Nelson v. County of Allegheny

• Decision Date: 18 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-3511,94-3511
• Citation: 60 F.3d 1010
• Parties: Tammy NELSON, (J.D. # 10); Arleigh Eddy, (J.D. # 17); Ida Kaufman, (J.D. # 26); Sandy Saunders, (J.D. # 47); Donna Skuta, (J.D. # 52); Janet Cocchi, (J.D. # 12); Mary Beddingfield, (J.D. # 7), v. COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, (The "County"); Charles R. Kozakiewicz, Warden of the Allegheny County Jail; City of Pittsburgh, (the City); Mayer Deroy, Assistant Chief of the City Lockup at the time of the incidents complained of, being sued in their official and individual capacities Judy Dick,* (J.D. # 16); Valerie Zyskowski,* (J.D. # 60); Janet Cocchi, (J.D. # 12); and Mary Beddingfield, (J.D. # 7) (* Pursuant to Rule 12(a), F.R.A.P.), Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 1010

60 F.3d 1010

32 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1179

Tammy NELSON, (J.D. # 10); Arleigh Eddy, (J.D. # 17); Ida Kaufman, (J.D. # 26); Sandy Saunders, (J.D. # 47); Donna Skuta, (J.D. # 52); Janet Cocchi, (J.D. # 12); Mary Beddingfield, (J.D. # 7), v. COUNTY OF ALLEGHENY, (The "County"); Charles R Kozakiewicz, Warden of the Allegheny County Jail; City of Pittsburgh, (the City); Mayer Deroy, Assistant Chief of the City Lockup at the time of the incidents complained of being sued in their official and individual capacities Judy Dick,* (J.D. # 16); Valerie Zyskowski,* (J.D. # 60) Janet Cocchi, (J.D. # 12); and Mary Beddingfield (J.D. # 7) (* Pursuant to Rule 12(a), F.R.A.P.), Appellants.

No. 94-3511.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued March 7, 1995.

Decided July 18, 1995.

A. Lawrence Washburn, Jr. (argued), Legal Center for Defense of Life, New York City, for appellants.

Brian S. Kane (argued), Stacey F. Vernallis, Pietragallo, Bosick & Gordon, Pittsburgh, PA, for appellees, County of Allegheny and Charles R. Kozakiewicz.

Susan E. Malie, City of Pittsburgh, Dept. of Law, Pittsburgh, PA, for appellees, City of Pittsburgh and Mayer Deroy.

Before: BECKER, SCIRICA, and WOOD, Jr., ^* Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.

For claims subject to federal statutes of limitations, commencement of a class action tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class, but upon denial of class certification, the tolling period ends. In this appeal we must decide whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would continue the tolling period of a state statute of limitations beyond a district court's denial of class certification until appeals of that denial are exhausted. We also must decide whether Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would permit relation back of an amendment to a pleading that names new plaintiffs after expiration of the statute of limitations when those new plaintiffs are neither substituted nor have shown mistake concerning identity. We will affirm the order of the district court dismissing plaintiffs' claims.

I.

On March 11, 1989, anti-abortion protestors demonstrated on the grounds of a private clinic in Pittsburgh and blocked patient access to the facility. Pittsburgh police arrested about sixty female protestors and took them to a city holding facility until their transfer to the Allegheny County jail. They were detained overnight and released the next day.

On February 21, 1991--eighteen days short of the two-year anniversary of the protest--this lawsuit was filed, as a class action by a representative on behalf of all the women arrested and by four protestors asserting individual claims. The lawsuit alleges that the city and county and their employees, through their actions in arresting and detaining the women, violated the protestors' civil rights under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. ¹ The district court denied a motion for certification of a plaintiff class on November 22, 1991. Eighteen days later, on December 10, the protestors filed a third amended complaint that included two more women asserting individual claims.

After the passage of two more years, and five years after the demonstration at issue, the protestors filed a fourth amended complaint on March 17, 1994. This latest complaint named five of the six women who had previously asserted individual claims (one woman chose voluntarily to dismiss her claims) and added two more plaintiffs, Janet Cocchi and Mary Beddingfield. On May 31, 1994, two additional protestors, Judy Dick and Valerie Zyskowski, filed a joint motion to intervene as party plaintiffs.

Defendants then moved to dismiss the claims of Cocchi and Beddingfield and to strike the motion of Dick and Zyskowski to intervene. The district court granted the motions, holding that the four women's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Cocchi, Beddingfield, Dick, and Zyskowski appeal.

