Nelson v. Crawford

• Decision Date: 21 December 1899
• Citation: 122 Mich. 466,81 N.W. 335
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: NELSON v. CRAWFORD.

81 N.W. 335

122 Mich. 466

NELSON v. CRAWFORD.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 21, 1899

Error to circuit court, Cass county; Harsen D. Smith, Judge.

Action for personal injuries by Sarah Nelson against Robert Crawford. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Plaintiff and her husband reside on a farm about 40 rods from the residence of defendant. One evening defendant, dressed in woman's clothes, navy-blue bicycle skirt, light waist sailor hat, with flowers on it, and a thin, black face veil took a parasol, and went to her house. He had been a frequent visitor there, and was accustomed to play with her children. Although for many years he had been adjudged insane or incompetent, his malady was of a harmless character, and it had never been considered necessary to restrain him. There is no testimony to show that he acted from malicious motives, or with any intent to do injury to plaintiff or any one. He said to others, shortly afterwards, 'I did it to have a little fun; to see if they had any nerve.' As he approached the back of the house, plaintiff stepped to the back door, and saw defendant standing three or four rods away. She spoke to him, but he made no reply,--only 'mumbled.' She testified that she was frightened, and ran into the house and into her bedroom, where her husband was in bed; that she called to her husband to get up, telling him that 'there is something here; I don't know what it is;' that defendant followed her into the house, and to the bedroom door; that her husband took up a stick of wood, raised it and told defendant to get out of the house; that defendant then gave his name; that she was made ill by fright; and that on October 22d, 42 days after the fright, she had a miscarriage, which she attributes to the fright. The only demonstration he made was by tapping the end of his parasol on the ground or floor. This suit is brought to recover damages resulting from the fright. The court directed a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that there was no assault or attempt to do her any bodily or physical injury, and that the law does not recognize fright alone, unaccompanied by any physical injury, as a basis for damages.

John Wooster and John R. Carr, for appellant.

Charles E. Sweet, for appellee.

GRANT C.J. (after stating the facts).

We think the court properly held that no violence was offered or threatened, and therefore there was no assault. The second question is new in this state. The decisions are not harmonious, and cannot well be reconciled. The court, in directing the verdict, quoted the following language from the late case of Mitchell v. Railway Co., 151 N.Y. 109 45 N.E. 354: 'If the right of recovery in this class of cases should be once established, it would naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned without detection, and where the damages must result on mere conjecture and speculation. The difficulty which often exists in the cases of alleged physical injury, in determining whether they exist, * * * would not only be greatly increased, but a wide field would be opened for fictitious and speculative claims. To establish such a doctrine would be contrary to principles of public policy. * * * We think the most reliable and better-considered cases, as well as public policy, fully justify us in holding that a plaintiff cannot recover for injuries occasioned by fright, where there is no immediate personal injury.' The damages claimed in that case are of the same character as those here claimed. The immediate effect of the fright in that case was greater, as the plaintiff became unconscious by reason of the fright. The facts were that while plaintiff was standing upon the crosswalk of a street awaiting an opportunity to board one of the defendant's cars, and just as she was about to step upon it, the team attached to the car drew near, turned to the right, and came so close to her that, when they were stopped, she stood between the horses' heads. Many of the cases are cited and commented on in the recent case of Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N.E. 657, in which it was held that no recovery for fright, without physical injury, is authorized by the common law or by statute. The facts of that case are much stronger for the plaintiff than are those in this case. The defendant was the landlord of plaintiff's sister; went to the house to collect rent; found the door ajar; opened it; walked upstairs; stepped inside the bedroom door; saw plaintiff sitting upon the floor; asked what she was doing, waived his arm, and, in a loud and apparently angry voice, said: 'I forbid you moving. If you attempt to move, I will have a constable here in five minutes. I refuse to take possession of these premises.' Plaintiff testified: 'I was so frightened I was paralyzed with fear.' Plaintiff recovered a large verdict. In its opinion the court say: 'These acts could not, in the ordinary course of things, have been reasonably anticipated to cause a diseased condition of appellant,--to create in her a seriously diseased condition. Appellee might reasonably have anticipated that his acts would cause excitement, or even fright; but fright and excitement so seldom result in a practically incurable disease that, from the ordinary experience of mankind, such a result could not have been expected. The evidence for plaintiff was that, by reason of the excitement and fright a condition of chorea, or St. Vitus'...