Nenninger v. Department of Social Services, Div. of Family Services, 19253
| Decision Date | 27 April 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 19253,19253 |
| Parties | Anthony NENNINGER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES, Respondent-Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Anthony Nenninger, pro se.
Karen L. Massey, Dept. of Social Services, Jefferson City, for respondent-respondent.
Anthony Nenninger (Claimant) appeals from a judgment of the Crawford County Circuit Court that affirmed the findings and orders of the Director of the Missouri Division of Family Services (Director). 1 The court also ruled that Director's decision was not "violative of constitutional provisions."
On appeal, Claimant contends the trial court erred when it found constitutional the Division's written administrative procedure that precludes an otherwise eligible member of a "Food Stamp household" from being included, even on a pro rata basis, unless "the individual is in the household for more than 50 percent of his ... meals." Claimant also asserts that the trial court erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing at which Claimant could have offered evidence to support his constitutional challenges.
We reverse and remand.
In July 1991, Claimant applied to the Division for food stamps. His application, filed with the Crawford County office of the Division, listed "household members" in the following fashion:
NAME RELATIONSHIP BIRTHDATE
Nenninger, Tony Robert Self 2" 3"58
Nenninger, Pedro M. Son 1"13"79
Nenninger, Forest R.(1/3 Son 1" 7"88
joint custody time)
----------
The Crawford County agency approved the claim as a two-person "food stamp assistance On July 31, 1991, Director's hearing officer heard Claimant's appeal. Linda Smith, employee of the Division, testified that food stamps were not allowed for Forest as part of Claimant's household because he (Forest) was receiving food stamps in his mother's household in Moniteau County, Missouri. She also testified that the Division did not base its decision in such a case "on joint custody."
group," consisting of Claimant and Pedro, but refused to approve Forest as a part of Claimant's group. Claimant timely appealed that decision to Director.
The standard thus described by Smith is based on procedures outlined in the Division's Income Maintenance Manual. Portions of that manual were put in evidence as exhibits 5 and 6. In pertinent part, Exhibit 5 reads:
"Chapter IX, Section II, Page 8d Agency Exhibit 5
....
D. Duplicate Participation
No member of a Food Stamp household will be allowed to participate in (1) more than one Food Stamp household and/or (2) more than one county. Counties must clear each household member for duplicate participation at each certification, recertification and whenever a new household member joins the Food Stamp household.
....
E. Verification of Household Composition Factors
1. The worker will verify the household's status only if it is questionable and would affect the household's eligibility or benefit level....
2. If questionable, the worker will verify any factors affecting the composition of the household such as household size and boarder status...."
The pertinent part of exhibit 6 reads:
"Chapter IX, Section II, Page 6a Agency Exhibit 6
....
NOTE: If the household composition is questionable, determine if the individual is in the household for more than 50% of their meals. Meal computation is based on 3 meals per day. If a person is in the household for any one day, the person is considered to have had 3 meals."
Claimant conceded to the hearing officer that the "Food Stamp worker ... had followed the regulations" but questioned the constitutionality of the regulations. While the hearing officer explained to Claimant his inability to decide constitutional issues and that such questions could properly be raised for the first time before the Circuit Court, the following colloquy occurred:
"[Hearing Officer] ... [W]hat I'm saying is that at this level we don't deal with the constitutional issues. Now if that's really all that you have to say then, perhaps we can conclude the hearing. If you want to get into whether your son, Forest, is in your home 50 percent or more of the time, you're certainly welcome to. Do you want to do that?
[Claimant]: (Inaudible) evidence that I wish to present now.
[Hearing Officer]: Okay, so you pretty much concede that he's in your home less than 50 percent of the time?
[Claimant]: Yes, sir.
[Hearing Officer]: Okay, is there anything else that anyone would like to say then?
[Claimant]: Am I to construe what you're saying is a formal rejection of evidence relating to the Equal Protection issue?
[Hearing Officer]: That's correct. You can assume that ... and I think I've already said this a couple of times at least, that at this level we do not deal with the constitutional issues and if you want to raise those constitutional issues, you have The hearing was then concluded.
to take those up into Circuit Court there in Crawford County."
Applying the Division's "50 percent" regulation, Director affirmed the Crawford County agency's decision that Forest should not be included as part of Claimant's Food Stamp Assistance Group. Claimant appealed to the Crawford County Circuit Court.
In his petitions for review 2 filed with the trial court, Claimant alleged that the Division's use of the challenged regulations "to exclude Forest Nenninger from [Claimant's] food stamp assistance group:
a) denied [Claimant] of equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by Section 1. of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2. of the Missouri Constitution; and
b) infringes on [Claimant's] right to freedom of association between parent and child as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9. of the Missouri Constitution and as encouraged by Section 452.375 RSMo.; and
c) deprived [Claimant] of food stamp benefits consistent with 7 CFR 273.1(a)(iii)."
Also, Claimant requested of the trial court that it "conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of this Petition...." In support of his hearing request, Claimant alleged that the hearing officer had "denied [Claimant] the opportunity to present evidence demonstrating facts of the discriminatory effects of [the Division's] rules, thereby depriving [Claimant] of due process...." In a supporting trial brief, Claimant devoted approximately three pages to a recital of what he characterized as "facts" which he stated would establish the factual basis for his constitutional challenge to the Division's regulation.
After additional briefing by both parties and without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court affirmed Director's decision. The body of the trial court's judgment reads:
Claimant appeals from that judgment.
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Claimant's fourth point relied on is dispositive of this appeal. In it Claimant contends the trial court erred when it ruled his constitutional challenge to the Division's regulations without conducting an evidentiary hearing. He argues that due process requires that he be given an opportunity via an evidentiary hearing "to provide the factual details necessary to demonstrate the actual discriminatory effects of the [Division's] rules," and, that under the circumstances, the trial court denied him that opportunity.
In response, the Director agrees that "one who may be deprived of a right or property by governmental action be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard," citing Blydenburg v. David, 413 S.W.2d 284 (Mo.banc 1967), and State v. Goodbar, 297 S.W.2d 525 (Mo.1957), as authority. Director argues, however, that Claimant had an "opportunity to present any evidence to the Circuit Court to demonstrate support for his claim that the challenged administrative procedures unconstitutionally discriminate against his family." We quote verbatim Director's contentions in this regard.
"[Claimant] was given [the] opportunity to give supporting facts in his Circuit Court Brief. In fact, the Statement of Facts in that Brief was several pages long and very little of the evidence contained therein was presented to the Agency in the administrative hearing. [Claimant] also had the opportunity to and did file a Reply Brief in response to the brief filed by [Director] in the Circuit Court. Further, the parties appeared before the trial court judge on numerous dates for oral arguments prior to and on the date of the Court's decision.
....
The Circuit Court in the case at hand did allow additional evidence by [Claimant] in the Statement of Facts section of his trial court Brief. [Claimant] further argued those offered facts extensively in both his Brief and Reply Brief. The Circuit Court's decision was based upon the facts contained in the hearing transcript and the briefs of both parties.
....
This is a matter of law in which no further evidentiary hearing is required.
As [Claimant] received the...
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