Nelson v. Formed Fiber Techs., Inc.

Decision Date13 April 2012
Docket NumberNo. 2:10–cv–00473–GZS.,2:10–cv–00473–GZS.
PartiesSteven NELSON, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FORMED FIBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Benjamin K. Grant, Jeffrey Neil Young, Carol J. Garvan, McTeague, Higbee, Case, Cohen, Whitney & Toker, P.A., Topsham, ME, for Plaintiff.

Heather B. Sanborn, David Swetnam–Burland, Daniel A. Nuzzi, Brann & Isaacson, Lewiston, ME, for Defendant.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GEORGE Z. SINGAL, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket # 40). As explained herein, after reviewing all relevant filings, including the Joint Stipulation (Docket # 38), Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Material Facts (Docket # 56) and supporting affidavits, and Defendant's Reply Statement of Material Facts (Docket # 69) and supporting affidavits, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Generally, a party is entitled to summary judgment if, on the record before the Court, it appears “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). [T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A “material fact” is one that has “the potential to affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.” Nereida–Gonzalez v. Tirado–Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 703 (1st Cir.1993) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505) (additional citation omitted).

The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In determining whether this burden is met, the Court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Santoni v. Potter, 369 F.3d 594, 598 (1st Cir.2004).

Once the moving party has made this preliminary showing, the nonmoving party must “produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue.” Triangle Trading Co. v. Robroy Indus., Inc., 200 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1999) (citation and internal punctuation omitted); see alsoFed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). “Mere allegations, or conjecture unsupported in the record, are insufficient.” Barros–Villahermosa v. United States, 642 F.3d 56, 58 (1st Cir.2011) (quoting Rivera–Marcano v. Normeat Royal Dane Quality A/S, 998 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir.1993)); see also Wilson v. Moulison N. Corp., 639 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2011) (“A properly supported summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, periphrastic circumlocutions, or rank speculation.”) (citations omitted). “As to any essential factual element of its claim on which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment to the moving party.” In re Spigel, 260 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.2001) (quoting In re Ralar Distribs., Inc., 4 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir.1993)).

Where a party alleges that an inadequate opportunity for discovery prevents it from mounting an opposition, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d)1 “offers a safeguard against judges swinging the summary judgment axe too hastily.” BlueTarp Financial, Inc. v. Eastern Materials Corp., 592 F.Supp.2d 188, 189 (D.Me.2009) (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. N. Bridge Assocs., Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1203 (1st Cir.1994)). Specifically, summary judgment may be deferred or denied if “a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). Because district courts “construe motions that invoke the rule generously, holding parties to the rule's spirit rather than its letter,” the First Circuit requires substantial, not perfect, compliance. BlueTarp Financial, 592 F.Supp.2d at 189 (quoting Resolution Trust Corp., 22 F.3d at 1203). A litigant who invokes Rule 56(d) must make an authoritative and timely proffer showing:

(i) good cause for his inability to have discovered or marshalled the necessary facts earlier in the proceedings; (ii) a plausible basis for believing that additional facts probably exist and can be retrieved within a reasonable time; and (iii) an explanation of how those facts, if collected, will suffice to defeat the pending summary judgment motion.

Rivera–Torres v. Rey–Hernández, 502 F.3d 7, 10 (1st Cir.2007) (internal citations omitted).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Pursuant to Local Rule 56(g), for the purpose of determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the parties have stipulated to several facts material to Defendant's Motion. ( See Joint Stip. ¶¶ 1–11.) Defendant Formed Fiber Technologies, LLC (Formed Fiber) manufactures automobile parts at its plant in Auburn, Maine. In 1976, Formed Fiber hired Plaintiff Steven Nelson and, in the fall of 2008, Formed Fiber employed Nelson as a full time employee in its maintenance department. On or about December 15, 2008, Formed Fiber laid off approximately 162 out of 300 employees at its Auburn plant, including Nelson. Roughly one month later, on or about January 12, 2009, Formed Fiber recalled Nelson and several other employees. Nelson and the other employees' tenure was short lived, however, and on January 23, 2009 they were laid off again.

