Nelson v. Meade

• Decision Date: 26 March 1930
• Citation: 149 A. 626
• Parties: NELSON et al v. MEADE et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

149 A. 626

NELSON et al

v. MEADE et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 26, 1930.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, York County.

Suit by Mary Nelson and others against Charles J. Meade, administrator with the will annexed of the estate of James M. Meade, deceased. On report.

Decree for plaintiffs.

Argued before PATTANGALL, C. J., DUNN, STURGIS, BARNES, FARRINGTON, JJ., and MORRILL, A. R. J.

Waterhouse, Titcomb & Siddall, of Sanford, for plaintiffs.

Harold H. Bourne, of Kennebunk, for defendants.

PATTANGALL, C. J.

On report. Bill in equity for construction of will of James M. Meade.

James M. Meade died without issue January 18, 1929. His will was duly probated March 25, 1929. Charles J. Meade was appointed administrator with the will annexed. Addie L. Meade, wife of James M. Meade, died on January 16, 1929, two days prior to the death of James M. Meade, leaving no lineal descendants. The assets of James M. Meade in the hands of the administrator will be sufficient to pay all indebtedness, expenses of administration, and legacies mentioned in his will.

The question here is as to the disposition of the sum of $5,000 bequeathed under the first clause of the will, which reads as follows:

"First. I give and bequeath to my wife Addie L. Meade the sum of Five Thousand Dollars to be held in Trust during the lifetime of my said wife, the full income therefrom to be devoted to the sole use and benefit of my said wife, and I further direct that my said wife shall and may use any part or the whole of said Five Thousand Dollars whenever in her judgment and discretion it may be necessary for her proper use and enjoyment. On the death of my said wife, said legacy of Five Thousand Dollars shall be equally divided, share and share alike or the unexpended part of said legacy, between Mary Nelson, Lillian Nelson, Thomas Nelson, Florence Nelson, James Nelson, Charles Nelson, children of Charles J. Nelson of Lion Mountain. New York, or so many of them as may be alive at the time of the decease of my said wife to have and to hold to them, their heirs and assigns forever in fee."

Plaintiffs claim as remaindermen under this clause, while defendants contend that the legacy mentioned therein lapsed because the life tenant deceased prior to the death of the testator, and that the property bequeathed falls to the residuary legatees named in another clause of the will.

Omitting from present consideration the words "in trust," the paragraph above quoted sets out the familiar proposition of a life estate in Addie L. Meade, with power of disposal, and a contingent remainder in the named children of Charles J. Nelson.

The general rule is that a legacy or devise will lapse when the legatee or devisee dies before the testator. The application of this rule is narrowed by the provisions of section 10, c. 79, R. S. 1916, but that statute is not applicable here. The wife is not a relative of the testator within its meaning, Keniston v. Adams, 80 Me. 290, 14 A. 203, nor did she leave lineal descendants, Morse v. Hayden, 82 Me. 227, 19 A. 443.

But plaintiffs invoke the doctrine of acceleration. The death of a life tenant prior to that of the testator may accelerate the taking effect of the remainder. Farnsworth v. Whiting, 102 Me. 302, 66 A. 831; Prescott Adm'r v. Prescott, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 141; Bates et al. Adm'r v. Dewson et al., 128 Mass. 334; Thompson v. Thornton, 197 Mass. 273. 83 N. E. 880; Howard v. Trustees, 88 Md. 292. 41 A. 160; Huber et al., Ex'r, v. Mohn, 37 N. J. Eq. 432; Taylor v. Wendel, 4 Bradf. Surr. (N. Y.) 324.

The principle has also been very generally applied where a widow or widower renounced the provisions of a will wherein a life estate with remainder over had been devised and in cases in which a conditional life estate was forfeited by remarriage.

The extinction of the first interest carved out of the estate accelerates the right of the second taker. Fox v. Rumery, 68 Me. 129; Adams v. Legroo, 111 Me. 307, 89 A. 63; Yeaton v. Roberts et al., 28 N. H. 459; Marvin v. Ledwith, 111 Ill. 144; Duncan v. Liddle, 123 Ark. 35, 184 S. W. 413; Fletcher v. Hoblitzell 209 Pa. 337, 58 A. 672.

There is an apparent conflict of authority as to whether or not contingent remainders may be accelerated. But the conflict is more apparent than real. A study of the cases discloses a clearly defined and logical line of demarcation between those in which the court has refused to accelerate contingent remainders and those in which acceleration has been permitted.

The application of the doctrine is not dependent upon the circumstance that the remainder is or is not vested. American National Bank v. C. C. Chapin, Trustee, 130 Va. 1,107 S. E. 636, 17 A. L. R. 304. The fact that a remainder is contingent is not conclusive of the right of acceleration, and the rule will not be applied where it will defeat the testator's intention. Keeton v. Tipton, 184 Ky. 704, 212 S. W. 909. The principle of acceleration in the vesting of a remainder by the premature termination of the preceding life estate being based on the presumed intention of the testator, there need be no distinction made between vested and contingent remainders in its application. Scotten v. Doe ex dem. Moore, 5 Boyce (Del.) 545, 93 A. 373, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 409. It is immaterial whether the remainder is vested or contingent if the time for distribution has in fact arrived, as in such case the contingency is determined and the donees ascertained. Blatchford v. Newberry, 99 Ill. 11.

A contingent remainder will not be accelerated if there still remain undetermined contingencies so that it is impossible to identify the remaindermen, or if there is evidence of an intention to postpone the taking effect of the remainder. Brandenburg v....