Nelson v. Guffey
| Decision Date | 06 January 1890 |
| Docket Number | 231 |
| Citation | 131 Pa. 273,18 A. 1073 |
| Parties | WILLIAM NELSON v. WILLIAM C. GUFFEY |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued November 6, 1889
APPEAL BY DEFENDANT FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NO. 1 OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, IN EQUITY.
No. 231 October Term 1889, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 117 September Term 1888, C.P. in Equity.
On June 20, 1888, a bill in equity was filed by William Nelson against William C. Guffey, in which it was in substance averred:
That on June 6, 1874, William C. Guffey, the defendant, then and now a resident of Westmoreland county, obtained an award of arbitrators against the firm of Blackmore & Nelson, composed of William Nelson, the plaintiff, and James Blackmore, since deceased, which was entered as a judgment at No. 680 June Term 1874, Court of Common Pleas No. 1, for the sum of $9,652.64, that on July 7, 1874, an exemplification of the record of said judgment was filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland Co., at No. 388 August Term 1874, and on the same day said defendant caused a writ of fieri facias to be issued thereon and personal property of Blackmore & Nelson, in said Westmoreland county, to be levied upon and advertised for sale; that on August 13, 1874, an injunction issued from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania, at No. 2036, restraining said defendant from interfering with the property or estate of said Blackmore & Nelson, and no further proceedings were had on said judgment in Westmoreland county until January 8 1887, when a writ of scire facias was issued thereon to revive the same, which writ was returned nihil, and afterward, to wit, February 25, 1887, an alias writ of scire facias was issued, which was likewise returned nihil whereupon, on March 9, 1887, judgment of revival was entered by default for want of appearance, and the sum due liquidated at $12,444.94; that immediately thereafter, upon the filing of the affidavit required by law, a writ of testatum fieri facias was issued upon said revived judgment, directed to the sheriff of Allegheny county, and was then in the hands of that officer for collection from the property of the plaintiff, the estate of said James Blackmore, deceased, being insolvent; and that the plaintiff, having been for many years prior to the entry of the original judgment, and continuously since, a resident of Allegheny county, had no notice of said writs of scire facias, and no opportunity to defend against the same, his first knowledge thereof being the issuance of said testatum fieri facias. The bill averred further, that the original judgment from which said exemplification was taken, had long since been satisfied and discharged; that on or about October 18, 1873, proceedings in involuntary bankruptcy were instituted in said District Court against said firm of Blackmore & Nelson, who were duly adjudicated bankrupts on October 29, 1874; that on February 12, 1879, the plaintiff was regularly discharged as a bankrupt from the payment of all pre-existing debts of the firm of Blackmore & Nelson, the judgment now attempted to be enforced by said William C. Guffey representing one of said pre-existing debts; that the plaintiff believed that the revival of said discharged judgment in Westmoreland county, where no notice could be had by the plaintiff, was a trick and a device, intended to deprive him of an opportunity to plead his discharge in bankruptcy, and thus to secure to the plaintiff an unconscionable advantage in the prosecution of his alleged claim.
So averring, the plaintiff prayed for an injunction directed to said William C. Guffey, the defendant, and the sheriff of Allegheny county, "to restrain them from further proceeding with said writ of testatum fieri facias, and to compel said William C. Guffey to abstain from any and all interference by execution, levy, sale, or in any other manner whatsoever, with the property or estate of your orator, by virtue of or under any authority of the judgment obtained against him at No. 680 June Term 1874, in the Court of Common Pleas No. 1 of Allegheny county, or upon the exemplification thereof entered at No. 388 August Term 1874, in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland county."
A bond having been filed, on hearing of plaintiff's motion after notice thereof, a preliminary injunction was issued and served; subsequently, an answer having been filed by the defendant, setting up the grounds of defence sufficiently appearing in the opinion of the court below, the cause was set down by the plaintiff for hearing upon bill and answer.
