Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County

• Decision Date: 04 December 1907
• Docket Number: 1868
• Parties: NEPHI PLASTER & MFG. CO. v. JUAB COUNTY
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

93 P. 53

33 Utah 114

NEPHI PLASTER & MFG. CO. v. JUAB COUNTY

No. 1868

Supreme Court of Utah

December 4, 1907

APPEAL from District Court, Juab County, Joshua Greenwood, Judge.

Action by the Nephi Plaster & Manufacturing Company against Juab county. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

M. A Breeden, W. A. C. Bryan, T. L. Foote, and Henry Adams for appellant

Van Cott, Allison & Riter for respondent.

FRICK J. McCARTY, C. J., and STRAUP, J., concur.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

This action is based on sections 2684, 2685, Revised Statutes 1898, which provide for the recovery of taxes paid by a taxpayer under protest in case such taxes are unlawfully imposed. The action was commenced by the respondent to recover back the sum of $ 205 paid as taxes to the appellant, Juab county, under protest for the year 1904, and which, the respondent contends, were unlawfully imposed. It appears from the record that the respondent was then the owner of a placer mining claim patented, on and in which are contained large and valuable deposits of gypsum, which deposits are, and for a number of years, by means of the necessary buildings, machinery, and appliances erected on said mining claim, have been, manufactured or converted into hard wall plaster, dental plaster, finishing plaster, fertilizers, and other manufactured products, all of which were sold on the market. The tax involved represents the ordinary rate of taxes imposed on the net proceeds or profits derived by the respondent from the sale of the products aforesaid, and were imposed by virtue of section 4 of article 13 of the Constitution of this state, which reads as follows:

"Sec. 4. (Taxation of Mines.) All mines and mining claims, both placer and rock in place, containing or bearing gold, silver, copper, lead, coal or other valuable mineral deposits, after purchase thereof from the United States, shall be taxed at the price paid the United States therefor, unless the surface ground, or some part thereof, of such mine or claim, is used for other than mining purposes, and has a separate and independent value for such other purposes; in which case said surface ground, or any part thereof, so used for other than mining purposes, shall be taxed at its value for such other purposes, as provided by law; and all the machinery used in mining, and all property and surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines and mining claims, which have a value separate and independent of such mines or mining claims, and the net annual proceeds of all mines and mining claims, shall be taxed as provided by law."

The Constitution became effective January 4, 1896, and in April following the first Legislature enacted a verbatim copy of the section above quoted as section 3 of what was termed the "Revenue Act" (Laws 1896, p. 424, c. 129), except that instead of ending the section with the words, "shall be taxed as provided by law," the section ended with the words, "shall be taxed as other personal property." The act also provided the manner in which the net proceeds of mines and mining claims should be ascertained for assessment and taxation. Section 3 of the act of 1896 was carried forward into the Revised Statutes of 1908 and re-enacted as section 2504, with the exception of the four words, "as provided by law," which were omitted from the body of the section. In 1903 (Laws 1903, p. 76, c. 91) the section was amended by adding thereto, after the words "mining claims," the following italicized words: "And also the net annual proceeds of coke made from coal or bullion or matte made from ore not taxed, which is deemed a product of the mines, shall be taxed as other personal property." Why this last amendment was added is not material now. From the foregoing it is manifest that the law in effect has undergone no material change since its first enactment, and is, in its scope and effect, as it was when first adopted. At all events the scope of the section must be limited in its effect to the terms used in the Constitution. With the intention of so limiting it, the district court entered its conclusion of law to the effect that the profits derived from the product manufactured from the gypsum taken from respondent's mining claim was not the subject of taxation as the net proceeds of mines and mining claims, and entered a judgment in favor of the respondent for the sum of $ 205, the amount of taxes paid by it as net proceeds, from which judgment Juab county appeals.

While there are numerous errors assigned, the whole case may be determined upon the one assignment, namely, that the court erred in its conclusion of law and in rendering a judgment for the respondent.

