Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Raleigh, NC

Decision Date07 June 1968
Docket NumberNo. 11931.,11931.
Citation397 F.2d 96
PartiesSamuel E. NESMITH, Appellant, v. YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF RALEIGH, N. C., and C. Lynn Brown, President of Executive Committee of Young Men's Christian Association of Raleigh, N. C., Inc., Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Michael Meltsner, New York City, (Conrad O. Pearson, Durham, N. C., Samuel S. Mitchell, Romallus O. Murphy, Raleigh, N.C., J. LeVonne Chambers, Charlotte, N.C., and Jack Greenberg, New York City, on brief) for appellant.

James K. Dorsett, Jr., Raleigh, N.C., (Henry A. Mitchell, Jr., and Smith, Leach, Anderson & Dorsett, Raleigh, N. C., on brief) for appellees.

Before SOBELOFF and BOREMAN, Circuit Judges, and RUSSELL, District Judge.

SOBELOFF, Circuit Judge:

The issue presented by this appeal is whether the health and athletic facilities of the Young Men's Christian Association of Raleigh, Inc., are covered by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq., which prohibits racial discrimination in places of public accommodation. That the lodging and eating operations of the Association are subject to the Act is uncontested.

Plaintiff, a 29-year old Negro Methodist minister, sought and was denied admission to the Men's Athletic Club of the Raleigh YMCA. Significantly, the only way an adult male can become a "member of the Y" is to be accepted as a member of the health or athletic club. Barring an applicant from membership in the health or athletic club not only denies him access to the sports facilities but also deprives him of all the incidents of YMCA membership. Upon being rejected as "insincere," plaintiff prosecuted this class suit on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, seeking an injunction against the racially discriminatory policies of the Raleigh YMCA.

Coverage under the Act seems manifest from the first two paragraphs of the statute. Section (a) requires that "All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of any place of public accommodation." (Emphasis added.) Section (b) (1) classifies any establishment which provides lodging to transient guests as a place of public accommodation, subject to a narrowly-drawn exception not pertinent here.1 It is undisputed that the Raleigh YMCA provides lodging for as many as 120 transient guests and operates as well a coffee shop, civic meeting rooms and a chapel, which are, in the word of the YMCA, "for the use and benefit of the general public of Raleigh."2 It is equally undisputed that neither the plaintiff nor any other Negro is permitted to use the showers, steam rooms, exercise devices, basketball courts and swimming pool which are facilities of the same YMCA which provides rooms for transient guests.

The YMCA contends, and the District Court found, that the athletic and health facilities are separate and distinct from the sleeping accommodations which are available to all and the adjoining coffee shop which stands ready to serve to any member of the public food that has moved in interstate commerce. The alleged separateness stems from the fact that the segregated athletic and health facilities are located twenty-five to fifty feet from the lodging area in a connected building, which shares a single heating unit, common utilities and a unitary telephone service with the building that houses the transient guests.

As the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia aptly observed, since places of public accommodation differ markedly in their operations, "the factual determination from which the Court must decide that it a public place either is or is not within the class described in the Act must be made on the circumstances of each case." Willis v. Pickrick Restaurant, 231 F. Supp. 396, 399 (N.D.Ga.1964). With constant awareness that the "essential purpose of the Act as reflected by both its language and history was to remove discrimination in places of public accommodation * * * with respect to all of the services rendered and operated within its physical confines * * *," Pinkney v. Meloy, 241 F.Supp. 943, 947 (N.D. Fla.1965),3 we must examine the particular circumstances here to determine whether the Raleigh YMCA is a single establishment wholly covered by the Act by virtue of its admittedly public accommodations or whether the health and athletic facilities are indeed separate from the covered portions.

