Nelson v. Martinson
Decision Date | 07 August 1958 |
Docket Number | No. 34393,34393 |
Citation | 328 P.2d 703,52 Wn.2d 684 |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | Donald W. NELSON and Alice E. Nelson, husband and wife, Respondents, v. M. B. MARTINSON and Jane Doe Martinson, husband and wife, Appellants. |
Rode, Cook, Watkins & Orth, Hoyt M. Wilbanks, Jr., Seattle, for appellants.
Abrams, McCush & Rinker, Bellingham, for respondents.
This is an appeal from an order granting the plaintiffs Donald W. Nelson and wife a new trial after a jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. Although his wife was joined as a party defendant, M. B. Martinson will be referred to herein as though he were the sole defendant (appellant).
On October 17, 1954, at approximately 1:40 a.m., the automobile in which the plaintiffs were riding collided with a cow on a public highway in Whatcom county, Washington. Thereafter, the plaintiffs instituted this action against the defendant, the owner of the cow, to recover damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by them in the collision. In their complaint, they alleged that they were riding in an automobile being driven by one Willis K. Ray and that the collision which occurred was caused by the negligence of the defendant in permitting his cow to run at large upon the public highway in violation of the law.
The defendant, in his amended answer and cross-complaint, admitted the collision and the ownership of the cow, but denied negligence. By way of affirmative defense, he alleged the plaintiffs were guilty of contributory negligence. In his cross-complaint, he asked damages in the amount of $800 for the loss of his cow.
During the trial, the evidence revealed that the defendant and his son left their pasture by way of a gate between five and six o'clock p.m. the evening preceding the collision. The defendant testified that the gate was 'locked' but he did admit, while testifying as an adverse witness for the plaintiffs, that, on the evening in question, he could not recall specifically whether it was he or his son who actually closed and latched the gate. He testified further that about forty-five minutes after the collision he found the gate to the pasture open but undamaged. It was established that the latch was on the outside of the gate, away from the pasture and, therefore, could not have been opened by any animals kept in the pasture. There was no evidence introduced that anyone other than the defendant and his son had gone through the gate the evening preceding the accident.
At the close of the defendant's evidence, plaintiffs' motion to dismiss defendant's cross-complaint and affirmative defense was granted. The only questions submitted to the jury under the trial court's instructions were: (1) whether the defendant was negligent; (2) whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision; (3) the amount of the plaintiffs' damages, in the event that the first two questions were answered in the affirmative.
The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial which was granted by the trial court. From this order, the defendant has appealed.
We have consistently held that the granting or denial of a motion for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that this court will not intervene unless it can be shown that the trial court manifestly abused its discretion. Coats v. Lee & Eastes, Inc., Wash.1958, 320 P. 2d 292; Skov v. MacKenzie-Richardson, Inc., 1956, 48 Wash.2d 710, 296 P.2d 521. See, also, Riley v. Department of Labor & Industries, Wash.1957, 319 P.2d 549. Further, a much stronger showing of an abuse of discretion will ordinarily be required to set aside an order granting a new trial than one denying a new trial. Riley v. Department of Labor & Industries supra; Johnson v. Howard, 1954, 45 Wash.2d 433, 275 P.2d 736; McUne v. Fuqua, 1953, 42 Wash.2d 65, 253 P.2d 632.
Superior Court Rule 16, 34A Wash.2d 118, as amended, effective July 1, 1954, provides, in part:
'In all cases wherein the trial court grants a motion for a new trial, it shall, in the order granting the motion, give definite reasons of law and facts for so doing.' (Italics ours.)
The order granting the respondents' motion for a new trial reads, in part, as follows:
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