Shortly thereafter, on February 11, 2009, Formed Fiber sent Nelson and the approximately 162 other laid off employees a letter stating that although Formed Fiber had initially believed that the layoffs would be temporary, “changed business forecasts”, “unforeseen circumstances”, and “sharp declines in automobile sales” had changed Formed Fiber's expectations such that “many of the December and January temporary layoffs may, in fact, extend beyond six months.” ( See Docket # 38–1.) Formed Fiber's letter also provided “notice under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (‘WARN’) Act of the possibility that the ... layoffs will exceed six months ..., resulting in a ‘mass layoff.’ As a potential affected employee, you are provided this notice pursuant to the WARN Act....” ( See id.) On a brighter note, the letter stated that “it remains our hope that these layoffs will be temporary and that laid off employees will be brought back to work.” Also on February 11, 2009, “pursuant to the [WARN] Act,” Formed Fiber sent a letter to the Maine Department of Labor, which provided “notice under the [WARN] Act of the possibility that the December and January layoffs will exceed six months in duration, resulting in a mass layoff.” ( See Docket # 38–2.)

Construing the facts as favorably to the nonmoving party as the record will permit, and drawing reasonable inferences from the materials in Nelson's favor, the Court finds the following additional facts for the purpose of deciding this summary judgment motion. ( See Plaintiff's Statement of Additional Material Facts (hereinafter “PSAMF”) & Defendant's Reply Statement of Material Facts (hereinafter, “Reply Stmt.”).) After being laid off, Nelson applied for unemployment benefits. Nelson believed that as a condition of receiving unemployment benefits he was required to look for work on a periodic basis. He also believed that if he refused suitable work which was offered to him, he would forfeit his right to unemployment benefits. Nelson attempted to speak with Formed Fiber Human Resources personnel about the likelihood of his recall, but Nelson's attempts were unsuccessful, which gave Nelson the impression that he was not going to be recalled to work at Formed Fiber. Accordingly, in the spring of 2009, Nelson secured and accepted a job with Chapman Trucking that paid him approximately $7.00 per hour less than his job at Formed Fiber.

Despite declines in automobile sales and changed business forecasts, approximately forty Formed Fiber employees who had been laid off in December or January returned to work within six months; Nelson was not one of those employees. On May 7, 2009, after obtaining the job with Chapman Trucking, Nelson met with Formed Fiber Human Resources Manager Chris Casey and notified Casey that he would be resigning because he had found another job. ( See Voluntary Separation Form (Docket # 38–3) & PSAMF ¶¶ 16, 18.) Nelson asked Casey whether or not his recall was imminent or whether he would be recalled at all. Based on Casey's response, or lack thereof, Nelson believed there was no likelihood that he would be recalled by Formed Fiber.

Nelson also asked Casey about obtaining the balance of his 401(k) plan. During this meeting, Casey provided Nelson with several documents, including a Voluntary Separation Form ( see Docket # 38–3), Formed Fiber's 401(k) Plan Participant Distribution Election Form ( see Docket # 57–1), and W–4 and W–4ME tax forms ( see Docket # s 57–2 & 57–3). The Voluntary Separation Form, which Nelson filled out, signed, and provided to Casey, is a one-page document with minimal text that is provided in clear, capitalized font and states—directly above Nelson's signature—“MY RESIGNATION IS VOLUNTARY AND IS NOT A FORCED LEAVING.” Nelson filled out these forms without reading them, because he believed he needed to do so in order to obtain the proceeds of his 401(k) plan. The record also reflects that Nelson rolled over his entire 401(k) balance directly into an IRA ( see Formed Fiber's 401(k) Plan Participant Distribution Election Form & Formed Fiber's ...

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