Nelson v. McPhee

• Decision Date: 18 June 1910
• Citation: 109 P. 305,59 Wash. 103
• Parties: NELSON v. McPHEE.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

109 P. 305

59 Wash. 103

NELSON v. McPHEE.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 18, 1910

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; H. W. Canfield Judge.

Action by Lewis S. Nelson against Sophia J. McPhee. Decree for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Corwin A. Townsend and Hastings & Stedman, for appellant.

Herr Bayley, Wilson & Smith, for respondent.

MORRIS J.

Action to quiet title, decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Respondent alleged ownership of lot 12, block 37, Heirs of Sarah A. Bell's Second addition to Seattle, by virtue of mesne conveyances, and prayed to have his title quieted as against appellant. The answer admitted the conveyances pleaded by respondent, denied his ownership, and set forth an ownership in appellant of an undivided one-half interest.

The only record before us consists of the pleadings, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree and hence the only question to be considered on the appeal is whether the findings support the decree. The findings recite that on January 15, 1889, the appellant was the wife of Jacob Scoland, and that on said day the lot in suit was conveyed to Jacob Scoland; that on May 20, 1891, appellant commenced an action against her then husband Jacob Scoland, praying for a divorce; that the husband appeared in such action and on September 5, a decree was entered awarding a decree to appellant; that in the complaint in the divorce action appellant alleged the community property of the parties to be a lot on the northwest corner of Lenora and Tenth streets (which is the location of the property in suit), and a property known as 1413 Eighth street; that in addition to the personal property described in the complaint, the court in the divorce action found that the husband had an interest in a towboat, and allotted to the wife the property known as 1413 Eighth street as her separate property for her support and the education of the children of the parties, and found a lot described as lot 6, block 49, Second addition of the Heirs of Sarah A. Bell, was the separate property of the wife; that the wife was also allotted the household furniture, and made other allowances; that said decree was appealed from and was on appeal sustained by this court; that there is no mention made in the decree granted the wife of lot 12, block 37, Second addition of the Heirs of Sarah A. Bell, nor is there any mention made of the personal property referred to in the findings; that on October 15, 1891, Jacob Scoland and his wife Sophia executed a mortgage on lot 12, which was subsequently satisfied; that on January 19, 1892, the same parties executed a second mortgage to the same mortgagee, upon lot 12, which was also thereafter satisfied; that on October 15, 1892, Jacob Scoland alone executed a mortgage to the same Anna O. Miller, on lot 12, which was thereafter duly satisfied, and that on October 18, 1893, Jacob Scoland, describing himself as an unmarried man, conveyed lot 12 to Anna O. Miller. The court finds further that there is no estoppel established, nor is a plea of the statute of limitations sustained, nor is there evidence showing ouster, nor demand on the part of respondent, for any money expended by him on account of lot 12. Then follows a conclusion of law, in which the court sets forth its belief that in the divorce action the trial court considered that the property awarded to the wife was an equitable distribution to her from the community property, and that the property not given to the wife was intended to remain the separate property of the husband. The court then further concludes, that the respondent is entitled to a decree quieting his title against any claim or interest of appellant, and orders a decree accordingly.

The appellant now contends that these findings do not support the conclusions nor the decree based thereon, for the reason that nowhere in the findings is there any statement of fact justifying the court in concluding that respondent was the owner of lot 12. It is apparent from a mere inspection of the findings as we have recited them that they are extremely meager and incomplete. The court below evidently had the entire record in the divorce proceedings before him, and in the present case, instead of setting forth the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree in...