Nelson v. Duckworth
| Decision Date | 01 May 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. S 83-534.,S 83-534. |
| Citation | 585 F. Supp. 462 |
| Parties | Robert NELSON and Charles Nelson, Petitioners, v. Jack R. DUCKWORTH, Superintendent, and Indiana Attorney General, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
Robert Nelson and Charles Nelson, pro se.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen. of Ind., David L. Steiner, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, Ind., for respondent.
This petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by two inmates presently incarcerated at the Indiana State Prison in Michigan City, Indiana. The matter is now before this court on respondents' motion to deny the writ and dismiss the petition, contained in their return to order to show cause. Both sides having briefed their respective positions, and the complete state court record having been filed with and carefully examined by this court per Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), this petition is now ripe for ruling.
Petitioners were convicted in a joint state court jury trial of rape and kidnapping, for which they each received prison sentences of twenty-one years (rape) and life (kidnapping). Their convictions were unanimously affirmed on direct appeal by the Supreme Court of Indiana. Nelson v. State, 265 Ind. 542, 356 N.E.2d 682 (1976). Petitioners subsequently commenced a post-conviction proceeding under Ind. P.C.R. 1 § 1 et seq., raising the claims now in issue. The state trial court denied post-conviction relief, and the Supreme Court of Indiana unanimously affirmed the denial of relief, finding no merit in petitioners' claims. Nelson v. State, 272 Ind. 692, 401 N.E.2d 666 (1980).
The grounds raised by the petitioners are, as follows:
In addressing petitioners' grounds for relief, several general principles should be noted. It should be observed that petitioners have not shown that the various state proceedings were less than full and fair, and, indeed, the state court records reveal that petitioners were afforded an adequate opportunity to raise their claims in the state courts. Accordingly, the factual findings of the state courts with respect to the present issues, including those set out in the opinions of the Supreme Court of Indiana, supra, are entitled to deference by this court, and those findings, being fully supported by the record, provide an adequate basis for decision herein. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981); United States ex rel. Clark v. Fike, 538 F.2d 750 (7th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1064, 97 S.Ct. 791, 50 L.Ed.2d 781 (1977).
Thus, it is the petitioners' burden to establish that the merits of an issue were not resolved against them in full and fair proceedings in the state courts. Sumner v. Mata, supra. In the absence of such a showing, this court will accept the factual determinations of the Indiana courts, where relevant on the issues. Sumner v. Mata, supra.
In their allegations supporting ground one in their petition, the Nelsons claim that the state prosecutor used the post-arrest silence of Charles against him on cross-examination, and that the prosecutor improperly referred to Robert's failure to testify and his post-arrest silence in final argument. These allegations are factually inaccurate. The relevant facts as contained in the 1980 opinion of the Supreme Court of Indiana establish that the cross-examination and arguments of the prosecutor were not constitutionally impermissible. In the face of the careful reasoning of the Supreme Court of Indiana, the unsupported claims of the Nelsons do not establish that the prosecutor deprived them of any constitutional rights or a fundamentally fair trial, as is required for the issuance of a writ under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974).
There is no basis for relief under ground one because the prosecutor did not, in fact, use anyone's post-arrest silence or Robert's silence at trial against petitioners. Neither Charles nor Robert were silent at the time of their arrests. Both made voluntary statements following their arrest which were proper subjects of cross-examination and comment at trial. Accordingly, the state prosecutor cannot be deemed to have acted in a manner contrary to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976).
In Doyle the Supreme Court proscribed the use at trial of a suspect's decision to remain silent following arrest and the giving of warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980). The rationale behind Doyle and its progeny was explained in Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982) (per curiam), as follows:
In Jenkins, as in other post-Doyle cases, we have consistently explained Doyle as a case where the government had induced silence by implicitly assuring the defendant that his silence would not be used against him. In Roberts v. United States 445 U.S. 552, 561, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 1365, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980), we observed that the post-conviction, presentencing silence of the defendant did not resemble "postarrest silence that may be induced by the assurances contained in Miranda warnings." In Jenkins, we noted that the failure to speak involved in that case occurred before the defendant was taken into custody and was given his Miranda warnings, commenting that no governmental action induced the defendant to remain silent before this arrest. 447 U.S., at 239-240, 100 S.Ct. at 2129-2130. Finally, in Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407-408 100 S.Ct. 2180, 2181-82, 65 L.Ed.2d 222 (1980), we explained that use of silence for impeachment was fundamentally unfair in Doyle because "Miranda" warnings inform a person of his right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence would not be used against him .... Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of silence maintained after receipt of governmental assurances.
455 U.S. at 606, 102 S.Ct. at 1311-12.
The Nelsons were not silent after the receipt of governmental assurances. On the contrary, the Nelsons both made apparently voluntary comments to the police which had a direct bearing on their participation in the crimes. It should be noted that while Miranda implicitly guarantees that the silence of an accused will not be used against him, the same warnings specifically advise an accused that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law. Id., 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. In its decision, the Supreme Court of Indiana observed that the prosecutor did not use the Nelsons' "silence" against them, but instead made proper use of their voluntary comments. The Court set forth the factual background concerning this matter, as follows:
272 Ind. at 693, 401 N.E.2d at 667.
As to Charles, the Supreme Court of Indiana observed that he had testified at trial and in so doing had admitted his presence during the abduction, the trip to Gary, and in the motel room. Id. at 667. Charles, in his testimony, however, denied any actual participation and on cross-examination even intimated that he had tried to help the victim. In response, the prosecutor asked Charles whether he had ever told anyone of his attempt to aid the victim and whether he had had a chance to talk to the police. Id. at 667. The Supreme Court of Indiana observed that in Doyle v. Ohio, supra, the Supreme Court had reasoned that silence after Miranda warnings is insolubly ambiguous, but noted that Charles' comments were not insolubly ambiguous because he had elected to give an account (following arrest) of his participation in the events. Nelson v. State, supra, 272 Ind. at 694, 401 N.E.2d at 668. The Supreme Court of Indiana observed that no violation of Coyle occurs in situations like that involving Charles Nelson, as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial