Nelson v. Lewis

Decision Date12 April 1937
Citation127 Fla. 654,173 So. 835
PartiesNELSON v. LEWIS.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied May 3, 1937.

Suit by W. E. Lewis against C. W. Nelson. From a decree foreclosing a tax deed lien, defendant appeals.

Reversed with directions. Appeal from Circuit Court Brevard County; M. B. Smith, judge.

COUNSEL

Clarence W. Nelson, of Miami, for appellant.

OPINION

BUFORD Justice.

In this case the appeal is from a decree foreclosing a tax deed as a lien on the lands sold for taxes.

The appellant presents two questions for our consideration. The first is whether or not the complainant was entitled to be decreed a lien for the amount of the involved certificates costs and taxes therein included, as shown on the face of the certificates together with interest on such full amount to the date of the decree and whether or not the complainant was also entitled to have a decree for the full amount of subsequent taxes with interest thereon from the time of payment to the time of the decree, the contention being that the complainant is not entitled to decree for the interest on the amount of the interest and costs shown on the face of the certificates issued by the clerk. This question has been determined adversely to the appellant's contention in the case of State ex rel. Comfort et al. v. Leatherman, 99 Fla. 899, 128 So. 21, 24, wherein we said:

'We think the contention of the respondent is well founded that the word 'thereon' the last word of said section 1002, could not have referred to any other subject in the sentence except the words 'the full amount that may then be due the applicant for all certificates, fees and cost of publication.' As pointed out by the relators 'the full amount' then due the applicant for each certificate, that is, up to the time of application for tax deed, which is regulated by the provisions governing redemption before that time, is fixed by those statutes at the amount of the taxes, with interest at the rate of 25 per cent. per annum for the first year and eight per cent. per annum thereafter. In other words, no other reasonable meaning can be given to the words 'full amount' and 'then be due' than that they included the taxes for which the lands were sold, with interest at 25 and 8 per cent. for the first and subsequent years, respectively, together with fees and cost of publication, this being the principal amount, so to speak, liquidated as of the time of application for a tax deed, or at commencing of publication of notice therefor. Then, omitting for the moment the alternative phrase as to redemption of a portion of the land, there follows the words, preceded only by a comma, 'together with eight per cent thereon.' With the intervening alternative clause omitted, it reads, 'by paying to the clerk the full amount that may then be due the applicant for all certificates, fees and cost of publication, together with eight per cent thereon.' It is quite clear that the phrase, 'together with eight per cent. thereon,' separated as it is only by commas from the principal phrase (and the intervening phrase being in the alternative), can mean nothing else than 8 per cent. on the principal amount so liquidated, to wit: 'The amount due' for all certificates, fees, and cost of publication. This evident meaning is strengthened by the use of the word 'thereof' in the intervening clause commencing 'or such portion thereof.' This word thereof' manifestly refers to the total amount due for certificates, plus fees and cost of publication, for otherwise
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5 cases
  • Wilson Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Glaaser, 61-176
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • January 22, 1962
    ...a definite amount. Evidence of such an amount is necessary in order to determine what is a reasonable attorney's fee. Cf. Nelson v. Lewis, 127 Fla. 654, 173 So. 835. When a party properly moves for a decree upon bill and answer after the expiration of the time for the taking of testimony, 1......
  • Nello L. Teer Company v. Hollywood Golf Estates, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • December 16, 1963
    ...Fla. Statutes § 627.0905(2) F.S.A.; Stuyvesant Ins. Co. of New York v. Nardelli, 286 F.2d 600 (C.A. 5, 1961); Nelson v. Lewis, 127 Fla. 654, 173 So. 835 (1937); Beasley v. Wolf, 151 So.2d 679 (Fla.Dist.Ct. of App., Since, upon remand, the trial court may redetermine costs to be taxed, there......
  • Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami v. George Const. Corp., SEVEN-UP
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • July 7, 1964
    ...fee. United Bonding Insurance Co. of Indianapolis, Ind. v. Presidential Insurance Co., Fla.App.1963, 155 So.2d 635; cf., Nelson v. Lewis, 127 Fla. 654, 173 So. 835. It should be noted that in setting a fee where the services include (a) defending the merits of the cause, and (b) securing th......
  • Town of Lake Maitland v. State Ex Rel. Landis
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • April 12, 1937
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