed to satisfy the judgment on the record thereof, and that a rule to show cause issue.

The defendants appeared and waived the issuance of the rule prayed for.

When that petition was filed, the attorneys for the respective parties, also, filed a stipulation in writing in this court, which stated, in substance, that in addition to the sum of $ 100,000, the defendant had paid to the attorneys for the plaintiffs $ 7,327.59, which said sums were together equal to the face amount of the said verdict for the plaintiffs, with interest thereon from September 13th, 1935, the date on which the judgment was entered, to December 3rd, 1936, on which date the said principal debt of $ 100,000 had been paid. In that stipulation it was, also, expressly agreed by the attorneys for the parties hereto that the sole question intended to be raised by the petition filed was whether, or not, the plaintiffs were entitled to interest on the said verdict for $ 100,000, so found for them, from April 13th, 1935, the date of that verdict, to the entry of the judgment thereon, on September 13th, 1935.

The precise form of the judgment entered, as shown by the records of this court, will appear in the opinion of the court.

Prayer of defendant company, petitioner granted.

Hugh M. Morris and Ivan Culbertson for plaintiffs.

Richards, Layton and Finger for defendant.

HARRINGTON and RICHARDS, J. J., sitting.

OPINION

HARRINGTON, J.

Under its petition, the defendant company claims that as the judgment entered against it and all costs and interest thereon have been paid, that judgment should be marked paid and satisfied on the record thereof.

In this connection, it claims:

1. That the plaintiffs are not entitled to interest from April 13th, 1935, the date of the verdict, to September 13th, 1935, the date of the entry of judgment thereon.

2. That in any event the judgment entered was merely for $ 100,000 and costs, and did not include interest from the date of the verdict; and that no such interest can therefore, be collected on that judgment.

The judgment entered was in the following form: "And Now To Wit, this Thirteenth day of September, A. D. 1935, judgment on verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for the sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars, besides costs, etc."

A verdict, and the judgment subsequently entered thereon, are two separate and distinct steps in a judicial proceeding; and the amount of the judgment is ordinarily governed by the verdict. No citations are needed to support this statement, but that they are separate steps in the same proceeding is apparent from various statutory provisions of this State pointed out by the defendant.

Among other sections, this appears from Sections 4424, 3764 and 4283 of the Revised Code of 1915.

Section 4424 provides:

"The death of either party, between verdict and judgment, shall not be alleged as error, if judgment be entered within two terms after the verdict."

Section 3764 provides:

"Whenever a judgment is entered, or signed, in the Superior Court (except judgments on verdict when entered before the end of the term next after that in which the verdict is given), the Prothonotary shall set down on the docket the day, month, and year of actually entering or signing it."

The defendant particularly relies, however, on Section 4283, which provides:

"A judgment [entered] upon a verdict, if entered before the end of the term next after that in which it is given, shall be deemed to be entered at the same time as the verdict, and shall bind accordingly."

But these provisions do not settle the question before us.

In the early days of the common law, neither a verdict, the judgment entered thereon, nor any other debts, bore interest. Kelsey v. Murphy, 30 Pa. 340; Erie Ry. Co. v. Ackerson, 33 N.J.L. 33; So. on Damages, §§ 301, 302; 33 C. J. 180.

Even before the statutes of 3 and 4 William IV. and 1 and 2 Victoria, that rule had been modified in some particulars in England (So. on Damages, § 302), and under the later rule, it seems, that though perhaps in most cases it was collected by suit on such judgment, and not by execution process issued on it, interest could be collected on a debt reduced to judgment. Watson v. Fuller, 6 Johns. 283; Erie Ry. Co. v. Ackerson, 33 N.J.L. 33; 2 Freeman on Judg., § 1090, p. 2262.

In Watson v. Fuller, 6 Johns. 283, Chancellor Kent, then Chief Justice, said:

"'Upon a judgment at law,' as Lord Loughborough admitted (2 Vezey Jun. 162), 'no interest subsequent to the judgment can be received. You may bring a fresh action for it, as a new cause of suit; but you cannot levy for it, nor charge the land under the elegit, with the intermediate interest from the date of the judgment.' And in another case, Lord Hardwicke said, that 'at law, where there is no penalty, no interest is given; where there is a penalty, you may levy the whole. If you bring an action of debt, interest may be recovered by that new action.' (2 Ves. Jr. 167.)"

In 2 Freeman on Judgments, p. 2262, § 1090, the author, also, said:

"It has sometimes been said that at the common law judgments did not draw interest, and in an action on a judgment rendered in another State, interest was in one case denied, because the court presumed that the common law prevailed in such state and that it gave no right to interest. The court, however, was not correctly advised as to the common law. By that law, interest could not be collected by execution, and the defendant could satisfy the original judgment at any time by paying the...