The building complex under review was begun as a single unit in 1958 on two adjacent lots which were bought simultaneously by the YMCA. Planned at the same time and financed from a common fund, including non-member contributions, the two adjoining buildings were completed and opened to their patrons in 1960. Since that time both structures have been under the general supervision of one authority, the Building & Equipment Committee. The Community Building, twice as large as the sister Athletic Building, contains bedrooms, a coffee shop, public lounges, television viewing areas, a chapel and meeting rooms for classes and discussions. The Athletic Building, to which access may be gained either from the Community Building or from the street, houses the exercise facilities, swimming pool, gymnasium, lockers and showers. A shed-like breezeway permits people to go from one structure to the other without being exposed to the weather.

Administratively and economically, the Raleigh YMCA is operated as a completely integrated entity. Pursuant to a single constitution, there is one executive secretary who, together with his delegated staff, administers both buildings and all of the activities therein contained. One general budget commingles all funds and assigns appropriations for every operation in both buildings, and deficits in one area may be overcome by profits accrued in the other. In 1965, the year plaintiff sought admission, bedroom rentals totalled $95,395.44; coffee shop revenues were $106,069.73; and clubroom rentals aggregated $14,377.43. Expenses in the Community Building from which these revenues were derived amounted to $180,167.59, leaving a surplus of nearly $36,000. On the other hand, activities in the Athletic Building yielded only $135,683.42 against operating costs of $218,659.58. The deficit was made up by using the excess from the Community Building plus a substantial contribution from the United Fund. All of this led to the District Court's unimpeachable finding of fact that "the general administrative and financial operations of the defendant association are conducted as one unified operation." Despite its finding of this objective fact, the court went on to make the subjective finding that the activities in the two buildings are "regarded as separate and distinct operations." In precisely what manner, by whom and for what purposes they are so "regarded" is spelled out neither in the court's opinion nor in any portion of the recorded evidence. We are therefore unable to accept this unsubstantiated finding upon which so much of the District Court's opinion depends.

In its advertisements soliciting memberships, the YMCA indiscriminately blends the activities of both buildings. Thus, in the same circular, men are invited to participate in such "adult special interest courses" as skin and scuba diving, judo, chess, bridge and fine arts. The first two, of course, are conducted in the athletic building while the latter three take place in the Community Building.4 Similarly, women are invited to enroll in "scuba diving, bridge and dancing classes." No distinction is made in this offer to the public between the several enumerated activities, whether held in one building or the other. The same brochure, in that part which is aimed at attracting young boys, speak of "special religious and social programs," the former presumably to be held in the Community Building's chapel and the latter in the social areas of either the Community Building or the Athletic Building. Obviously, and most importantly, the activities in both buildings are inextricably intertwined5 in the successful promotion of the YMCA's avowed objective, "the building of Christian character in our community's youth." (Emphasis added.) Providing decent rooming and wholesome food is neither more nor less essential in achieving this aim than teaching good sportsmanship and athletic proficiency. Like the buildings in which they are housed, the various operations of the Y serve to complement each other in an effort to attain the common goal.

In light of the physical, administrative, financial and conceptual integration of all of the facilities of the Raleigh YMCA, we are constrained to hold that within the meaning and intent of the Civil Rights Act the entire operation is a single establishment. And since it is an establishment which in important part provides lodging for transient guests, it is covered by the Act and may not lawfully discriminate on racial grounds in purveying any of its facilities or accommodations.

No issue has been raised in the District Court or before us as to whether the swimming pool, gymnasium and exercise activities come under section 201(b) (3) of the Act which prohibits discrimination in "any motion picture house, theatre, concert hall, sports arena, stadium, or other place of exhibition or entertainment." (Emphasis added.) We do not adjudicate this but we note the Fifth Circuit's en banc statement in a case involving a violation of section (b) (3):

"* * * to allow an amusement park such as Fun Fair to open its doors to all and invite the patronage of the public generally and then permit it to exclude Negroes under the facts presented by this record would violate the clear purpose and intent of the quoted sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. One of the purposes of that legislation was to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness and humiliation of racial discrimination." (Emphasis added
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