Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc.
| Citation | 707 S.W.2d 371 |
| Decision Date | 25 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 67428,67428 |
| Parties | , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 10,970 Jane W. NESSELRODE, et al., Respondents, v. EXECUTIVE BEECHCRAFT, INC. and Beech Aircraft Corp., Appellants, and Judith Lynn Hultgren, Defendant Ad Litem. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Missouri |
Reed O. Gentry, Douglas N. Ghertner, Kansas City, for appellant Beech Aircraft Corp.
Robert W. Cotter, Roger W. Penner, Kansas City, for appellant Executive Beechcraft, Inc.
Glenn E. McCann, James Welsh, Theresa Shean Hall, Kansas City, James T. Wiglesworth, Gregory M. Dennis, Overland Park, Kan., William E. Simmons, Kansas City, for respondents.
This appeal by defendants Beech Aircraft Corporation (Beech) and Executive Beechcraft, Inc. (Executive) involves the law of strict tort liability. Suit was brought as a products liability action under Missouri's wrongful death statute, § 537.080(1), RSMo Supp.1981 (). Judgment was entered on the jury's verdict in favor of Jane Nesselrode, wife of decedent, George Nesselrode and his three daughters by a prior marriage. We affirm the judgment.
On July 23, 1981, George Nesselrode and two business associates boarded a chartered Beech Baron Model 58TC airplane at Kansas City, Missouri's Downtown Airport. The twin-engine airplane was owned, operated and maintained by Executive. Within three minutes after taking off, the airplane crashed, killing the pilot, Gerald Hultgren, and his three passengers.
Jane Nesselrode filed a six count wrongful death petition against Beech, Executive and the estate of Gerald Hultgren. The three adult children of Nesselrode intervened as plaintiffs and filed their petition which mirrored the petition of the widow.
Plaintiffs' petitions advanced two primary theories of liability against Beech and Executive. First, plaintiffs alleged that Beech had negligently designed and manufactured two important flight components--the right and left elevator trim tab actuators. These two parts are critical in controlling the upward and downward movement of the airplane. In addition to alleging negligent design, plaintiffs alleged that Beech's negligence included its failure to provide a warning adequate to safeguard against the possibility of the reverse installation of the right and left elevator trim tab actuators. Plaintiffs' second theory of liability was strict tort liability for defective design and failure to warn.
As to Executive, plaintiffs advanced two theories of liability--negligent installation and inspection of the right and left elevator trim tab actuators and strict tort liability for supplying the airplane in a defective and unsafe condition. Finally, the petition stated a cause of action grounded in negligence against the pilot.
At trial, plaintiffs abandoned their allegations of negligence against Beech and Executive and the jury was instructed solely on strict tort liability in connection with the liability of Beech and Executive. It should also be noted that the trial court, with the approval of all of the parties, submitted the case under our comparative fault doctrine. However, the propriety of such an application of our comparative fault doctrine is not an issue raised by either party on this appeal and therefore is not a question for resolution in this case.
The jury returned a verdict of $1,500,000.00 for plaintiffs against Executive and Beech. The pilot, Gerald Hultgren, was assessed 0% of fault, and accordingly, he did not appeal the judgment to the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District. Beech and Executive, however, both sought review before the court of appeals. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in not sustaining Beech's motion for a directed verdict and subsequent motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. As to Executive, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial solely on the question of damages.
We granted transfer because of the general interest and importance of the issues raised and now decide the case as if upon original appeal. Mo. Const. art. V, § 10.
Beech's chief contention is that plaintiffs' evidence, as a matter of law, was fatally deficient and plaintiffs failed to make a submissible case under either a theory of defective design or under a theory of failure to warn.
In this appeal, Executive does not question its liability but challenges the plaintiffs' presentation of damages to the jury.
Because the focal point of this case involves the threshold question of whether Beech's elevator trim tab actuators were defective because of the way they were designed, it would seem appropriate at this juncture to briefly explain the purpose and actual operation of these two important flight control components.
