Nelson v. University of Maine System
Decision Date | 29 January 1996 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 95-0179-B. |
Parties | Richard NELSON and Edwin Jessiman, Plaintiffs, v. UNIVERSITY OF MAINE SYSTEM, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
George Schelling, Gross, Minsky, Mogul & Singal, Bangor, Maine, for Plaintiffs.
F. Paul Frinsko, Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, Portland, Maine, for Defendant.
Plaintiffs Richard Nelson and Edwin Jessiman, professors at the University of Maine at Mathias, sue the University of Maine System, an academic institution incorporated under the laws of Maine. Plaintiffs filed a five count complaint alleging violations of their rights under Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (Counts I and III), and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 4 of the Maine Constitution, (Counts II and IV). Nelson also sues for breach of contract (Count V).
The University of Maine System pleads several affirmative defenses, including: (1) failure to state a claim for violation of the freedom of speech and breach of contract, (2) statute of limitations, and (3) preemption. Plaintiffs move to strike these defenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f). Defendant moves for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The Court addresses these motions below, denying Plaintiffs' Motion, and granting Defendant's Motion as to Count II, IV & V.
Plaintiffs Nelson and Jessiman teach at the University of Maine at Mathias. Jessiman is tenured, Nelson is not. Jessiman holds a Ph.D, and teaches in the Behavioral Sciences Department. He was first hired as an assistant professor of Psychology in 1977, before being promoted and later tenured. Jessiman previously served as the Chairman of the Student Disciplinary Committee. Nelson, a professional historian and educator, earned two doctoral degrees, one in Education, and another in American History, and taught for ten years at the college level before coming to Machias. He has published several books and scholarly articles.
Both professors have "spoken out on behalf of persons whom they believed had been discriminated against on grounds of gender," and have "raised concerns" about certain University staff members as to their "discriminatory treatment both to women and those who work to advance gender equality." (Am.Compl. ¶ 1). Nelson and Jessiman claim that the University ignored their complaints, and later retaliated against them for this action. In the case of Jessiman, this retaliation came by way of the University failing to properly investigate complaints of sexual harassment lodged against him. These complaints remain in Jessiman's Equal Employment Opportunity file. Nelson claims the University retaliated against him by denying him tenure.
Jessiman and Nelson cite the following facts as relevant.
In the fall of 1994, President Reynolds informed Jessiman that complaints had been lodged against him for sexual harassment. These charges stem from Jessiman's allegedly improper conduct during a class he taught on sexuality. Jessiman contends he encouraged the University to investigate these allegations, offered tape recordings of the class for review, and produced the names of other students present in the class. He claims that the University never considered any of this evidence.
Professor Nelson applied for tenure in September of 1992. Nelson cites these additional facts as relevant to the alleged retaliatory denial of his tenure application.
Plaintiffs move to strike several of Defendant's affirmative defenses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f).1 Under Rule 12(f) the Court may "order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Motions to strike, however, are disfavored, and they are rarely granted absent a showing of prejudice to the moving party. 2A Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 12.213, 12-210 — 214 (1995); Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1381, 672 (1990). Courts grant motions to strike a defense "only if the defense is legally insufficient, and presents no question of law or fact that the court must resolve." 2A Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 12.213 at 112-210.
The Court denies Plaintiffs' Motions to Strike, as the defenses raise legitimate legal issues. In re All Maine Asbestos Litigation, 575 F.Supp. 1375, 1377 (D.Me.1983). The Court discusses these substantive issues more fully in dealing with the Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), either party can file for judgment on the pleadings "after the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when "all material allegations of fact are admitted in the pleadings and only questions of law remain." Wright and Miller, § 1367 at 510. See Geupel v. Benson, 704 F.Supp. 312, 313 (D.Mass.1989). The Court will not grant a 12(c) motion "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Rivera-Gomez v. Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir.1988). "Because the rendition of judgment in such an abrupt fashion represents an extremely early assessment of the merits of the case," the Court accepts the nonmoving party's well-pleaded facts as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in her favor. Id. (citing Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir.1985)). Public policy, affording each litigant a full and fair hearing on the merits, warrants against imprudent use of this motion. Wright and Miller, § 1368 at 517.
Defendant seeks judgment on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims, Counts II and IV, are subsumed by their Title IX claims, (2) Plaintiff Nelson's Title IX claim, Count III is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and (3) Nelson's contract claim, Count V, is barred by the arbitrator's award. The Court grants Defendant's motion as to Count II, IV and V.
Defendant moves for Judgment on the Pleadings on Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims, Counts II and IV, on the grounds that these claims are subsumed by their Title IX claims, Counts I and III. It is well settled that when Congress legislates and creates specific and comprehensive remedies to redress an individual plaintiff's rights, Congress can preclude private enforcement of constitutional claims when the relief sought is covered under the statute's remedial scheme. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 2626, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1012-13, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3468, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984). The Sea Clammers doctrine holds that congressional...
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