Nelson v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company

• Citation: 126 N.W. 902,111 Minn. 193
• Decision Date: 03 June 1910
• Docket Number: 16,438 - (12)
• Parties: GEORGE NELSON v. CHICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

126 N.W. 902

111 Minn. 193

GEORGE NELSON v. CHICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY

Nos. 16,438 - (12)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

June 3, 1910

Action in the district court for Waseca county to recover $1,990 for personal injuries received while employed by defendant as a sectionman. The answer alleged that plaintiff entered into an agreement to accept $250 in full payment of all claims against defendant; that on March 21, 1906, he received that amount. The amended reply alleged that immediately after the injuries complained of plaintiff was placed in the care of defendant's physician, and he was the only physician consulted; that he advised plaintiff that the injuries were an ordinary fracture of the thigh bone, and the same would unite and heal and he would recover perfect action of his limb and be as well as ever and able to go to work in six months; that a few days after a claim agent of defendant called at plaintiff's house and informed plaintiff he had consulted with the attending physician, and he was informed that plaintiff would be able to go to work in six months, and agreed to pay for the services of a nurse, which would amount to $40, and his wages for the period of time during which he would be disabled, amounting to $250; that there was a mutual mistake, whereby plaintiff was induced to sign a release of all damages on account of his injuries, upon the payment of his nurse's bill and his wages for the time he would be disabled. The case was tried before Buckham, J., who denied plaintiff's motion to direct a verdict in favor of plaintiff. The court charged the jury, inter alia, that "if they chose to take the judgment of the physician as the basis of their settlement and that basis failed to be correct it cannot authorize either party to say, I didn't get as much as I ought to have and he got more than he ought to have, and proceed to rescind the contract. The only question is this: Did Mr. Nelson understand when he signed that contract that he was executing a release? If he did there is nothing in this case which warrants a jury in setting it aside. Now that is a distinct statement of the law of the case." The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant. From an order denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial, he appealed. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Release of claim voidable for fraud.

A release of a claim for personal injuries, executed in reliance on fraudulent and false representations of probability of recovery, made to the injured person by an attending physician in the employ of persons sought to be charged therewith, is voidable.

Release of claim voidable for fraud -- mistake.

Such release may also be avoided when its execution was due to a mutual mistake of the injured person and of such a physician who has assisted in procuring the settlement.

Validity of release.

Where, however, such an attending physician in the course of treatment expresses a mistaken, but honest, opinion as to the period within which the injured person, suffering from a known injury, would recover, and where that expression of opinion, when made, had no connection whatever with a settlement, or with negotiations for a settlement, a release executed in reliance on his statement under circumstances here shown was properly held valid.

F. B. Andrews and John Moonan, for appellant.

The plaintiff contends that the evidence conclusively shows that a mutual mistake was made in relying upon the statement of the physician, and that this mistake is sufficient ground for avoidance of the release. Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Fowler, 136 F. 118; Lumley v. Wabash R. Co., 76 F. 66; Houston v. Brown (Tex. Civ. App.) 69 S.W. 651; St. Louis v. Hambright, 87 Ark. 614; International v. Shuford, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 251; Galveston v. Cade (Tex. Civ. App.) 3 S.W. 124; Jones v. Gulf, 32 Tex. Civ. App. 198; Vialett v. Consolidated, 30 Utah 260.

There can be no question in the case at bar but that the condition of mind on the part of Nelson which effected the settlement, was brought about and induced by the statements of the physician. Missouri v. Goodholm, 61 Kan. 758; Gulf v. Huyett (Tex. Civ. App.) 108 S.W. 502; Pattison v. Seattle (Wash.) 104 P. 825; Bjorklund v. Seattle, 35 Wash. 439; Texas v. Jowers (Tex. Civ. App.) 110 S.W. 146; St. Louis v. Richards (Okla.) 102 P. 92; 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. § 878; Pollock, Cont. § 524; Riggs v. Thorpe, 67 Minn. 217.

The court erred in charging as follows: "The only question is this: Did Mr. Nelson understand when he signed that contract, that he was executing a release? If he did, there is nothing in this case which warrants a jury in setting it aside. Now that is a distinct statement of the law of the case." This was another way of the court's directing a verdict for the defendant. This took away from the jury not only all the evidence offered in reference to the statement of the doctor and Mr. Nelson's reliance thereon, but all the question of undue influence of the defendant's officers and agents in procuring the release, and all the other circumstances surrounding the plaintiff, which was the procuring cause of the execution of the release. Prussian v. Milwaukee, 56 Wis. 325; Sheanon v. Pacific, 83 Wis. 507; International v. Shuford, supra; Bjorklund v. Seattle, supra; Haarstad v. Gates, 107 Minn. 565; Peterson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 36 Minn. 399, 38 Minn. 511.

Brown, Abbott & Somsen, for respondent.

OPINION

JAGGARD, J.

Plaintiff and appellant was injured, it was for present purposes admitted, by the negligence of defendant. Defendant claimed, among other things, that plaintiff had released his claim against defendant. Plaintiff replied, alleging that the release was void because of mutual mistake, due to the mutual belief of the parties that the injury was less serious than it actually was. The jury returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff appealed from the order of the court denying his motion for a new trial.

Undoubtedly as was pointed out by Collins, J., in Hedin v. Minneapolis M. & S. Institute, 62 Minn. 146, 64 N.W. 158, 35 L.R.A. 417, 54 Am. St. 628, "false statements and representations, to warrant an action for deceit, must be, generally speaking, as to a material fact or...