In a Beech Baron Model 58TC there are two parts that are known as the right and left elevators and they are considered to be the primary flight control mechanisms for the upward and downward movement of the airplane. The elevators are located at the tail section of the airplane and are rectangular flaps inserted into the horizontal stablizer--which appears as a small set of wings located near the rear end of the airplane.
If the pilot wants the airplane to climb upward he begins the process by pulling a control wheel, situated in front of him inside the cockpit, toward his chest. Moving the control wheel in this fashion signals the elevators--which look like flaps--to rise.
This action is designed to permit the elevators, on either side of the airplane, to use the flow of the air to push down the tail of the plane--thereby pitching the nose of the airplane upward and allowing the airplane to climb. This action by itself is sufficient to make the airplane climb; however, upon completion of this manuever, the pilot will begin to feel a tremendous force coming through the control wheel. Because of the strength of this force, the pilot must keep his hands on the wheel to prevent it from moving away from him.
Attached to each elevator is another flight control mechanism called a trim tab. The trim tabs also look like flaps and they are attached to the trailing edge of the elevators--appearing as if they were inserted into the elevators. The trim tabs are designed to help relieve the tremendous force created by the operation of the elevators. Thus, when the pilot wants to climb, he pulls the control wheel toward his chest, which causes the elevators to rise. To relieve the forces created by the movement of the elevators, he then "trims" the airplane by moving the trim tabs in a downward direction. In doing so, the trim tabs serve as a sort of deflective device in relationship to the forces created by the movement of the elevators. By working in such a manner, the trim tabs relieve the forces that are exerted on the control wheel and make the pilot's use of the control wheel much less of a physical burden.
The correct directional movement of the trim tabs is mechanically accomplished by way of two parts called actuators, or more precisely, elevator trim tab actuators. There are two actuators, a right one and a left one. In this case it is undisputed that the right actuator, which belongs on the right side of the airplane, was installed by Executive's mechanics on the left side of the airplane. And they installed the left actuator on the right side of the airplane, when it should have gone on the left side of the airplane.
Reversing the proper placement of the elevator trim tab actuators causes the trim tabs to move in a direction opposite from the one in which they are supposed to move--thereby preventing the proper operation of the elevators. Thus, when Gerald Hultgren, the pilot in this case, attempted to make the airplane climb, he began by signaling the elevators into operation. Next, he signaled the trim tabs to move downward, to assist in the climb and to relieve the forces he felt on the control wheel. But, because the right and left actuators had been reversely installed, the trim tabs not only failed to make the correct directional movements but actually forced the nose of the airplane downward, making it virtually uncontrollable. 1
In June of 1981, a month before the fatal airplane crash, Executive performed a required 100 hour periodic inspection on this particular airplane, and during the course of the inspection discovered that the airplane's original actuators needed to be replaced. 2 Executive ordered new actuators from Beech. Approximately six days before the fatal crash, Executive's mechanics installed the new actuators, but in doing so, they installed the right actuator on the left side and the left actuator on the right side.
The crux of the plaintiffs' theory of defective design focuses on the fact that the right and left actuators, as designed by Beech, are visually identical but functionally distinct, and as such, they are capable of being interchanged--i.e., reversed--during installation. Relying on these facts, plaintiffs contend that the actuators, as designed, were sold in a defective and unsafe condition. In connection with their failure to warn theory of liability, plaintiffs argue essentially that the very nature of the design of the actuators created the need for a warning--and the absence of a warning detailing the possibility of reverse installation and its consequences also caused the actuators to be sold in a "defective condition".
This Court first adopted strict tort liability in Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Company, 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo.1969). In Keener, which was a case involving a defect in the manufacturing process rather than a problem associated with the way the product was originally designed, we set forth our basic reasons for adopting strict tort liability, 3 and we also delineated the initial contours of the doctrine. Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Company, 445 S.W.2d at 364-65. In the course of doing so, we acknowledged...
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