Nelson v. Dettmer

• Decision Date: 24 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 18700.,18700.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Vayle NELSON et al. v. Karen S. DETTMER et al.

305 Conn. 654

46 A.3d 916

Vayle NELSON et al.

v.Karen S. DETTMER et al.

No. 18700.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 13, 2012.

Decided July 24, 2012.

Michael G. Rigg, Hartford, for the appellants (defendant John Dempsey Hospital et al.).

Steven D. Ecker, Hartford, with whom were Paul A. Slager, Stamford, and, on the brief, M. Caitlin S. Anderson, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and HARPER, Js.^*

McLACHLAN, J.

In this appeal, we must determine whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction and substantive authority to set aside its prior decision granting a motion for summary judgment. The issues on appeal arise out of two reversals of fortune, so to speak, in favor of the named plaintiff, Vayle Nelson (plaintiff), through her parents and next friends, Susan Birk and Glen Nelson, in a medical malpractice action against, inter alia, the defendants, John Dempsey Hospital and the University of Connecticut Health Center (state). The claims commissioner (commissioner) granted the plaintiff permission to sue the state after vacating an earlier decision dismissing the plaintiff's claim, and the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to set aside the summary judgment rendered in favor of the state after the legislature amended General Statutes § 4–158 to authorize the commissioner to vacate a decision under certain conditions. The state appeals from the trial court's decision granting the plaintiff's motion to set aside the summary judgment rendered in favor of the state. The state argues: (1) that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim because the commissioner did not have authority to vacate his original dismissal of the plaintiff's claim, thus leaving the state's sovereign immunity intact; and (2) that the trial court lacked substantive authority to entertain the plaintiff's motion to set aside because the motion was not filed within the four month limitation period provided in General Statutes § 52–212a.¹ We conclude that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction and substantive authority to consider the plaintiff's motion to set aside. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record discloses the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The plaintiff was born on April 30, 2005, in Charlotte Hungerford Hospital. After her birth, due to serious medical complications, the plaintiff was transported to John Dempsey Hospital by the transport team for John Dempsey Hospital and the University of Connecticut Health Center. The plaintiff alleges that she sustained severe and permanent brain damage due to a delay in treatment by the state.

The plaintiff filed a claim with the commissioner pursuant to General Statutes § 4–160,² seeking permission to bring an action against the state. The commissioner dismissed this claim on January 30, 2007, for failure to prosecute because the plaintiff failed to respond to the state's discovery requests. The plaintiff alleges that her attorney had not informed her of the discovery requests or the dismissal of her claim. Upon discovery of the dismissal, the plaintiff retained new counsel and filed a motion to vacate the dismissal and reopen her claim. The commissioner concluded that “ ‘justice and equity’ ” required the granting of the plaintiff's motion and her request for permission to bring an action against the state.

The plaintiff thereupon filed the present action in the Superior Court. Thereafter, the state moved for summary judgment, arguing that the commissioner did not have statutory authority to vacate his prior dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. The state further contended that, because the commissioner did not have authority to undertake further proceedings with respect to the plaintiff's claim, the state retained sovereign immunity, and, therefore, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims. The trial court agreed and granted the state's motion on November 13, 2008. The plaintiff then filed a timely motion to reargue that decision. On February 11, 2009, the trial court granted the motion to reargue but ultimately upheld its prior decision in favor of the state.

Subsequently, on May 20, 2009, No. 09–44 of the 2009 Public Acts (P.A. 09–44) was enacted. Public Act 09–44 amended General Statutes (Rev. to 2007) § 4–158 by adding a new subsection (e) ³ that expressly authorized the commissioner to vacate a prior dismissal in certain circumstances. Additionally, P.A. 09–44, § 1, provided that it applied to all “claims filed prior to, on or after” the date of enactment. On June 11, 2009, the plaintiff moved to set aside the court's previous ruling on the state's motion for summary judgment, arguing that the new subsection (e) of § 4–158, as enacted pursuant to the P.A. 09–44, specifically granted the commissioner the authority to vacate a prior dismissal. The state objected on the following grounds: (1) the plaintiff's motion was not timely; (2) § 4–158(e), as amended, violated article first, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut because it constituted an exclusive public emolument or privilege for the plaintiff; and (3) even if § 4–158(e) did not violate the constitution of Connecticut, it did not impact the trial court's prior decision.

The trial court rejected these arguments and granted the motion to set aside. The trial court first determined that it had authority to consider the plaintiff's motion because it was timely filed within four months of that court's ruling on the plaintiff's motion for reargument, and, even if the motion fell outside the four month limit, it fell within the “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” exception to the four month limitation contained in § 52–212a. Second, the trial court held that § 4–158(e) did not constitute an exclusive public emolument or privilege for the plaintiff in violation of article first, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut because § 4–158(e) applied universally and not solely to the plaintiff.⁴ Finally, the court reviewed § 4–158(e) and determined that both the plain language and the extratextual evidence supported the conclusion that the statute applied to the situation at hand and provided the commissioner with authority to vacate his earlier dismissal. Accordingly, the trial court set aside its decision granting summary judgment in favor of the state. This appeal followed.⁵

On appeal, the state claims that the trial court improperly interpreted § 4–158(e), as amended by P.A. 09–44, to provide the commissioner with the authority to vacate the earlier dismissal of the plaintiff's claim and, thereafter, to waive the state's sovereign immunity. The state also renews its argument that the plaintiff's motion to set aside the summary judgment was untimely under § 52–212a. In particular, the state contends that the trial court improperly determined that it had the authority pursuant to § 52–212a to consider the motion to set aside because that motion was filed within the four month statutory period, and, even if the motion was not filed within the four month limit, it met the “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” exception under § 52–212a. In response, the plaintiff challenges the state's interpretation of § 4–158(e) and argues that the trial court's interpretation of the plain language of the statute is reinforced by the legislative history. The plaintiff also argues that her motion was timely filed because the four month statutory limitation period ran from the date on which the trial court denied the relief requested in the plaintiff's motion to reargue the summary judgment decision, not the date summary judgment was rendered, as the defendant claims. Alternatively, the plaintiff suggests that the new subsection (e) of § 4–158, triggered the application of the “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” exception to § 52–212a, permitting the filing of an untimely motion to open or set aside when strict adherence to the four month time limit would thwart the purpose of remedial legislation. Upon consideration of these claims, we agree with the plaintiff.

I

We begin with the state's contention that the trial court improperly interpreted § 4–158(e) to provide the commissioner with the authority to vacate an earlier dismissal of a claim and to conduct further proceedings, including waiving the state's sovereign immunity. “Sovereign immunity relates to a court's subject matterjurisdiction over a case ... and therefore presents a question of law over which we exercise de novo review.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 711, 937 A.2d 675 (2007). “Once the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented.... The court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Paul Travelers Cos. v. Kuehl, 299 Conn. 800, 816, 12 A.3d 852 (2011).

“The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law.... It has deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient common law.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, supra, 284 Conn. at 711, 937 A.2d 675. “[T]he doctrine protects the state from unconsented to litigation, as well as unconsented to liability.” Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 166, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000), overruled on other grounds by Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 325, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). When the state has not expressly waived sovereign immunity by statute,⁶ “a plaintiff who seeks to bring an action for monetary damages against the state must first obtain authorization from the [commissioner].... [T]he ... commissioner is authorized by statute to hear monetary claims against the state and determine whether the claimant has a cognizable...