On September 3, 1889, after argument, the court, SLAGLE, J., filed an opinion, which, after stating the facts shown by the pleadings, proceeded:
The defence set up in the answer is altogether legal: (1) that the debt was not discharged, because it was created by the recovery of judgment on June 6, 1874, after proceedings in bankruptcy were commenced; (2) that if the original judgment was discharged by the proceedings in bankruptcy, they did not affect the revived judgment obtained on March 9, 1887, in Westmoreland county; and (3) because said William Nelson, before the bringing of his bill in this case, had presented his petition to the court containing substantially the same averments as the bill, and asking that the judgment at No. 680 June Term 1874, be opened to permit him to plead his discharge in bankruptcy, upon which a rule was granted, and after argument of counsel and consideration by the court, was discharged.
If the third objection is good it will be unnecessary to consider the first and second. It may therefore be properly disposed of first.
It has been held in a number of cases that "a bill in equity cannot be maintained to restrain execution upon a judgment at law, where a rule to show cause, etc., founded on the same facts, had previously been discharged by the court:" Given's App., 121 Pa. 260; Gordinier's App., 89 Pa. 528; Frauenthal's App., 100 Pa. 290. This is simply the application of the principle that a judgment of any court having jurisdiction, is conclusive of the matters adjudicated, as between the parties and privies. But in order to make the judgment conclusive it must appear that the issues are the same, and involve substantially the same state of facts, and that the decision was upon the merits of the case. Such does not appear to be the case here. The bill filed is for the purpose of restraining the plaintiff at No. 680 June Term 1874, from proceeding to execute in this county a testatum fieri facias upon a judgment entered in Westmoreland county upon exemplification from this county, or any execution process upon the judgment in this county. The matter adjudicated by the court upon petition at No. 680 June Term 1874, which is claimed to be a bar, was an application to open the original judgment and permit the defendant to plead the discharge in bankruptcy. It is very clear that these are not the same issues. A state of facts might exist which would justify the restraining of execution, which would not authorize the opening of a judgment. It might be that the court would say, "As there was no fraud, and the judgment was obtained after a legal trial, it cannot be opened," and at the same time say, "if the execution were based upon a judgment within our control we would stay it without hesitation." The court is therefore of opinion that the order of the court at No. 680 June Term 1874, discharging the rule to open the judgment in that case, is not a bar to proceedings in equity to restrain execution for the same debt.
Considering upon the first question, as to the effect of the discharge upon the original judgment, the cases of Boynton v. Ball, 121 U.S. 457; Wise's App., 99 Pa. 193, the opinion proceeded:
It is clear, therefore, that the plaintiff should not be compelled to pay the debt evidenced by the judgment at No. 680 June Term 1874, unless something has occurred since the discharge in bankruptcy to avoid its effect. This is supposed to be found in the entry of judgment upon the scire facias upon this judgment transferred to Westmoreland county.
The allegation of a fraudulent purpose in issuing the writ in Westmoreland county, where the defendant did not reside, and had no property, instead of issuing upon the judgment in Allegheny county, where he did reside and own property, is denied, and must be accepted as true; but the allegation that the defendant in that case and the plaintiff here, had no notice of the proceedings or knowledge of the judgment until the attempt to enforce a testatum execution is not denied, and the effect as to him is the same, whether so intended or not.
In Dimmock v. Reviere Copper Co., 117 U.S. 559, it was held that "a discharge in bankruptcy is no bar to an action upon a judgment recovered against the bankrupt after his discharge, in a suit commenced before the bankruptcy and pending when the discharge was granted, though founded upon a debt provable against him in bankruptcy." See also Stewart v. Colwell, 24 Pa. 67. But this was because the discharge having been granted before judgment, the defendant had an opportunity and should have availed himself of it on a defence in proper time. This case is more like that of Wise's Appeal, where the judgment was entered upon a warrant of attorney, in which the court held that it should be opened to enable the defendant to avail himself of the benefit of his discharge, which he could not have upon the scire facias.
In this case there is no element of waiver or laches. The judgment was entered upon two nihils, which, though equivalent to service for some purposes, is not actual but only constructive notice; and it appears that as soon as the defendant in that case had knowledge of the judgment, he took action to...
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