II.

The district court had jurisdiction of this case under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 (1988) and Sec. 1343(a)(3)-(a)(4) (1988). We have jurisdiction if the district court's orders constitute "final decisions" under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1988). The determination that appellants' claims are barred by the statute of limitations is a final and reviewable decision. See Green v. Humphrey Elevator & Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877, 878 n. 4 (3d Cir.1987) ("order dismissing the complaint in the instant action is final and thus reviewable ... because the statute of limitations on appellant's cause of action has run").

We exercise plenary review over a district court's dismissal of a complaint. See Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir.1993); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir.1988). Although we generally review dispositions of motions to intervene for abuse of discretion, Brody ex rel. Sugzdinis v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir.1992), the district court here did not exercise discretion in denying the motion to intervene, but barred the claims because of its legal conclusion that the statute of limitations had expired. In these circumstances, we conduct plenary review. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 560, 94 S.Ct. 756, 769-70, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974) ("In denying permission to intervene in this case, however, Judge Pence did not purport to weigh the competing considerations in favor of and against intervention, but simply found that the prospective intervenors were absolutely barred by the statute of limitations. This determination was not an exercise of discretion, but rather a conclusion of law...."). Similarly, "[w]e have plenary review of the district court's choice and interpretation of applicable tolling principles and its conclusion that the facts gave rise to a tolling of the statute of limitations." Sheet Metal Workers, Local 19 v. 2300 Group, Inc., 949 F.2d 1274, 1278 (3d Cir.1991). Finally, our review of the district court's construction of Pennsylvania law is de novo. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1220-21, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991) ("We conclude that a court of appeals should review de novo a district court's determination of state law."); Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1557 (3d Cir.) ("The determinations regarding state law, where appropriate, will be reviewed de novo."), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 480, 130 L.Ed.2d 393 (1994).

III.

Because Congress did not establish a statute of limitations applicable to Sec. 1983 actions brought in federal court, federal district courts must "borrow" state laws of limitations governing analogous state causes of actions. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-85, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1794-96, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1980) (citing 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 and numerous cases). Furthermore, "the practice of 'borrowing' state statutes of limitations 'logically include[s] rules of tolling.' " Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 657, 103 S.Ct. 2611, 2616, 77 L.Ed.2d 74 (1983) (citing Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 485, 100 S.Ct. at 1795-96). The parties agree that Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations applies to the plaintiffs' Sec. 1983 claims here and that the running of the statute properly was tolled when the class action was filed. The parties dispute, however, the duration of the tolling period applicable to claims of class members.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court approves tolling the running of statutes of limitations while eligible class members are putative parties to a class action. See Alessandro v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 487 Pa. 274, 409 A.2d 347, 350 n. 9 (1979). The United States Supreme Court has held that such tolling protects both intervenors and purported class members who later file individual actions. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350, 103 S.Ct. 2392, 2395-96, 76 L.Ed.2d 628 (1983); American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554, 94 S.Ct. 756, 766-67, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974). ² The dispute here concerns when such tolling stops. The defendants argue the tolling period ended when the district court denied certification of the class. Plaintiffs contend that tolling should have continued until the class representative's appeal of the denial was exhausted.

Plaintiffs seek to rely on a decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court that held tolling continued during the pendency of the class representative's appeal. Miller v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 352 Pa.Super. 581, 508 A.2d 1222, 1231 (1986). The district court declined to follow the Miller panel, noting the different appellate procedures followed by Pennsylvania and federal courts. Pennsylvania courts treat the denial of class certification as a final order from which an appeal may be taken immediately. Alessandro, 409 A.2d at 350. Denial of class certification by a federal court, however, is interlocutory and ordinarily not immediately appealable. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 470, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2458-59, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). Thus, in state court proceedings, there is some logic to continuing the tolling period while the certification decision is resolved. But in federal court, such a continuation would result in a substantial extension of the tolling period. The district court found that this distinction made application of the Superior Court's rule to cases in federal courts unreasonable. We agree.

In deciding that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would similarly credit this distinction, we observe that, in related contexts, Pennsylvania's highest court has weighed the policies warranting application of tolling periods to statutes of limitations against the risks of diluting those statutes. "Statutes of limitations embody important policy judgments that must be taken into account in determining the scope of application of the tolling principle." Cunningham v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 515 Pa. 486, 530 A.2d 407, 409 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008...