The appellant contends that gypsum is a mineral and falls within the term, "other valuable mineral deposits," referred to in the Constitution, and that it, or the product thereof, also falls within the clause, "and the net annual proceeds of all mines and mining claims," contained in the section quoted. The respondent concedes that the mining claim on and in which the deposit of gypsum is found and from which it is taken was located and patented under the mineral laws of the United States and of this state; that the net proceeds or profits amounted to a sum which would produce the sum of $ 205 under the legal rate of taxation, if such proceeds constitute the net proceeds of mines within the purview of the constitutional provision; and that gypsum is a mineral and constitutes a valuable mineral deposit. That gypsum is a mineral, and constitutes a mineral deposit under the mineral laws, cannot well be disputed. Lexicographers, geologists, and laymen all agree that it is a mineral, and such is also the holding of the officials of the Interior Department of the government of the United States, as will be seen from the Pacific Coast Mining Co. v. N. P. Ry. Co., 25 Land Dec. following decisions: Phifer v. Heaton, 27 Land Dec. Dep. Int. 57; McQuiddy v. State, 29 Land Dec. Dep. Int. 181; Dep. Int. 233; 1 Lindley on Mines, sec. 97. The only question for solution, therefore, is, does the profit realized from the product manufactured from the gypsum taken from respondent's mining claim constitute "net proceeds" under the clause in the Constitution that all net proceeds of "all mines and mining claims" shall be taxed, as the term is used in the Constitution? If it does, the court erred; if it does not fall within that clause, then gypsum, or the manufactured product therefrom, must be taxed generally as other manufactured products, and not under this section.

Respondent's counsel contend that the gypsum deposit, although a mineral deposit, does not come within the mineral deposits mentioned in the Constitution, and that it does not come within the term "mine" or "mines" as the term is there used. We might dispose of this contention by simply saying that it does clearly come within the term "mining claims," and is a mineral deposit, and therefore falls within the terms in that regard. In view of the contention, however, that the products of respondent's mining claim should not be taxed in this form, because they are not the net proceeds of a mine, as that term is popularly understood, we have examined the authorities, and we think that the workings on respondent's mining claim, under the decisions, also fall within the term "mine," and that minerals, prima facie at least, are not confined to the metals.

The question, however, is, what is to be deemed as being within the popular conception of a mine? Is it to be confined to the understanding that a farmer, stock raiser, or ordinary merchant has of the term. Or to what those who work in or come in contact with mines and mining rights generally and popularly understand it to be? Or is it to be understood, when found in a statute or Constitution, what the courts generally have held it to mean? In view that the decisions of courts are but the reflection of the common understanding with respect to particular things and the terms used in any industry, business, or calling, and are thus simply reduced to legal terms, we think that if the courts have construed and applied what is meant by the terms "mine" and "mines," then this meaning must control, and especially so when the term is used in some statute or constitution. This must be so for the simple reason that the term will then have acquired a legal meaning, which, unless the contrary clearly appears from the context, must be deemed to be the meaning intended to be applied to it in the law in which it is found.

In 1 Lindley on Mines, secs. 87 to 97, the author reviews the authorities and discusses the meaning of mines and minerals, and there points out that anciently the term "mine" or "mining" meant subterranean excavation. But in section 89 the author points out that the term "mine" has received an enlarged meaning in later times. He says:

"These primary significations were soon enlarged, so that in time the word 'mine' was construed to mean, also, the place where minerals were found, and soon came to be used as an equivalent of 'vein,' 'seam,' 'lode,' or to denote an aggregation of veins, and, under certain circumstances, to include quarries and minerals obtained by open workings." (Italics ours.)

In section 91, in his work on Mines, Mr. Lindley states some general rules of interpretation as applied in England and Scotland, the fourth of which reads as follows:

"Where the term 'mines' and 'minerals' are both used in the same deed or statute, the word 'minerals' is not, on that account, to suffer limitation of its meaning."

In referring to the authorities upon this subject, we cannot for lack of space, give a statement of the cases, but must confine ourselves strictly to the point decided...